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Preface
This book is dedicated to the study of case – an inflectional category system for
marking the relations between events and the roles of their participants. How-
ever, I have to confess that it wasn’t exactly love at first sight between case mark-
ing andme. Or second. I can still recite the complete Latin case paradigmwithout
batting an eyelash because me and my fellow pupils were drilled to do just that:
-us -a -um -i -ae -a. Later, at the age of sixteen, I had an unpleasant encounter
with what Mark Twain described as “that awful German language”. One time you
had to say den and the other dem without any obvious reason. When I asked the
teacher about it, I was literally told to just learn the dialogues in the book by rote
and trust him that I was saying the right thing. In the meantime, English and
French were stealing my heart because they opened new worlds to me without
making a fuss about what seemed to be tiny little details at the time.
And yet, here I am presenting a book about the origins and evolution of case
systems. You may interpret this as an unhealthy tendency towards masochism,
but I am in fact making amends for my early prejudices against case. While work-
ing on my doctoral research, it dawned on me that case systems are very elegant
solutions to a very complex communicative problem. Case markers turn out to
be grammar’s Swiss army knife: they can be used for expressing event structure,
spatial and temporal relations, gender and number distinctions, and many other
subtle grammatically relevant meanings. I marveled at this unexpected display
of functionality and I got intrigued by the rise and fall of case paradigms.
The research in this book therefore tries to be a new step in unravelling the se-
crets of case systems by modeling how such systems may emerge as the result of
the processes whereby language users continuously (re)shape their language in
locally situated communicative interactions. Since these processes are virtually
impossible to grasp in natural languages, this book offers additional evidence
through agent-based models in which a population of embodied artificial agents
self-organize a case-like grammar with similar properties as found in case lan-
guages such as German, Latin and Turkish.
More specifically, two innovative experiments are reported. The first experi-
ment offers the first multi-agent simulations ever that involve polysemous lin-
Contents
guistic categories. Here, the agents are capable of inventing grammatical mark-
ers for indicating event structure relations, and of generalizing those markers
to semantic roles by performing analogical reasoning over events. Extension by
analogy occurs as a side-effect of the need to optimize communicative success. In
the second experiment, agents are capable of combining case markers into larger
argument structure constructions through pattern formation. The results show
that languages become unsystematic if the linguistic inventory is unstructured
and contains multiple levels of organization. This book demonstrates that this
problem of systematicity can be solved through multilevel alignment. All the ex-
periments are implemented in Fluid Construction Grammar (FCG), and use the
first computational formalization of argument structure in a construction-based
approach that works for both production and parsing.
Even though the experiments involve the formation of artificial languages, the
results are highly relevant for natural language research as well. This book there-
fore engages in an interdisciplinary dialogue with linguistics and contributes to
some currently ongoing debates such as the formalization of argument structure
in construction grammar, the organization of the linguistic inventory, the status
of semantic maps and thematic hierarchies and the mechanisms for explaining
grammaticalization.
x
1 Case and artificial language evolution
1.1 Introduction
The more than 6.000 languages in the world each have their unique way of of-
fering their speakers an astonishing range of expressivity. We can just as easily
engage in hair-splitting philosophical debates as we can start gossiping about
as soon as somebody leaves the room. At the heart of the grammar that allows
us to communicate all these complex meanings lies the way in which relations
between words are organized. If you want to hear about juicy facts such as who
kissed whom, grammar can help you finding out using various strategies such
as word order, verbal agreement and case marking.
Among all the possible strategies employed by language users, only few have
seduced linguists so skillfully as grammatical case has done. Ever since Pāṇini(4th
Century BC), case has claimed a central role in linguistic theory and continues to
do so today. However, despite centuries worth of research, case has yet to reveal
its most important secrets, as can be gleaned from the many recent monographs
(Blake 1994; Butt 2006), collections (Kulikov, Malchukov & de Swart 2006; Barð-
dal & Chelliah 2009; Malchukov & Spencer 2009) and projects (“Case and the-
matic relations”, Davidse (1996); PIONEER, Amberber & de Hoop (2005); “Indo-
European Case and Argument Structure in a Typological Perspective”, Barðdal
(2009)). Among the many open questions, the following two are explored in this
book:
1. Why do some languages evolve a case system?
2. How can a population self-organize a case system?
Both challenges have proven to be problematic and even controversial in the
literature on case. The first question is answered differently by each linguistic
theory – if answered at all. The second one has largely been out of reach of lin-
guists due to insufficient historical data, which makes that changes in a language
can often only be detected once that change has already propagated and become
acceptable in a population (Croft 1991: 34–35).
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This book proposes that case categories are culturally constructed (as opposed
to being innate), and that a case system may emerge spontaneously as language
users try to optimize their communicative success in locally situated interactions
while at the same time minimizing the cognitive resources required to do so.
The validity of this hypothesis is demonstrated through agent-based modeling
– a research methodology that is well-established in fields such as biology and
economics, but which is still relatively unknown in linguistics. One reason is that
experiments in artificial language evolution have so far mainly focused on simple
one-to-one mappings between meaning and form, whereas all natural language
systems are highly complex and ambiguous phenomena. As the experiments
in this book will show, however, it is perfectly feasible to tackle such intricate
phenomena as well if we use more sophisticated tools for handling linguistic
representations and processing.
1.2 Case and the grammar square
1.2.1 Overview
Before delving into methodological issues, however, let us first look at the em-
pirical domain that needs to be modeled in order to have a clear appreciation of
the complexity of case systems and the problem of “argument realization” (i.e.
the relation between event structure and its morphosyntactic realization in lan-
guage).
1.2.2 The functions of case systems
Most case systems are used as a device for marking what the role of a participant









‘Mehmet gave the apples to the man.’ (Blake 1994: 1, example 1)
The case markers make it clear to the hearer that Mehmet was the giver of the
apples, not the recipient. Marking the roles of participants in an event has some
serious advantages: it allows the hearer to interpret the utterance correctly with-
out actually observing the scene (i.e. “displacement” becomes possible) because it
rules out ambiguities, and it reduces the semantic complexity of parsing because
the hearer does not have to infer who was the giver and who was the receiver
2
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from other contextual cues. So one of the basic functions of case marking is to
indicate event structure.
Secondly, case markers are also used for packaging information structure. In
example 1.2.2, the suffix -ı not only marks the accusative case, but it also indicates
that the apples are “specific” (as opposed to undetermined). Many languages also
exploit case markers for marking the topic and focus of an utterance, for marking
new vs. given information, and so on.
Finally, case marking can be used for indicating various other grammatical















This book focuses on the first function of case systems: indicating event struc-
ture. More specifically, it reports on experiments in artificial language evolution
that show how a primitive case system may emerge in a multi-agent population.
In order for the experiments to have any scientific value, they must be compat-
ible with what is known about the evolution of real-life case systems, which I
will summarize in the following sections.
1.2.3 Stage I: no marking
Many languages do not have a case system at all, but rather employ a differ-
ent strategy such as word order (e.g. English). There are even languages that
hardly use any marking whatsoever for indicating “who did what to whom” to
the hearer. For instance, the language Lisu generally does not mark event struc-



















‘Tigers bite dogs.’ / ‘Dogs bite tigers.’
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event-specific
participant role
(move - mover - 
moved)
Figure 1.1: In the first stage, the experiments start with a lexicon but without any
grammar. The lexicon may contain words such as move, whose event
structure may include participant roles such as “mover” (i.e. the one
who did the moving) and “moved” (i.e. the thing that is being moved).
However, the language has no means of marking those participant
roles explicitly, hence the hearer has to infer the intended interpreta-
tion from the context.
In both sentences, there is only a topic marker (“known topic” versus “new
topic”), but the correct reading depends on the context in which the sentence was
uttered. Another example is Riau Indonesian (Gil 2008), which only marks event
structure in extremely rare cases. While such examples seem odd for speakers of
most other languages, Palmer (1994: 23) notes that even English does not always
mark event structure. For example, the famous phrase the shooting of the hunters
does not indicate whether the hunters did the shooting or whether they got shot
themselves.
The experiments in this book therefore start from the point where a popula-
tion of language users have already evolved a lexicon, but no grammar yet (see
Figure 1.1). This point of departure is not only justified by the empirical obser-
vation that new case markers evolve from existing lexical items (see further be-
low), but also by the fact that experiments on artificial language evolution have
already shown how vocabularies may emerge in a population of grounded em-
bodied agents (e.g. Steels 1996b,a; 1997c). In this way we can better isolate the
features that are hypothesized to be formed in the experiments. Of course, once
the dynamics of these experiments are better understood, a series of integrated
experiments must be carried out to confirm the results.
1.2.4 Stage II: specific marking
Attested examples of the emergence of modern case markers show that they are
recruited from existing lexical items and that they start out in very restricted use
scenarios. Blake (1994: chapter 6) gives examples of how verbs, nouns and even
adverbial particles can develop into case markers. Blake writes that a predicate
like COME is a two-place predicate implying a “comer” and a “destination”. A
predicate like LEAVEmirrors this implication by having a “leaver” and a “source”.
A predicate like FLY, however, only implies a “flier”. If speakers then wish to
4
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produce utterances such as he flew to/from Bangkok, pairs of predicates can be






















‘He will fly from Bangkok.’
(Blake 1994: 163–164)
Such languages are known as “serial verb language languages”. The second
verb is (usually) non-finite and cannot be marked for tense, aspect or mood in-
dependently of the first verb, and it takes no expressed subject or it implies the
same subject as that of the first verb. Blake writes that functionally speaking,
these second verbs are equivalent to prepositions. Serial verb language construc-
tions are in fact very frequent and their development into adpositions and case
markers has been widely attested, especially in the languages of West Africa,
New Guinea, Southeast Asia and Oceania (ibid., at 163; also see Givón (1997),
section 7, for more on serial verb language constructions and similar examples).
The recruitment and evolution of a lexical item into an adposition and eventu-
ally a case marker is a long and complex process. For reasons that I will explain
later on in this book, this crucial step in grammaticalization is “scaffolded” in
the experiments. Rather than reusing an existing lexical item in a more gram-
matical way, the artificial agents will be capable of inventing a new form which
already acts as some kind of adposition or verb-specific case marker, as shown
in Figure 1.2. The experiments thus simplify stage II in order to focus first on
the function of such markers and how they can be propagated in a speech com-
munity. It is needless to say, however, that this part of the grammaticalization
event-specific
participant role




Figure 1.2: In the second stage, a specific marker arises in order to solve a commu-
nicative problem. In natural languages, this marker is often a lexical
item which is recruited for a new use. In the experiments, this stage
involves the invention of a new marker.
5
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chain remains on the research agenda for future experiments and first steps to-
wards grammaticalization of existing lexical elements have already been taken
by Wellens, Loetzsch & Steels (2008).
1.2.5 Stage III: semantic roles
When verb-specific case markers propagate successfully in a speech community,
they often extend their coverage to other verbs as well. To come back to example
5, this would mean that maa ‘come’ evolves from the marker of the destination
of a flight to a general allative case role (i.e. the destination of motion events).
Extension of the use of a marker would in this case be semantically motivated
and can occur by analogical reasoning over events. This is also the strategy that
is employed in the experiments.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the new mapping between meaning and form when case
markers become generalized semantic markers. Instead of directly mapping a
particular participant role (e.g. the “mover”) onto a case marker, a semantic role
(such as Agent) mediates between this mapping.
Since case markers in natural languages usually carry more than one function,
it is hard to say what the semantic roles are that underlie a syntactic pattern. We
can however look at “agnating structures” (Gleason 1965). Agnation illustrates a
structural relationship between two grammatical constructions which have the
same (major) lexical items, but different syntactic structures. If the alternation
between these two structures is recurrent for groups of constructions, then this
can be seen as a pattern in the language. An example of agnating structures is
the alternation between the English ditransitive (as in I gave him a book) and its
prepositional counterpart (as in I gave the book to him).
Differences in the semantic categorization of verbs can come to surface if small
but regular variations show up between these agnating structures. Compare the
groups of agnating structures in the following examples:
(6) I gave him a book. I gave the book to him.
I sent him a letter. I sent the letter to him.
(7) I baked him a cake. I baked a cake for you.
I bought him a present. I bought a present for him.
Both groups of verbs can occur in the ditransitive construction, but they select
a different preposition in the agnating prepositional construction. The choice for
either to or for is semantically motivated: the verbs listed in example 6 entail an
actual transfer of the direct object (= recipient), whereas the verbs in (7) indicate
6
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event-specific
participant role










Figure 1.3: Specific markers may get extended through analogy in stage III. They
now start to act as semantic roles.
that there is an intended transfer (= beneficiary). This is confirmed in the fact that
sentences such as ?I gave him a book, but he refused it feel awkward, whereas
sentences such as I baked him a cake, but he refused it are perfectly acceptable.
So it seems that both groups of verbs belong to different subclasses.
The extension of specific markers to semantic roles is useful for communica-
tion in several ways. First of all, semantic roles increase the potential for gener-
alization in a language: by extending the functionality of a semantic role, there
is a higher chance that it will be reused for categorizing new and similar partici-
pant roles as well. Instead of having to negotiate a different marker for each new
instance, speakers of a language can thus make a semantically motivated inno-
vation which increases the chance that the hearer will understand the speaker’s
intention. Second, and related to the first point, semantic roles increase the ex-
pressiveness of a language because they allow speakers to profile different as-
pects of the same event. For example, semantic roles can focus on the relation
between an agent and a patient as in he broke the window, but also profile exclu-
sively the resulting state of one of the participants as in the window was broken.
Finally, semantic roles can significantly reduce the inventory size by grouping
together larger classes of verbs.
The model proposed in this book predicts that the conventionalization of a
mapping between verb-specific arguments and semantic roles (even though se-
mantically motivated) is neither a determined nor a straightforward one. The
choice depends on the conventions that are already present in the language, on a
speaker’s previous experience, frequency, etc. Moreover, the model predicts that
there will be several varieties in the population which compete with each other
7
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for becoming the dominant semantic role of a particular argument. Thus we can
expect that languages come up with very divergent classifications. For example,











Linking similar events can also be reversed from language to language. For ex-
ample, when French speakers want to say I miss you, they literally say something








So semantic roles seem to be language-specific, which fits our assumption that
they have to be constructed and learned. But once they become part of a language,
are they an affair of ‘take it or leave it’, or is it possible that the same verb-specific
participant role can be mapped onto multiple semantic roles? The answer seems
to be that this mapping too is indirect and dependent on the context. For example,
the ‘sneezer’ in he sneezes seems to be a patient, whereas it is (also) a causer in
he sneezed the napkin off the table. All the above observations are reflected in
Figure 1.3 and more evidence is provided in the next chapter.
1.2.6 Stage IV: syntactic roles
Languages typically have thousands of verbs and semantic roles. However, case
languages tend to have streamlined case systems with only a dozen cases or less.
As Croft (1991) states
surface case marking imposes structure on thematic relations to an even
more abstract degree than verb roots impose structure on the human expe-
rience of events. (Croft 1991: 158–159)
We know that a case marker has evolved into a syntacticmarker once it can be
dissociated from a particular semantic role (Givón 1997: 2–3). For instance, the
German nominative case can be used for covering virtually all semantic roles of
the language.
8
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participant role















Figure 1.4: In the next step, even more abstractions occur through syntactic roles.
The mapping between semantic roles and grammatical cases is hy-
pothesized to be handled by argument structure constructions which
can combine several semantic roles into a larger pattern.
Figure 1.4 shows an updatedmapping between event structuremeaning and its
surface form, which is nowmediated by an abstract and hidden layer of semantic
and syntactic categories. I will from now on refer to this picture as the grammar
square. Each mapping in the square can vary according to the communicative
and linguistic circumstances, so the relation between a participant role and its
morphosyntactic realization is multilayered and indirect.
The picture presented here however has the danger that case markers are con-
sidered in isolation, whereas they can only be understood in relation to the other
parts of the pattern in which they occur. Indeed, the mapping of semantic roles
onto syntactic roles (and vice versa) is hypothesized to be taken care of by ar-
gument structure constructions (Goldberg 1995). These constructions may be
schematic, verb-class-specific or even verb-specific. I will come back to this point
in the next Chapters that introduce the formalization of such constructions.
1.2.7 Further developments
Stages I–IV described the possible evolutionary pathway of a case marker which
resulted in an inflectional category that groups together various semantically re-
lated roles. This is also the endpoint of the experiments described in this book
because they focus only on case marking as a way to express event structure
in a grammatical way. There are, however, other functions which may be per-
formed by case markers such as packaging information structure, marking per-
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spectivization and other grammatical distinctions such as gender and number (as
argued in §1.2.2). Especially information structure seems to be the most impor-
tant pressure for case markers to extend their coverage and become even more
dissociated from their previous meaning.
Finally, case markers eventually decline and even whole grammatical systems
of case may get lost and replaced by other grammatical devices. This is appar-
ent in the (almost) complete loss of case marking in languages such as English,
French and Dutch, which replaced it with word order constraints. Individual case
markers may disappear because they are “merged” with another case such as the
merger of the instrumental and locative case in Middle Indo-Aryan (Blake 1994:
176). Whereas merger seems to be relatively common in the life cycle of case sys-
tems, case split is quite rare. Merger of case markers means that the case system
is reduced unless new members are recruited. With the loss of cases and further
developments in the grammaticalization of case markers, the different cases of a
language may become insufficiently differentiated from each other. This allows
other strategies, such as word order complemented with prepositions in English,
to become more popular and eventually the new conventions of a language. The
decline of entrenched and conventionalized grammatical units falls beyond the
scope of this book.
1.3 Modeling language evolution
1.3.1 Overview
The experiments reported in this book are models of artificial language evolu-
tion, in which computational and mathematical models and robotic experiments
are used for evolving (new) artificial languages that have similar properties as
found in natural languages. As such, the methodology provides possible and
operational explanations for those properties. Experiments typically involve a
population of artificial language users (henceforth called agents) that engage with
each other in communicative interactions.
1.3.2 Three models of artificial language evolution
There is a wide consensus in the field that language has evolved because there
is a selectionist system underlying it. Despite this consensus, there is disagree-
ment on how linguistic variation and hence the potential for change is caused,
and which selectionist pressures are operating to retain a particular variation
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Figure 1.5: Iterated learning models assume that languages evolve because chil-
dren are faced with a learning bottleneck when observing and recon-
structing the language of the previous generation.
in a language. There are basically three different perspectives based on genetic
evolution, cultural transmission, and problem-solving respectively.
Models of genetic evolution (e.g. Briscoe 2000; Nowak, Komarova & Niyogi
2001) investigate the biological evolution of the language faculty (i.e. our abil-
ity to acquire and use language). These models put the selectionist pressure at
the level of fitness (i.e. the ability to survive and reproduce), which is assumed
to be directly related to communicative success. Agents are endowed with an
artificial genome that determines their communicative behavior. Depending on
how much of language is assumed to be innate, the genome may include which
concepts can be employed by the agents for structuring their world, which types
of categories are to be used, and so on. Potential innovation takes place when
this genome is transmitted from parents to children. Because genome copying
involves crossover and possibly mutation, variation is inevitable, and some of it
will lead to higher or lower success.
Iterated Learning Models (ILM, Brighton, Kirby & Smith 2005; Kirby 2001;
Kirby & Hurford 2002; Kirby, Smith & Brighton 2004; Smith, Kirby & Brighton
2003) investigate what happens when language is culturally transmitted from
one generation to the next without any interference from functional pressures,
as illustrated in Figure 1.5. Each cycle, an adult generation (typically represented
by a single agent) produces speech output based on its internal grammar, which
is observed by a new generation (also typically a single agent) for reconstructing
the language. The model assumes that there is a learning bottleneck (i.e. the
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child cannot observe all utterances in the language), hence the learner agent
may overgeneralize the input based on innate learning biases. When the adult
agent “dies” and is replaced by the child, the mistakes in learning become the
new convention and the language changes. The ILM shows strong affinity for
child-based theories of language change as found in generative linguistics (King
1969).
The third class ofmodels views the task of building and negotiating a communi-
cation system as a kind of problem-solving process. Agents try to achieve a com-
municative goal with maximal success and minimal effort. This problem-solving
process is definitely not a rational but an intuitive one that is seldom accessible to
conscious inspection. It is not an individualistic problem-solving process either,
but a collective one, in which different individuals participate as peers. Accord-
ing to this view a communication system is built up in a step by step fashion
driven by needs and failures in communication, and it employs a large battery
of strategies and cognitive mechanisms which are not specific to language but
appear in many other kinds of cognitive tasks, such as tool design or navigation.
Recent experiments by Galantucci (2005) on the emergence of communication in
human subjects provide good illustrations of these problem-solving processes in
action. Variation and innovation in problem-solvingmodels are common because
each individual not only tries to converge to the shared communication system,
but can also contribute innovations to it. In fact the main challenge is rather
to explain how agreement between individuals and thus a globally shared pop-
ulation language can ever arise. This approach to language evolution is closely
related to cognitive-functional theories of language and utterance-based models
of linguistic change (Croft 2000; 2004).
The three models are of course not mutually exclusive: it is clear that the mod-
els of cultural evolution expect a rich cognitive-linguistic system, which can only
be explained through the genetic endowment of the agents. Similarly, problem-
solving models can be modeled using a generation turnover as well (Vogt 2007).
However, one particular advantage of the problem-solving approach is that it
attempts to explain as many linguistic phenomena as possible in terms of func-
tional and communicative pressures. This means that innate mechanisms are
only used as a last resort, which arguably avoids putting all the explanatory bur-
den on the shoulders of biology. This book therefore subscribes to the problem-
solving approach.
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1.3.3 The do’s and don’ts of artificial language evolution
The question of the origins and evolution of language is notoriously difficult be-
cause there are no fossil traces or written accounts left of the first languages, and
there are no data available about the biological changes that enabled language.
These facts have led Christiansen & Kirby (2003) to pose the provocative ques-
tion: is language evolution the hardest problem in science?
Without attempting to answer that question, it actually is possible to come
up with solid theories despite the lack of real-life data: in various other disci-
plines, such as the origins of the universe, significant advances are made using
mathematical models and computational simulations. Another example is Arti-
ficial Life where computational models, robotic experiments and biochemistry
are used as techniques to develop artificial phenomena that may help to explain
processes of evolution in natural phenomena.
(i) Creating natural language-like phenomena. Let me start by debunking a
myth about modeling language evolution that seems to be lingering in the minds
of some people: computational simulations and robotic experiments can never
lead to the emergence of an actual natural language like English or Russian. There
are just too many factors that have shaped these languages and modeling them
would require to model the entire state of every speaker and every interaction
ever. The “languages” that emerge in this kind of experiments should thus not
be directly linked to natural languages: they are novel artificial constructs and
hence the methodology only offers a “proof of concept” of what results can
be achieved within the specific set-up of a given experiment. However, these
constructs may be natural language-like and thus offer a possible and working
hypothesis for how similar phenomena could have come about in natural lan-
guages.
Secondly, even in abstraction, we cannot model every aspect of language at
once, just as it is impossible to perform controlled psycholinguistic experiments
that take every detail about language processing into account. The key is there-
fore to pick a phenomenon observed in natural languages and try to isolate this
feature into a controlled simulation or experiment. Focusing on smaller problems
is standard practice in many scientific disciplines. As Stephen Hawkin writes in
his A Brief History of Time:
It turns out to be very difficult to devise a theory of the universe all in one
go. Instead, we break the problem up into bits and invent a number of par-
tial theories. Each of these partial theories describes and predicts a certain
limited class of observations, neglecting the effects of other quantities, or
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representing them by simple sets of numbers. It may be that this approach
is completely wrong. If everything in the universe depends on everything
else in a fundamental way, it might be impossible to get close to a full so-
lution by investigating parts of the problem in isolation. Nevertheless, it is
certainly the way we have made progress in the past.
Hawkin (1988: 12)
In problem-solvingmodels of artificial language evolution, the researcher there-
fore first chooses a topic of interest that is common to most if not all languages,
such as tense, aspect and mood. Investigating such a feature involves the follow-
ing steps (Steels 2006):
1. The researcher selects a feature of language to investigate;
2. The researcher hypothesizes which set of cognitive mechanisms and exter-
nal pressures are necessary for the emergence of this feature:
a) These cognitive mechanisms are operationalized in the form of com-
putational processes, and a population of simulated or embodied agents
is endowed with these mechanisms;
b) The external pressures are operationalized in the form of an interac-
tion pattern embedded in a simulated or real world environment;
3. Systematic computer simulations are performed demonstrating the impact
of the proposed mechanisms. If possible, results should be compared be-
tween simulations with a proposed mechanism and simulations without
this mechanism in order to show that it is not only a sufficient but also a
necessary prerequisite for the emergent feature.
Even if the simulations show that the investigated feature only emerges if cer-
tain mechanisms are included, this still does not prove anything about similar
features in natural languages because different evolutionary pathways are possi-
ble. However, the simulations then at least show one possibility and may provide
an additional piece of the puzzle next to evidence from linguistics, archeology,
biology and other fields.
(ii) Clarifying the scaffolds and assumptions. Computational simulations and
robotic experiments are at the same time blessed and cursed with the fact that
every detail of the hypothesis has to be spelled out completely, otherwise the sys-
tem does not work. “Blessed” because this may reveal effects of the hypothesis
that were overlooked or not expected by the verbal theory; “cursed” because
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there is a danger of “kludging” something together to get the system off the
ground. There is often a fine border between significant results and quirks re-
sulting from a kludge, so it is crucial that it is crystal clear which features of the
model are supposed to be “emergent” on the one hand, and which features are
“assumed” or “scaffolded” on the other.
Assumptions and scaffolds are unavoidable in computational simulations be-
cause it is simply impossible to explain everything at once. Drawing the line be-
tween what is “assumed” and what is “scaffolded” is not always an easy decision.
I define “assumed features” as those aspects of the simulations that we cannot
explain using the methodology described here. One example is the assumption
that agents are social and cooperative beings that want to reach communicative
success. Another example is the capacity for building composite structures. I
define “scaffolded features” as those aspects of the simulations that in principle
could be evolved using the methodology but are given so that not every simu-
lation or experiment has to start from scratch. An example of a scaffold is the
space of possible phonemes: in none of the experiments in this book, agents had
to learn the distinctive sounds of their language. These “scaffolded” features may
be brought in at a later stage or form the subject of other experiments, such as
work on the emergence of vowel systems (de Boer 2000; Oudeyer 2005).
(iii) Global versus local measures. Another important dichotomy is that of
global versus local measures. In experiments that study language from a usage-
based point-of-view, only local measures which can be observed by the agents
themselves within the local interaction may have an influence on the linguistic
behaviour of the agents. Typical local measures are:
• Success of the language game: the agents that are involved in a language
game can experience whether the game was a success or not. This may
influence the confidence with which they employ certain linguistic items;
• Search and difficulty: An agent can “measure” for example the ambiguity of
an utterance because it causes an elaborate search space during processing;
• Cognitive effort: Agents can “measure” the cognitive effort needed during
parsing and production, such as howmuch processing time they need, how
many times they need to add information from their worldmodel to the lin-
guistic data, how many times they need to perform additional operations
such as egocentric perspective reversal, etc.
Globalmeasures, then, aremeasureswhich are used by the experimenter solely
for analyzing the simulations. These measures should by no means have an in-
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fluence on the linguistic behaviour of the agents. For example, if an agent should
decide between two competing forms for a meaning, it has to make the appropri-
ate choice based on its individual past experiences and on the local information
in the language game. A global measure such as how many agents share one of
the competitors would require an overview of the complete population, which no
speaker ever has. Convergence has to come about in a distributed, self-organized
fashion without external guidance or central control.
1.4 A brief history of prior work
1.4.1 Overview
This book is part of more than a decade worth of research on language as a com-
plex adaptive system. The research itself is rooted in prior work in Artificial Intel-
ligence and robotics in the mid-eighties, which involved home-made robots of all
shapes and sizes – driving around on wheels, flying with balloons and propellers,
or waggling their tails in the rough waters of the Brussels’ university swimming
pool. These creations were the result of a break with mainstream research in
Artificial Intelligence: whereas most work in AI tried to formalize human intelli-
gence, Luc Steels and his students at the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (VUB,
Brussels) investigated how “intelligence” might evolve in a community of phys-
ical agents as they autonomously interact with each other, their environment,
and humans. They thus developed a bottom-up, behaviour-oriented approach to
sensori-motor intelligence, which was at the same time also being explored by
Rodney Brooks at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab (Steels & Brooks 1995).
Even though fascinating results were obtained, something was missing that
could ever lead the experiments to other, more human-like intelligent behaviour
than was displayed by the robots. The research then shifted its focus from beha-
viour-based robotics to embodied language in the autumn of 1995 when Steels
had the following two ideas: first of all, language may have been the missing
link in the initial experiments. Language may be a necessary step that enables
the human cognitive system to bootstrap itself in tight interaction with the world
and in a population of social cooperative agents (Steels 2003a). Second, the same
principles andmechanisms that had since 1985 proven to be relevant for the work
in robotics also had to be relevant for bootstrapping intelligence and language.
These principles included self-organization, structural coupling, level formation
and other (mainly biologically inspired) mechanisms (Steels 1998b). In this sec-
tion I will give an overview of the research efforts at the AI Lab in Brussels and
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SONY Computer Science Laboratory Paris (which adopted the work on language
as one of its founding research topics in 1996).
1.4.2 The emergence of adaptive lexicons
The first breakthrough experiment investigated how self-organization could ex-
plain the emergence of coordinated vocabularies (Steels 1997c). Self-organi-zation
is a phenomenon in which coupled dynamical systems form a structure of in-
creased complexity without guidance by an outside source or some central con-
troller. Standard examples of self-organization are the formations of termite
nests or paths in an ant society. The process has been used successfully for de-
scribing phenomena in various scientific disciplines: physics (e.g. crystalization),
chemistry (e.g. molecular self-assembly), economy (catallaxy), etc. Language is
also an example of a complex system that is shared by a speech community with-
out central control (although some “watchdogs” such as the Académie française
do their utter best to have people speak according to their set of standards).
In the experiments reported by Steels (1997c), agents engage in communicative
interactions about a set of predefined meanings. If the speaker has no word for
a meaning, he will invent a new one which may be adopted by the hearer. The
agents assign a success score to the form-meaning mappings based on success in
the interaction. After some rounds of negotiation, a shared set of form-meaning
mappings emerges without the need for central control. Similar experiments
using neural networks were reported by Batali (1998).
The notion of a language game was first introduced by Steels (1996; also see
Steels 2001 for an introduction). Language games are routinized local interactions
or scripts. An example of a language game in natural languages is a speaker who
asks Can you pass me the salt, please?. The language game is a success if the
hearer passes the salt or even if he responds that he refuses to do so (but at least
he understood the message). The game is a failure if the hearer passes the pepper
instead of the salt or if he just shrugs her shoulders. The speaker can then point
to the salt, which gives the hearer some additional clues as to what hemeant with
salt. An iteration of language games is called a dialogue, but this more complex
interaction pattern has not been studied anymore since Steels (1996a).
In these first experiments, the meaning space of the agents was predefined.
However, since no concepts or categories are assumed to be innate in this line
of work, several experiments have been conducted investigating how agents can
create their own concepts and meanings. The first breakthrough was reported
in Steels (1996c), in which agents created perceptual categories through discrim-
ination games. In a discrimination game, an agent tries to discriminate a certain
object from the other objects in the context by creating or using a set of one or
more distinctive features for that object. In the next breakthrough experiment,
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discrimination games and language games were coupled to each other so that
agents did not only self-organize a lexicon, but also used the lexicon for sharing
concepts or perceptual distinctions (Steels 1997a,d; 1998a; 1999a,b). In a next step,
it was shown how these ideas can be grounded in actual robotic agents (Steels
2001b; 2002a; Steels & Vogt 1997; Vogt 2000). The structural coupling of con-
cepts and lexicons has also been successfully applied to the domains of colour
(Belpaeme 2002; Belpaeme & Bleys 2005; Steels & Belpaeme 2005) and space
(Loetzsch et al. 2008b; Steels & Loetzsch 2008).
The research on lexicon emergence steadily grew and touched upon topics
such as how lexicons can continue to change and evolve because of language con-
tact and population dynamics (Steels 1997b; Steels & McIntyre 1999) and stochas-
ticity in cultural transmission (Kaplan, McIntyre & Steels 1998; Steels & Kaplan
1998a,b). The experimenters also developed the notion of a semiotic landscape,
a powerful framework to study the semiotic dynamics involved in the language
games (Steels & Kaplan 1999a,b). The research culminated in the Talking Heads
experiment which involved thousands of agents travelling over the internet in
order to play language games with each other (Steels 1999c; 2000b; 2001a; Steels
& Kaplan 1999a,b; 2002; Steels et al. 2002).
The research on lexicon emergence is still being pursued today. For exam-
ple, the Naming Game, which first appeared in Steels (1997c), has recently been
implemented in humanoid robots that autonomously have to recognize objects
as individuals and then agree on names for them. The Naming Game has also
been picked up by scientists from statistical physics and complex systems who
search for scaling laws and who investigate the long-term behaviour of the sys-
tem using mathematical models (Baronchelli et al. 2006; De Vylder 2007). Other
recent work using computational modeling investigates howwordmeanings can
be more flexible and how the emergence of lexicons can scale up to much larger
worlds (Wellens, Loetzsch & Steels 2008).
1.4.3 Towards grammar
Even though the first decade has been largely spent on investigating the proper-
ties of emergent adaptive lexicons, the emergence of grammar has always been
on the research agenda with first attempts as early as 1997 (Steels 1997e). The re-
search strategy involves moving all the insights gained from the experiments on
lexical languages to the domain of grammar and identify which additional mech-
anisms and ideas are needed for the emergence of languages featuring grammat-
ical properties (Steels 2005a).
The first steps towards grammar involved a pregrammatical stage of multiple
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word utterances, which was first investigated by Steels (1996b). In this experi-
ment, multiple word utterances emerge naturally as the set of distinctive features
for talking about objects expands and the agents have to adapt to cope with it.
Van Looveren (2005) then showed how a multiword naming game can yield a
more efficient communication system because a smaller lexicon could be used
for naming objects. However, none of these experiments involved any grammar.
At the end of the nineties, a significant breakthrough was achieved which re-
sulted in the general roadmap for investigating the emergence of grammar that
is still being followed today (Steels (1999c): 44–47; Steels (2000a)). Whereas lexi-
cal languages are perfectly suited for language games involving only one object,
grammar becomes useful when agents have the possibility of communicating
about multiple objects because the search space becomes exponentially larger.
Grammar thus emerges not in order to reduce inventory size or to become more
learnable (as is proposed by genetic and Iterated Learning Models), but rather
to reduce the complexity of semantic parsing for the hearer (this idea has been
formalized and operationalized by Steels 2005b). Luc Steels then worked on sys-
tems for studying the emergence of compositional meanings (see §1.4.4) and for
the emergence of grammar to take care of these compositional meanings.
Van Looveren (2005) applied these ideas to his experiments on multiple word
games and lifted the agents’ assumption that multiple words always refer to the
same object. For example, the utterance yellow ball might refer to one object (a
yellow ball) or at least two objects (some yellow thing and a ball). When faced
with this referential uncertainty, the agents can exploit a simple syntax for indi-
cating to the hearer whichwords refer to the same object. Referential uncertainty
has also been investigated from the viewpoint of pattern formation (as another
pregrammatical stage, Steels, van Trijp & Wellens 2007) and as a trigger for in-
troducing additional syntax (Steels & Wellens 2006).
Another key issue in the emergence of grammar is the question of how agents
can autonomously detect when additional constraints or grammarmight become
useful in order to improve their communicative success. The answer is “re-entran-
ce” (Steels 2003b), a strategywhichwas already present in the experiments on the
emergence of lexicons but which had to be developed further to fit into a gram-
matical framework. Re-entrance can be seen as some kind of self-monitoring
in which the speaker first simulates the effect of his utterance on the hearer by
taking himself as a model. If he detects problems such as ambiguity or an explo-
sion of the search space during parsing, he will adapt his linguistic behaviour
by adding more constraints or choosing a different verbalization. Similarly, the
hearer can perform re-entrance for learning novelties in the speaker’s utterance.
19
1 Case and artificial language evolution
A similar mechanism called “the obverter strategy” can be found in other ne-
gotiation-based models as well (Smith 2003a). Another way to increase the au-
tonomy of the agents is to offer them strategies for self-assessing what kind of
communicative goals they can attain given their present linguistic experience
(called the “autotelic principle”, Steels 2004b,c; Steels & Wellens 2007).
Most of the above ideas were put to practice in 2001 in the first “case experi-
ment”, which I will describe in Chapter 3 and of which some results were pub-
lished in Steels (2004a) and to a lesser extent in Steels (2003b; 2007). Luc Steels
implemented a unification-based grammar formalism to support the experiment,
which ultimately led to the first design of Fluid Construction Grammar (FCG,
also see Chapter 2). FCG is under constant development to meet the demands
and requirements of new experiments such as the following:
• A bidirectional and uniformway of language processing (Steels &De Beule
2006). This feature is needed for allowing agents to act both as a speaker
and as a hearer; and for allowing the agents to perform re-entrance;
• A way to deal with compositional semantics and to link meanings to each
other (Steels, De Beule & Neubauer 2005).
The name “Fluid Construction Grammar” comes from the fact that FCG has
many features in common with (vanilla) construction grammar (Croft 2005) and
that it aims at investigating the “fluidity” of language emergence (i.e. various
degrees of entrenchment of linguistic units). A software implementation of FCG,
incorporated in a more general cognitive architecture called “Babel2”, has been
made freely available at www.emergent-languages.org.
Fluid Construction Grammar has already been used for investigating the emer-
gence of compositionality (De Beule & Bergen 2006), recursion and hierarchy
(Bleys 2008; De Beule 2007; 2008), structures for expressing second-order mean-
ings (Steels & Bleys 2005) and semantic roles (Steels 2004a; van Trijp 2008c).
1.4.4 Other research avenues
The above account of the history of the research on language as a complex adap-
tive system did not refer to the experiments on the emergence of vowel systems
and phonology (de Boer 2000; Oudeyer 2005). I also left out the work performed
on event recognition, but I will come back to this in Chapter 3. Another area that
I left largely uncovered is the research into conceptualization and the emergence
of complex meanings.
Together with the key insights on the triggers and functions of grammar at
the end of the ninetees, Steels developed a constraint-based system for studying
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the emergence of compositional meaning (Steels 2000a) which uses constraint
propagation both for conceptualization and interpretation. In the system, a set
of constraints can be composed into some kind of semantic program that the
speaker wants the hearer to perform. For example, if the speaker wants to draw
the hearer’s attention to a particular ball in the context, he has to conceptualize a
network of meanings or constraints that will help the hearer to correctly identify
this ball. For example, the utterance the red ball indicates to the hearer that he
has to (a) filter the objects in the context and retain those that match with the pro-
totype [BALL], (b) filter this set of balls and retain the red ones, and (c) pick out
the one remaining object (its uniqueness was indicated by the determiner the in
combination with the singular form ball). The system allows for the composition
of second-order semantics (e.g. the bigger ball) and context-sensitive meanings
(e.g. a “small” elephant is still bigger than a “big” mouse).
Even though at that time therewas already an operational system, the research
on compositional meanings was put on a hold to first develop a grammar for-
malism that could support it. With the recent advances in Fluid Construction
Grammar, the research got picked up again and first experiments have already
been reported that couple meanings produced by the system to FCG and vice
versa (Bleys 2008; Steels & Bleys 2005). The system has also been completely




2 Processing case and argument
structure
2.1 Introduction
The mathematical properties of case and argument structure have been exten-
sively studied in the tradition of formal grammars such as Combinatorial Catego-
rial Grammar (CCG; Steedman 2000), Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG; Bres-
nan 1982) and Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG; Pollard & Sag
1994). The focus of those studies has been the development of competence models
(i.e. knowledge representations), thereby treating linguistic processing as a prob-
lem that can be dealt with separately. However, if our artificial agents have to
use their linguistic knowledge in communicative interactions, we need a strong
integration of both processing and competence.
One family of linguistic theories that is particularly interesting for achieving
such an integration is construction grammar, because it is explicitly concerned
with how meanings can be mapped onto forms and vice versa. Unfortunately,
computational construction grammars are scarcely out of the egg: the formaliza-
tions of Construction Grammar (CxG; Kay & Fillmore 1999) and Sign-Based Con-
structionGrammar (SBCG; Boas & Sag 2013) have not actually been implemented
(yet), and Embodied Construction Grammar (ECG, Bergen & Chang 2005) only
has a parsing model but cannot handle production.
In order to conduct the experiments presented in this book, I therefore im-
plemented a bidirectional processing model for argument structure and case in
Fluid Construction Grammar (FCG). To the best of my knowledge, this implemen-
tation is the first (and currently the only) constructional account of argument
structure that handles both parsing and production. This Chapter discusses the
operationalization in more detail, which is necessary for appreciating the struc-
tures that the artificial agents evolve in the experiments. I will discuss the opera-
tionalization’s relevance for linguistic theory in more detail in Chapter 5, where I
compare my solution to a recent proposal on argument realization in Sign-Based
Construction Grammar.
2 Processing case and argument structure
2.2 Representing and linking meanings
The operationalization follows a proposal by Steels (2005; also see De Beule
(2007); Steels, De Beule & Neubauer (2005); Steels & Wellens (2006)) and uses
a logic-based representation for meaning. For example, the utterance box and
ball may be represented as follows:
(1) box(?obj-x) ∧ ball(?obj-y)
As is standard practice in first order predicate calculus, variables (i.e. all sym-
bols that start with a questionmark) are used for referring to objects. The variable
‘?obj-x’ thus has to be bound to the object [BOX] and the variable ‘?obj-y’ has to
be bound to the object [BALL]. Suppose that we want to say that the box is big
and that the ball is blue, then the meaning may be represented as:
(2) big(?obj-x) ∧ box(?obj-x) ∧ blue(?obj-y) ∧ ball(?obj-y)
Note that ‘big’ and ‘box’ share the same variable ‘?obj-x’ because they both
refer to the same object; and that ‘blue’ and ‘ball’ also share the same variable
‘?obj-y’ because they both refer to [BALL]. The speaker may then express this
meaning as (the) big box and (the) blue ball. Now imagine that the hearer is a non-
native-speaker of English who has learned several words, but hasn’t acquired the
grammar yet. In other words, he does not know that English uses word order
in an Adjective-Noun Construction to indicate which adjective modifies which
noun. If he just uses his limited linguistic knowledge of English, he would come
up with the following parsed meaning:
(3) big(?obj-w) ∧ box(?obj-x) ∧ blue(?obj-y) ∧ ball(?obj-z)
In this parsed meaning, there are neither shared variables between big and
box, nor between blue and ball because lexical meanings do not specify which
words go together. So there may be several hypotheses possible: each word may
refer to a different object (i.e. in some languages adjectives can be used as heads
of a phrase as well as nouns), blue may refer to [BALL] but also to [BOX] (as
it is possible to put adjectives in French both before and after a noun as in un
grand ballon bleu ‘a big blue ball’, lit. ‘a big ball blue’), etc. So the hearer has to
witness the scene if he wants to disambiguate the possible interpretations of the
speaker’s utterance, which may even not be possible if there are other big and
blue objects available.
One of the primary functions of grammar is therefore marking which mean-
ings should be linked to each other. In the present formalization, this means that
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the grammar has to take care of variable equalities. Variables are said to be equal
if they refer to the same object. In the meaning in example 3, there is an equality
between ‘?obj-w’ and ‘?obj-x’ because they both refer to [BOX], and there is an
equality between ‘?obj-y’ and ‘?obj-z’ because they both refer to [BALL]. These
variable equalities can be resolved by the English Adjective-Noun Construction,
which leads to the meaning of example 2.
This book is concernedwith how case systems indicate who’s doing what in an
event. This can be easily operationalized using the same formalization of linking
meanings through variable equalities. I will illustrate this for examples 4 and 5,
which are two different argument realization patterns of the verb sweep.
(4) He sweeps the floor.
(5) He sweeps the dust off the floor.
If we consider sweep to be a verb of surface contact and motion (such as wipe,
rub, and scrub; see Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1999)), then sweep can take at least
three participant roles: a sweeper, something being swept, and the source from
where the motion starts. One could imagine other roles as well, such as the in-
strument used for sweeping (a broom or a hand) or the destination of the motion,
but they are not necessary for this discussion. In a logic-based representation, the
meaning of sweep can be represented as follows:
(6) sweep(?event-x) ∧ sweep-1(?event-x, ?object-a) ∧ sweep-2(?event-x,
?object-b) ∧ sweep-3(?event-x, ?object-c)
Note that the meaning does not only contain a logic predicate for the event,
but also explicit predicates for the participant roles themselves. Instead of using
the labels sweeper, swept and source, the more neutral labels sweep-1, sweep-2
and sweep-3 are used. These are in fact arbitrary labels which can be mapped by
robotic or software agents onto their sensory experiences. The meanings of the




These meanings are introduced by the lexical entry of each word, but it is not
yet specified how the meanings should be linked to each other. This is again
taken care of by the grammar through variable equalities, which is illustrated
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Figure 2.1: One of the primary functions of grammar is to indicate how different
meanings should be linked to each other. In the present formalization,
this is represented through variable equalities: the variables ‘?object-
u’ and ‘?object-a’ should be made equal because they both refer to
[JACK]; and the variables ‘?object-v’ and ‘?object-b’ should be made
equal because they both refer to [FLOOR].
in Figure 2.1. Here, the variables ?object-u and ?object-a should be made equal
because they both refer to [JACK]. The equality between ?object-v and ?object-
b should also be identified because they both refer to [FLOOR]. After making
the coreferring variables equal, the hearer can parse the following meanings for
examples 4 and 5:
(10) ∃ ?object-a, ?object-b, ?object-c, ?event-x: jack(?object-a) ∧
floor(?object-b) ∧ sweep(?event-x) ∧ sweep-1(?event-x , ?object-a) ∧
sweep-2(?event-x, ?object-b) ∧ sweep-3(?event-x, ?object-c)
(11) ∃ ?object-a, ?object-b, ?object-c, ?event-x: jack(?object-a) ∧ dust(?object-b)
∧ floor(?object-c) ∧ sweep(?event-x) ∧ sweep-1(?event-x, ?object-a) ∧
sweep-2(?event-x, ?object-b) ∧ sweep-3(?event-x, ?object-c)
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Figure 2.2: During processing, the language user builds up a reaction network by
trying out constructions. The pathway with the highest confidence
scores is selected for producing or parsing an utterance.
2.3 A brief introduction to Fluid Construction Grammar
2.3.1 Overview
As already mentioned before, Fluid Construction Grammar is a computational
grammar formalism for bidirectional language processing, learning and evolu-
tion. During linguistic processing, the FCG-system is either provided with a
meaning that needs to be verbalized (production) or an utterance that needs to
be analyzed into a meaning (parsing). The FCG-system then builds up a ‘reaction
network’ (or search tree; see Figure 2.2) in which each node represents a stage
in the build-up of the semantic and syntactic structure of an utterance.
Traveling from one node to the next can be achieved by applying a construc-
tion (i.e. a conventionalized mapping between meaning and form). Since there
may be several hypotheses given a certain context, each link between the nodes
has a ‘confidence score’ to guide the search. This score is based on (a) the (lin-
guistic) context in which constructions can be applied, and (b) how successful
the applied constructions have been in previous communicative situations. The
system will in the end choose the chain with the highest estimated success.
FCG uses many well-known techniques from computational linguistics such
as term unification and feature structures to represent linguistic knowledge. In
fact, all linguistic knowledge (including constructions) is represented as coupled
feature structures, which couple a semantic pole to a syntactic pole. All feature
structures are organized in units which are used by the basic operators of FCG
27
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for retrieving and adding new feature-value pairs. Thus, all linguistic knowledge


























Direction marker (here: bidirectional)
Syntactic pole
2.3.2 Unify and Merge
The two basic operations performed in FCG are called ‘unify’ and ‘merge’ (Steels
& De Beule 2006: not to be confused with ‘merge’ in Minimalism). These opera-
tors decide whether or not a construction can be applied in order to obtain a new
node in the reaction network. ‘Unify’ means that – depending on the direction
of processing – the feature structure of one of the poles of a construction acts
as a set of constraints that have to be compatible with the corresponding pole of
the current node in the reaction network. If all the constraints are satisfied, the
other pole is ‘merged’ with the corresponding pole in the current node (unless
merging fails because of conflicts in both poles). The combination of the unify
and merge operations leads to a new coupled feature structure, which is the next
node in the reaction network (see Figure 2.3).
Constructions can be applied bidirectionally using the same operations, so
parsing and production use the same linguistic knowledge but in opposite direc-
tions. Achieving both production and parsing is a non-trivial problem, and some
formalisms therefore focus exclusively on either production or parsing (e.g. Em-
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Figure 2.3: During production, the feature structures (squares) in the left pole of
a construction (bottom left in top figure) are unified with those of the
current coupled feature structure (top left in top figure). If unification
is successful, the right pole is merged with the coupled feature struc-
ture. This yields a new coupled feature structure, which is a new node
in the reaction network (right). During parsing, the same operation
is performed but this time the right pole of the construction is unified
and the left one is merged with the current node.
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bodied Construction Grammar). FCG makes no claim that all linguistic knowl-
edge is bidirectional, but uses bidirectional application of constructions for cou-
pling input to output so that agents equipped with FCG can act both as speakers
and as hearers.
When in production mode, the FCG-system unifies the left pole of a construc-
tion (typically the semantic pole) with that of the current node; and if successful
it merges the right pole (typically the syntactic pole) with that of the current
node. During parsing, exactly the same linguistic items are used, but this time
in the opposite direction: here, the right pole has to unify with the correspond-
ing pole in the current node after which the left pole can be merged with its
corresponding pole in the current node.
2.3.3 Structure building.
FCG has a special operator – called the ‘J-operator’ – for specifying hierarchical
relations between units. Roughly speaking, all units markedwith a J-operator are
ignored during the unification phase, but are added or merged during the merge
operation. I will limit my discussion here to the functions of the J-operator that
are relevant for the constructions in this chapter. For a more technical specifi-
cation, see De Beule (2007: chapter 4) and De Beule & Steels (2005). The basic
syntax of the J-operator is shown in example 12.
(12) a.




In this syntax, the variable ‘?unit’ has to be bound to some unit in the coupled
feature structure. If the unification phase did not yield a binding for this variable
yet, a new unit will be built. This unit is then made a sub-unit of the unit that
matches with the second argument of the J-operator. In this example this is
the unit that is bound to the variable ‘?parent’. The J-operator can also take an
optional third argument, which is a list of the units which have to be made sub-
units of the unit that is bound to the first argument of the J-operator (?unit). Next,
additional feature-value pairs can be listed which are merged to the structure by
the J-operator. I will illustrate the J-operator through an example. Suppose that
we only have the top-unit on one of the poles in the coupled feature structure
and that there is a construction containing the following J-unit:
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(13)
((J ?new-unit ?top-unit))
Since there is no unit yet which could have been bound to the variable ?new-
unit during the unification phase, a new unit is created. This unit is then made
a sub-unit of the unit that is bound to the second argument of the J-operator so
that we get the following structure:
(14) Top-unit
New-unit
Suppose now that another construction applies which contains the following
J-unit:
(15)
((J ?another-new-unit ?top-unit (?new-unit)))
Let’s assume that the variable ?top-unit was bound by the unifier to ‘top-unit’
and that the variable ‘?new-unit’ was already bound to ‘new-unit’ (which de-
pends on the unification of the units that were not marked by the J-operator).
The variable ‘?another-new-unit’ does not have a binding yet so a new unit is
built, which is made a sub-unit of ‘top-unit’. This time there is also a third argu-
ment of the J-operator. All the units in this list are made sub-units of the newly




Another use of the J-operator that is adopted in this thesis is the possibility of
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If the second argument of the J-operator is an empty list (NIL), no structure
building operation needs to be performed. In this case, the J-operator will only
try to merge the feature-value pairs that are specified with the structure of the
unit which is bound to the first argument of the J-operator (?unit). This function-
ality is needed because it allows the merging of new feature-value pairs on the
same pole after successful unification rather than only merging the other pole of
the construction to the coupled feature structure. In other words, it allows a con-
struction to add both semantic and syntactic feature-value pairs to the coupled
feature structure.
It should be noted that the above tree-like representation of hierarchical struc-
ture is only a visualization. The units of a construction or coupled feature struc-
ture are only elements of a flat list and are themselves not hierarchically orga-
nized. Instead, hierarchical relations in the linguistic structure are explicitly rep-
resented as feature-value pairs using the feature ‘sem-subunits’ on the semantic
pole and the feature ‘syn-subunits’ on the syntactic pole.
2.4 Parsing ‘Jack sweep dust off-floor’
2.4.1 Overview
With the meaning representation and FCG overview in mind, we can now dive
into more details of the operationalization. This section illustrates parsing using
the sentence Jack sweep dust off- floor is parsed, which is a simplification of the
sentence Jack sweeps the dust off the floor. Obviously, this section does not pro-
vide a description of an actual English utterance, but only highlights the problem
of argument realization while ignoring issues such as agreement, determination,
and so on.
At the beginning of the parsing process, the FCG-system creates a first node in
a reaction network, which is a coupled feature structure with an empty semantic
and syntactic pole. I assume here that the utterance is segmented into the sepa-
rate strings “jack”, “sweep”, “dust”, “off-” and “floor”. These strings are all lumped
together along with the observed word order (i.e. the ‘meets’-constraints) into
the form-feature of one unit on the syntactic pole, which I will call the top-unit.
The label ‘top-unit’ is arbitrary but makes interpretation easier for human read-










((string jack-unit ”jack”) (string sweep-unit ”sweep”)
(string dust-unit ”dust”) (string off-unit ”off-”)
(string floor-unit ”floor”) (meets jack-unit sweep-unit)
(meets sweep-unit dust-unit) (meets dust-unit off-unit)
(meets off-unit floor-unit)))))>
2.4.2 Unifying and merging lexical entries
In the next step, the FCG-system performs a lexical look-up for all the words in
the utterance. For this, we need a lexical entries (also called lexical constructions).










(form (== (string ?new-unit ”jack”))))
((J ?new-unit ?top-unit)
(syn-cat (== (pos noun\is{noun})))))>}}
Note that the lexical entry for jack contains variables not only for the mean-
ing but also for the unit-names. The unification engine of FCG can use these
variables to match them against the unit-structure of the current node in the re-
action network. Since we’re in parsing mode, the right pole of the entry (under
the directional marker <==>) needs to be unified with the right-pole of node-1.
The right pole specifies that there has to be some unit (?top-unit) which must
contain the feature form, which itself must contain in its value the feature-value
(string ?new-unit ”jack”). These constraints are indeed satisfied: the variable
?top-unit can be bound to the unit top-unit in the current node because it ful-
fills all the necessary conditions.
Since unification is successful, the left pole, which contains the meaning of the
lexical entry, can bemergedwith the left pole of node-1. The units that aremarked
with the J-operator were ignored during the unification phase, but are now in-
tegrated: the J-operator pulls the lexical information for jack down into a new
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unit and specifies that this new-unit is a sub-unit of the top-unit. The J-operator
also merges additional features with this new unit concerning its referent and
its semantic and syntactic categorization. One could devise many other catego-
rizations and features for jack, but they are not necessary for understanding the
example here so they are left out for convenience’s sake.
Since both unification and merge were successful, a new node is created in the
reaction network. Here we see that the other words are still in the top-unit, but
that there is a new unit for jack (which I conveniently label ‘jack-unit’ here but













((string sweep-unit ”sweep”) (string dust-unit ”dust”)
(string off-unit ”off-”) (string floor-unit ”floor”)
(meets jack-unit sweep-unit) (meets sweep-unit dust-unit)
(meets dust-unit off-unit) (meets off-unit floor-unit))))
(jack-unit
(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”)))
(syn-cat ((pos noun\is{noun})))))>
The lexical entries for dust and floor look almost exactly the same, apart from
their semantic categorization and meaning. Both entries also unify and merge










(form (== (string ?new-unit ”dust”))))
((J ?new-unit ?top-unit)
(syn-cat (== (pos noun\is{noun})))))>
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<Lexical entry: floor
((?top-unit






(form (== (string ?new-unit ”floor”))))
((J ?new-unit ?top-unit)
(syn-cat (== (pos noun\is{noun})))))>}}\\
The lexical entry for sweep, however, is a bit more complicated. Its main func-
tion is the same as for the other lexical entries: given the string “sweep”, it will
merge the meaning of this word with the semantic pole of the current node in the
reaction network. The main difference with the other words lies in the semantic
and syntactic categorization of sweep. Take a look at the features ‘syn-frame’ in















(form (== (string ?new-unit ”sweep”))))
((J ?new-unit ?top-unit)
(syn-cat (== (pos verb\is{verb})))
(syn-frame (== (syn-role-subject ?unit-1)
(syn-role-object ?unit-2)
(syn-role-oblique ?unit-3)))))>}
At first glance, it seems that the lexical entry contains a predicate or case frame
that lists the valence of a verb as in traditional lexicalist approaches. The big dif-
ference with most other approaches is however that these frames do not directly
list the argument structure of the verb but only its potential valents. For exam-
ple, the syn-frame only states that sweep can occur in an argument structure in
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Figure 2.4: The relation between the meaning of an event and its morphosyn-
tactic realization is indirect and multilayered. This figure shows how
a lexical entry introduces its ‘potential valents’ from which the con-
struction selects the actual valency combination. The construction
then maps this meaning onto a syntactic pattern, which in itself is re-
alized as a certain form (depending on linguistic and extra-linguistic
context)
which there may be some unit playing the role of subject, some unit playing the
role of object, some unit playing the role of oblique, or several units playing a
combination of these roles. None of these roles are however obligatory: the verb
remains agnostic as to which of these valents actually should be realized or what
the possible combinations may be. I will show later that it is the construction
that will select from the potential valents what the actual valency of the verb is
or will be in the utterance (also see Figure 2.4).
This architecture of potential valents is mirrored in the semantic frame. Here
too, the verb only lists all its potential valents: there may be an agent role, a
surface role, a moveable role, or a source role. The sem-frame does not specify
which of these roles actually have to be realized, nor what the possible combi-
nations are. It does specify, however, how these potential valences should be
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linked to the verb-specific participant roles in the meaning feature. For example,
‘sem-role-agent’ is linked to ‘sweep-1’ because they share the variable ‘?obj-x’.
‘Sem-role-source’ is linked to ‘sweep-3’ because they share the variable ‘?obj-z’.
The participant role ‘sweep-2’ is even linked to two different potential valents:
‘sem-role-surface’ and ‘sem-role-moveable’. The lexical entry thus allows partic-
ipant roles to be mapped onto different semantic roles.
Both the sem- and syn-frame also contain variables that have to be bound to
the unit-names of the arguments to which the roles may be assigned later on.
For example, the variable ‘?unit-1’ should be bound to the unit that plays the role
of subject (if present). Notice, however, that this variable is not the same one as
the variable name of the unit that may play the agent role (if present): ‘?unit-a’.
In most other grammar formalisms, such as HPSG, a direct link between ‘agent’
and ‘subject’ is assumed and alternating argument structures such as passives
are derived through lexical rules. I do not assume such a link between subject
and agent: having two different variable names reflects the fact that both can
be bound to different units as is the case in the passive voice. I therefore con-
sider the passive as an alternative argument structure construction instead of a
derivational one. An active construction links agent and subject to each other
by making their variables equal, whereas the passive construction features a dif-
ferent pattern by making other variables equal (e.g. those of the subject and the
surface role as in The floor was swept). Here again, it is the construction that
decides and not the verb. I will return to this matter in Chapter 5.
The next two Chapters will demonstrate how these potential valents can be
gradually acquired and constructed through language use. They should there-
fore not be seen as a rigid set of possibilities or as some set of innate categories.
Instead the potential uses of a verb can be extended (and shrunk) if needed for
communicative purposes, and each possibility may become conventionalized or
become obsolete in the speech community.
Unifying and merging the lexical entries for sweep, floor and dust (the ordering






























(syn-subunits (jack-unit sweep-unit dust-unit floor-unit))
(form
((string off-unit ”off-”) (meets jack-unit sweep-unit)
(meets sweep-unit dust-unit) (meets dust-unit off-unit)
(meets off-unit floor-unit))))
(jack-unit
(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”)))
(syn-cat ((pos noun\is{noun}))))
(sweep-unit






(form ((string dust-unit ”dust”)))
(syn-cat ((pos noun\is{noun}))))
(floor-unit
(form ((string floor-unit ”floor”)))
(syn-cat ((pos noun\is{noun})))))>}}
Themeanings in the above coupled feature structure are however still unlinked
(see §2.2). In other words, the hearer knows at this stage the meaning of the in-
dividual words, but not who is doing what in the sweep-event: the variables that
accompany the meaning of sweep (‘?obj-x’, ‘?obj-y’ and ‘?obj-z’) are not shared by
any of the arguments (‘?object-1’, ‘?object-2’ and ‘?object-3’). We therefore need
to unify and merge the correct construction that is able to handle the unresolved
variable equalities.
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2.4.3 A syntactic case marker
Before that construction is applied, there is still the string “off-” in the top-unit
that needs to be parsed. In this example I analyze off- as some kind of simple case
marker that assigns the oblique case to the argument that immediately follows
it. By treating off- as a case marker I can immediately illustrate how markers are
represented in the experiments as well.
In line with its definition in §1.2.6, a syntactic case marker is dissociated from a
particular semantic role. I therefore implement case markers in a morphological
rule or construction (a “morph-rule”) in which both the left and the right pole
are syntactic (so both poles operate on the syntactic pole of the current node in
the reaction network). One could say in this approach that a case marker has
a syntactic or grammatical meaning rather than a semantic one. The notion of
potential valents can also be applied to capture the polysemous nature of case
markers, but for simplicity’s sake I will assume here that there is a one-to-one
mapping between the syntactic role ‘oblique’ and the marker off-.
The morph-rule specifies that, during parsing, there needs to be a unit which
contains in its form-feature the string “off-” and a word order constraint that says
that the marker immediately precedes (“meets”) some other unit. If this unifies
(and it does with the right pole of node-5), the left pole merges with the syntactic
pole of the current node in the reaction network. The information added here is
that the role of oblique is assigned to the other unit (which immediately followed
the marker). Note that this other unit should already be present in the current
node as a sub-unit of the top-unit. This is indeed the case: the variable ‘?some-
unit’ can be bound to ‘floor-unit’ which was already present after unifying and
merging the lexical entry of floor.
The morph-rule also contains a two-legged operation using the J-operator: in
a first step, a new unit is created for off-, and in a second step the J-operator
specifies that the newly-made unit must become a sub-unit of the other unit
that immediately followed it (floor-unit). Without repeating the entire coupled
feature structure, the syntactic structure now looks as in Figure 2.5.
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top-unit
jack-unit sweep-unit dust-unit floor-unit
off-unit
Figure 2.5: Syntactic structure.
(form (== (string ?marker-unit ”off-”)
(meets ?marker-unit ?some-unit))))
((J ?marker-unit ?top-unit))
((J ?some-unit ?top-unit (?marker-unit))))>}}
2.4.4 The caused motion construction
The utterance Jack sweeps the dust off the floor is a typical example of the caused
motion construction (Goldberg 1995: chapter 7), which here carries the meaning
of ‘X causes Y to move Z by sweeping’. In the semantic pole, the construction
selects from the verb the semantic roles of agent, moveable patient and source.
On the syntactic pole it assigns the syntactic roles of subject, object and oblique




(sem-subunits (== ?unit-a ?unit-b ?unit-c ?unit-d)))
(?unit-a













(syn-subunits (== ?unit-a ?unit-b ?unit-c ?unit-d))
(form ((meets ?unit-b ?unit-a) (meets ?unit-a ?unit-c)
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(meets ?unit-c ?unit-d))))
(?unit-a
(syn-cat (== (pos verb\is{verb})))









Since the hearer is parsing, the right pole needs to be unified with the current
node in the reaction network. The right pole here demands there to be some
unit with at least four sub-units and with a certain word order among them (i.e.
the “meets”-constraints). The last argument also has to have the syntactic role
of oblique. The right pole of the current node satisfies all the constraints: jack-
unit receives subject status and dust-unit becomes the object. The unit for floor
was already marked as oblique by the morphological rule that was shown in the
previous section.
Thanks to the word-order constraints, the construction can unambiguously
bind the variables ‘?unit-b’ to ‘jack-unit’, ‘?unit-c’ to ‘dust-unit’ and ‘?unit-d’ to
‘floor-unit’. The construction then links the syntactic roles to the semantic roles
by making the necessary variables equal: the subject jack-unit is assigned the
role of agent, the object dust-unit is assigned the role of moveable (object) and the
oblique floor-unit is assigned the role of source. By doing so, the construction can
also link the meanings to each other: sem-role-agent shares the variable ‘?obj-x’
with sweep-1 and the referent of jack-unit, sem-role-moveable shares the variable
‘?obj-y’ with sweep-2 and the referent of dust-unit, and sem-role-source shares
the variable ‘?obj-z’ with sweep-3 and the referent of floor-unit. This leads to the

































(syn-subunits (jack-unit sweep-unit dust-unit floor-unit))























(form ((string off-unit ”off-”)
(meets off-unit floor-unit)))))>}}
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Now we can extract the following meaning from the semantic pole of the cou-
pled feature structure:
(27) ∃ ?obj-x, ?obj-y, ?obj-z, ?event-x: jack(?obj-x) ∧ dust(?obj-y) ∧
floor(?obj-z) ∧ sweep(?event-x) ∧ sweep-1(?event-x , ?obj-x) ∧
sweep-2(?event-x, ?obj-y) ∧ sweep-3(?event-x, ?obj-z)
As can be seen in themeaning, all variables that refer to the same referent have
been made equal by the construction. The hearer thus knows that jack was the
sweeper, that dustwas the thing being swept, and that the floorwas the source of
the motion. In the experiments reported in this book, the agents will then match
this parsed meaning against their world model.
2.5 Producing ‘jack sweep floor’
2.5.1 Overview
This section gives an overview of how an utterance such as jack sweep floor can
be produced in Fluid Construction Grammar. In this case, the caused motion con-
struction is not used, but a construction which maps the semantic frame ‘X acts
on surface Y’ onto the syntactic frame ‘Subject-Verb-Object’. The speaker starts
with the following meaning (in which NIL stands for ‘empty’ or ‘not profiled’):
(28) ((jack object-1) (floor object-2) (sweep event-1)
(sweep-1 event-1 object-1) (sweep-2 event-1 object-2)
(sweep-3 event-1 NIL))
In order to verbalize this meaning, the speaker constructs a reaction network.
The first node in the network is a coupled feature structure in which the entire
meaning is placed into one unit in the semantic pole, and in which the syntactic




(meaning ((jack object-1) (floor object-2)
(sweep event-1) (sweep-1 event-1 object-1)
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2.5.2 Unifying and merging lexical entries
Next, the speaker builds new nodes in the network by unifying and merging the
lexical entries that cover these meanings. Suppose that the speaker has the same
lexical entries as given in the previous section and that all three of them (jack,

























(syn-subunits (jack-unit sweep-unit floor-unit)))
(jack-unit
(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”)))
(syn-cat ((pos noun\is{noun}))))
(sweep-unit






(form ((string floor-unit ”floor”)))
(syn-cat ((pos noun\is{noun})))))>}}
Since the speaker knows which meaning he wants to express, there are no
unresolved variable equalities in the meanings in the semantic pole. However,
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so far no semantic or syntactic roles have been assigned yet: the lexical entry
of sweep has merely introduced its potential valents, but not its actual valency.
This is reflected by the fact that the arguments do not have the feature ‘sem-role’
or ‘syn-role’ yet and that there are still variables left for the unit-names in both
the syn- and sem-frame. It is also still undecided which participant should be
mapped onto subject and which onto object or oblique.
2.5.3 The agent-acts-on-surface construction
Trying to unify the caused motion construction leads to a failure: first of all,
floor is categorized as a static surface-object and thus violates the construction’s
constraint that the patient has to be moveable, and second, the source argument
is missing. So a different construction needs to be unified and merged to travel to
the next node in the network. The following ‘agent-acts-on-surface’ construction




(sem-subunits (== ?unit-a ?unit-b ?unit-c)))
(?unit-a










(syn-subunits (== ?unit-a ?unit-b ?unit-c ?unit-d))
(form ((meets ?unit-b ?unit-a) (meets ?unit-a ?unit-c))))
(?unit-a
(syn-cat (== (pos verb\is{verb})))






First the speaker tries to unify the semantic pole with that of the current node
in the reaction network. This is a success because all the constraints are satisfied:
the construction expects some unit with three sub-units, one of which is an an-
imate-object and one of which is a surface-object. The construction also selects
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the semantic roles of ‘agent’ and ‘surface’ from the verb’s potential valents and
assigns them to the correct arguments. Next, the right pole of the construction
is merged with the right pole of the current node. Since it is specified that the
agent maps onto subject and the surface maps onto object in this construction,
the correct syntactic roles are assigned to the arguments, including their word


























(syn-subunits (jack-unit sweep-unit floor-unit))
(form ((meets jack-unit sweep-unit)
(meets sweep-unit floor-unit))))
(jack-unit










(form ((string floor-unit ”floor”)))
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(syn-role syn-role-object)
(syn-cat ((pos noun\is{noun})))))>}}
The speaker has no other constructions or linguistic items that could unify and
merge, so he is almost done processing. In the final phase, he takes all the formal
constraints specified in the syntactic pole of the last node and renders them into
the utterance jack sweep floor.
2.6 Networks and conventionalization
The previous two sections showed how lexical and constructional meanings can
integrate through the potential valents of the verb on the one hand, and the
selection of the actual valency by the constructions on the other. I also suggested
that the list of potential valents can be extended if needed for communication.
However, this solution is too powerful because it does not explain why speakers
of English prefer not to use sweep in for example the ditransitive construction
as in *he swept him the dust. We therefore need an additional strategy to restrict
the powers of the proposed representation.
Utterances such as *he swept him the dust are perfectly intelligible but some-
how speakers (usually) refrain from using words in constructions that they are
not conventionally associated with. Convention or entrenchment can intuitively
be captured in a network as illustrated in Figure 2.6. The basic idea is the follow-
ing: we never observewords in total isolation but always in language use. We can
therefore keep links between constructions that reflect their past co-occurrences.
For example, sweep has a link to the intransitive construction, the caused mo-
tion construction, etc. The link reflects conventionalization through a confidence
score: the higher this score, the more confident the speaker feels integrating the
lexical entry with the construction. The lower the score, the more “strain” there
is to go ahead and fuse the lexical entry with the construction. Scores in the net-
work can be changed each time the lexical entry and the construction co-occur:
the score increases if they are used in successful communication, but decreases
if co-occurrence leads to communicative failure. Each interaction also yields the
possibility of adding new links. I will come back to the exact nature of this net-
work in the following chapters.
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He swept the dust off the floor.
Agent-acts-on-surface construction
He swept the dust off the floor.
Ditransitive construction






Figure 2.6: Lexical entries keep a link to all the constructions that they integrated
with. Each link has a specific confidence score which reflects how
confident the language user is that the lexical entry can be fused with
the construction. The higher the score, the more conventionalized the
link is. The lower the score, the more “strain” the speaker will have
to use the entry and the construction together. This network thus




The grammatical square (see Figure 1.4) illustrates the multifunctional and indi-
rect nature of case marking. It can also be read as a “research roadmap” for ex-
periments on the emergence of a grammar for case. More specifically, the experi-
ments must investigate how a population of agents can evolve a grammar which
takes care of (1) the mapping between event-specific participant roles and gener-
alized semantic roles, (2) the mapping between semantic roles and grammatical
cases, and (3) the mapping between cases and surface case markers. Construct-
ing and aligning this kind of grammar in a multi-agent population is incredibly
difficult because all mappings are agent-internal and are thus not directly observ-
able by other agents. Moreover, these mappings vary depending on the commu-
nicative and linguistic context so the agents have to be capable of dealing with
polysemy. Finally, linguistic conventions may constantly change so the agents
have to be able to adapt to newly propagated constructions.
In this Chapter I will present three baseline experiments which first replicate
simulations reported by Steels (2002b; 2004a) and then lift them towards a multi-
agent simulation. I will specifically focus on which diagnostics, repairs and align-
ment strategies are needed for each step of increased complexity. In the next
section, I will first give an overview of the experimental set-up that is shared by
all experiments after which the simulations themselves are reported.
3.2 Experimental set-up
3.2.1 Overview
The simulations in this book investigate how a population of artificial agents can
autonomously construct a shared grammatical system for marking event struc-
ture (in the form of a case grammar). As argued in §1.3.3, we need to hypothesize
which cognitive mechanisms and external pressures are the minimal ingredients
that enable the agents to do so, and we need to operationalize them into com-
putational processes and a world environment. Since case marking is a complex
3 Baseline experiments
phenomenon, I will divide the topic into several subparts that follow the stages
of development identified in §1.2.7.
Table 3.1: This table shows the key cognitive abilities which are given to the
agents in the baseline experiments. In the first experiment, agents are
“intelligent” enough to resolve variable equalities by using their world
model but they cannot express these equalities in their language. In
experiment 2, the agents can decide to invent new markers to indicate
the linking of equal variables but they cannot generalize or abstract.
In the third experiment, the agents can perform analogical reasoning



















3.2.2 Key abilities and self-assessment criteria
In the problem-solving approach adopted in this book, innovation and language
change happens in three steps: (1) the speaker innovates and is therefore the
main cause of potential language change, (2) the hearer tries to infer and learn
the innovation through an “abductive process” (as opposed to uniquely relying
on induction or genetically evolved innate knowledge), and (3) the innovation
propagates in the population. Step (1) may be skipped when the hearer over-
generalizes or imposes more systematicity on the utterance than introduced by
the speaker. Hearer-based innovation or “reanalysis” can be described in terms
of the same cognitive processes as involved in speaker-based innovation so the
two sources of innovation are complementary to each other (Hoefler & Smith
2008). Step (3) implies that an innovation only becomes a linguistic convention
if it has been adopted by a sufficient number of language users. Propagation is
made possible through the alignment strategies of the agents.
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This approach requires a population of agents endowed with rich cognitive
capabilities. As argued in §1.3.3, agents can only make use of local measures
such as communicative success and cognitive effort for steering their linguistic
behaviour. The cognitive mechanisms of the agents therefore have to enable the
agents to move into a meta-level in which they can self-assess what problems
they encounter during communication, whether there is opportunity for opti-
mization, or what the reasons for success and failure are in a language game.
They need to be able to couple this diagnosis to repair strategies in order to
solve their communicative problems and to their alignment strategies in order
to converge on a shared language. All the experiments in this book mainly focus
on the effect of these three aspects: diagnostics, repairs, and alignment strategies.
The baseline experiments reported in this Chapter first of all replicate the
two-agent simulations reported by Steels (2002b; 2004a). These experiments
only focus on the first three stages of case marker development ranging from
no marking to the formation and marking of semantic roles. Additionally, the
experiments are pushed forward to multi-agent simulations in which language
convergence becomes the main issue. All three baseline experiments share the
same world environment, communicative task, and assumptions and scaffolds
(see below). However, they differ in the key cognitive abilities that the agents
are endowed with. I define “key cognitive abilities” as those mechanisms that are
hypothesized to be crucial for the transition in the grammar from one stage to
the next, and of which the simulations need to demonstrate or falsify whether
this is indeed the case. Table 3.1 illustrates the difference between the baseline
experiments in terms of key cognitive abilities and can be summarized as follows:
1. In baseline experiment 1 (corresponding to stage 1 – §1.2.3), agents are
given the diagnostic to figure out how the meanings of lexical items are
linked to each other by exploiting the situatedness of the interaction. How-
ever, the agents have no means of extending their language to explicitly
mark the relations between words;
2. In baseline experiment 2 (corresponding to stage 2 – §1.2.4), agents are
endowed with a repair strategy which enables them to invent a participant
role-specific case marker for optimizing communication;
3. In baseline experiment 3 (corresponding to stage 3 – §1.2.5), agents are en-
dowed with the capacity to perform analogical reasoning over event struc-
tures. They can exploit this capacity for generalizing existing markers to
cover new participant roles. As I will show later, generalization is not a
51
3 Baseline experiments
goal in itself but rather a side-effect of the need for optimizing communi-
cation.
These key cognitive abilities will be explained in more detailed along with
the experiments further down in this Chapter. The abilities are each time given
and fixed by the experimenter and the simulations do not explain where they
come from. However, the global vision underlying this work is that speakers
and hearers can autonomously configure their language capacity by recruiting
cognitive mechanisms that are also used for other tasks such as hierarchy build-
ing operators (Steels 2007). This process is driven by needs in communicative
success, expressive power and the conventions adopted by other agents in the
population. Here again, agents have to be capable of self-assessing when to re-
cruit a mechanism, which ones are the best candidates, and to self-regulate the
semantic complexity of their communication. For simulations that investigate
self-regulation and reconfiguration of the language faculty on the longer run,
see Steels &Wellens (2006; 2007). In the remainder of this section, I will describe
those aspects of the simulations which are shared by all the experiments.
3.2.3 Description games
An obvious requirement for developing a grammar formarking event structure is
communication about events. This is operationalized in the form of the descrip-
tion game, a routinized communicative interaction which involves the complete
semiotic cycle as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Applied to the simulations in this book,
the interaction pattern conforms to the following script:
1. Two agents are randomly selected from the population. One will act as
speaker, the other as hearer. The speaker and hearer start a local language
game so the other agents cannot observe it;
2. Joint attention (Tomasello 1995) between the agents is required and as-
sumed. This is operationalized by giving the agents a shared context. The
context contains one or more events (depending on the complexity of the
game) which are observed by the agents;
3. Both the speaker and the hearer build aworldmodel based on the observed
events. The world model consists of a series of facts in the memory;
4. The speaker is given a communicative goal. In this book, the goal is always
to make an assertion about a certain state of affairs in the context (i.e. the





















Figure 3.1: The semiotic cycle involved in language games. There are three sys-
tems working in tight interaction with each other: the sensory-motor
system (perception and modeling), the conceptual/intentional system
(conceptualization and interpretation), and the linguistic system (pro-
duction and parsing). This book mainly focuses on the latter one and
is complementary to other research efforts on grounded language use
and conceptualization.
Figure 3.2: The world environment consists of dynamic scenes in which puppets
perform various actions such as walking and pushing blocks to each
other. Here, one puppet “gives” a block to another puppet by sliding
it over a table. The scene contains four participants (two puppets, a
block and a table), a “ground” and various micro- and macro-events.
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5. The speaker chooses an event to describe and conceptualizes a meaning
for it. Conceptualization involves profiling of the event and finding a dis-
criminating meaning for the participants in the event (see further below);
6. The speaker then verbalizes the meaning by producing an utterance which
is transmitted to the hearer;
7. The hearer observes the utterance and parses it;
8. The hearer then interprets the parsed meaning by comparing it to the facts
in the world model. This leads to themental action of agreeing or disagree-
ing with the description;
9. The hearer signals agreement with the description if the parsed meaning
is unambiguously compatible with the hearer’s world model, or signals
disagreement if it is not. Agreement means communicative success, dis-
agreement means communicative failure. No other kinds of feedback or
requests for information are included;
10. Based on the outcome of the game, both agents consolidate their linguistic
inventories.
3.2.4 The world, sensory-motor input and conceptualization
3.2.4.1 Overview
The semiotic cycle in Figure 3.1 clearly shows that linguistic processing is only
one part of the general cognitive architecture which is involved in communica-
tion. Even though the experiments in this book mainly focus on the production
and parsing of linguistic utterances, at least two other systems are directly rele-
vant for communication: the sensory-motor system (in a broad sense responsible
for dealing with the sensory experience and for building a world model) and the
conceptual-intentional system (responsible for conceptualization and interpreta-
tion as well as concept formation). These three “systems” work together in tight
interaction and without a clear-cut division between them.
In this section, I will describe what kind of world environment is used in the
experiments, what kind of world model is built by the sensory-motor system,
and what kind of meanings are conceptualized for communication. These three




The environment in the experiments consists of dynamic real-world scenes from
a small puppet theater. The puppets perform various actions such as moving, dis-
appearing from a scene, walking towards each other, and carrying objects. The
use of real-world scenes is part of earlier work on grounded language communi-
cation (Steels 2002b; Steels & Baillie 2003) and is not essential to the dynamics
of the models reported in this book: a simulated world suffices for the scope of
this book and can in fact be used for scaling up the experiments to larger worlds.
The choice for using data from real-world scenes was made in order to demon-
strate that the models can be incorporated into research on the grounding of
communication.
For the baseline experiments, 20 different scenes were recorded comprising
207 event tokens belonging to 15 different event types. There are 103 event to-
kens which take one participant (e.g. a ‘move-event’), 99 event tokens which po-
tentially take two participants (e.g. a ‘walk-to’-event) and 5 event tokens which
potentially involve three participants (e.g. a ‘give-event’). Given the conceptual-
ization algorithm (see below), this leads to a frequency of about 64% of utterances
involving one participant, about 34% of utterances involving two participants
and only 2% of utterances involving three participants. In most experiments
each event type was given the same frequency in order to balance this skewed
frequency. As I will demonstrate later, equal frequency offers a much clearer
picture of the propagation and convergence dynamics in the experiments.
3.2.4.3 Sensory-motor input
The real-world scenes were recorded using two SONY pan-tilt cameras (EVI-D31)
which were hooked up to computers running the PERACT system (Baillie &
Ganascia 2000; Steels & Baillie 2003), which was designed for the visual recogni-
tion of events and which is related to other attempts in visual-recognition such
as Siskind (2000). Even though two cameras were used, this book uses only the
data obtained through one of them. The simulations are thus not affected by dif-
ferences in world models due to noisy recognition of the events or differences
in visual perspective. These difficulties are very interesting for investigating the
robustness of the model in grounded communication, but are not part of this
book.
Since the vision system is quite complex (but fortunately well-documented in
Baillie & Ganascia (2000)), I will restrict my discussion to its general architecture
and to the design choices that are important for understanding what information
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is delivered to the language system. The PERACT system first delineates objects
based on colour histograms and then groups the pixels belonging to the same ob-
ject together. These objects (two puppets, a table, two blocks, etc.) were learned
in advance and PERACT can handle seven of them simultaneously in one scene.
Starting from basic visual “primitives” or “micro-events” such as touching, move-
ment and appearance, the system tracks the objects in real-time and assembles
more complex descriptions (or “macro-events”) when it recognizes a pattern in
the scene. This recognition is often unreliable, but saliency, confidence and hier-
archy are used to categorize the scene in terms of micro- and macro-events. This
categorization of events is then supplied to the linguistic system.
For each agent, the filtered results of sensory processing is then represented
as a series of facts in the memory. For example, an event in which one of the





(girl jill) (jill jill) (house house-1)
(yellow house-1) (boy jack) (jack jack)
As can be seen in example 1, there are three objects in the scene (two puppets
called “Jack” and “Jill”, and a house), but only two of them are participants in the
move-inside-event (“Jill” and the house). For each object, the vision system deliv-
ers at least two facts which can be used during conceptualization for discriminat-
ing the objects from the other ones in the same scene (see below). These facts are
very simple (for example ‘house’ and ‘yellow’ for the house-object), but can be in-
terpreted in a more general sense as being the features describing an object (e.g.
in a more detailed implementation, the feature-values of a R(ed)G(reen)B(lue)-
channel could be used instead of the feature ‘yellow’).
The labels of these facts thus carry English names, but should not be inter-
preted as such. For example, ‘move-inside’ actually involves a puppet moving
behind another object. The vision system, which is based on colour recognition,
does not have any notion of a container or some kind of ‘insideness’. Instead it
sees one colour blob (the girl puppet) moving towards another one (the yellow
‘house’) until the colour regions “touch” each other after which the girl puppet
disappears out of sight. So the label ‘move-inside’ does not reflect what actually
happens in the scene (in terms of human conceptualization) but it is used for
facilitating the analysis of the event recognition by the experimenter.
From the above it should also be clear that the PERACT system describes dy-
namic scenes in different levels of complexity. For example, the move-inside-
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event is itself a macro-event which can be decomposed into sub-events (which
are macro-events themselves or micro-events, and which are also represented
as facts in the memories of the agents). The micro-events for a move-inside-
event are primitive relations such as ‘visible’, ‘distance-decreasing’, ‘movement’,
‘touching’ and ‘disappearing’. The PERACT system offers a hierarchical descrip-
tion of events including time stamps for their beginnings and ends. As I will
explain in §3.5, the simulations reported in this book disregard this temporal
and hierarchical information and treat the event structure of an event as a flat
list of micro-events. This choice was made in order to focus on the participant
roles as a whole rather than on causal-aspectual parts of the event-structure. I
will come back to this choice when discussing the experiments on Stage IV in
the development of case markers.
One final remark regarding the sensory-motor input has to do with the status
of the visual ‘primitives’. I do not make any claims about whether they are innate
or not, nor do I claim that they represent a realistic set for categorizing events
in human cognition (neither in terms of size nor in terms of quality). The idea
is rather that events can be decomposed into a much richer representation that
allows analogical reasoning and the comparison of event structures.
3.2.4.4 Conceptualization
The categorization of the scenes in terms of event types and objects (and their fea-
tures) is already taken care of by the sensory-motor system. Conceptualization
in the simulations is therefore a very basic, but nonetheless crucial operation.
First of all, during conceptualization the speaker agent decides on the event pro-
file that it wants to express. “Event profile” should be interpreted in roughly the
same way as commonly assumed in cognitive linguistics (see for instance Croft
1998). Since the agents do not take temporal-aspectual information of the events
into account, profiling events essentially consists of deciding which participants
have to be expressed explicitly. For the aforementioned move-inside-event, the
speaker can thus conceptualize three different event profiles so the agents have
to be able to deal with multiple argument realization:
• One in which only the puppet “Jill” is expressed (playing the participant
role ‘move-inside-1’);
• One in which only the object ‘house’ is expressed (playing the participant
role ‘move-inside-2’);
• One in which both participants are expressed.
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Themeaning of events is a simple copy of the facts in the memory of the agent,





For those objects that have to be expressed explicitly according to the event
profile, the agent plays a simple discrimination game (Steels 1996c; 1997a). Sup-
pose that the agents observe a scene in which there are two blocks represented
as the following facts:
(3)
(ball object-1) (blue object-1)
(ball object-2) (green object-2)
If the agent wants to talk about the blue ball, it needs a feature or a feature
set which discriminates this ball from the green one. Since both objects have
the feature ‘ball’, this cannot be used for discriminating the blue ball from the
green one. The colour-feature, however, is discriminating so the speaker would
conceptualize the following meaning for the blue ball:
(4)
(blue object-1)
If there are more than one discriminating features (e.g. the features ‘girl’ and
‘jill’ in example 1 both discriminate the puppet “Jill” from the puppet “Jack”), the
agent randomly chooses one. The objects are defined in such a way that there is
always at least one feature discriminating them from other objects in the same
scene.
Suppose that the speaker profiles the move-inside-event such that only the
house-object has to be expressed explicitly – roughly meaning something like
‘(something) moved inside the house / the yellow thing’. Conceptualization could








3.2.5 Additional assumptions and scaffolds
The agents in these simulations are endowed with strong (cognitive) capacities
that enable them to communicate linguistically with each other. Listing all as-
pects of language that are assumed, scaffolded or ignored would take too much
space, so I will restrict myself to the most important ones:
• The agents are assumed to be social and cooperative. All agents are equally
involved in the formation of their language, so the simulations ignore the
possible influence of differences in social status;
• All agents are “adult” language users. No growth of cognitive capabilities
occurs and the models do not take specific child language acquisition re-
strictions into account. All agents are endowed with the same capacities;
• The agents are assumed to be able to communicate about compositional
meanings (i.e. meanings which are related to each other in some way). In
the simulations, Fluid Construction Grammar is used as a formalization
of the capacity to combine and manipulate hierarchical symbolic form-
meaning mappings. The models further ignore how these symbolic units
should be coupled to neurological processing;
• The agents do not have real “speech”. Instead, all utterances are perfectly
transmitted from the speaker to the hearer in the form of strings of words.
The influence of phonological changes on grammaticalization processes
is well understood in theoretical linguistics, but computational models on
the formation of phonological and syllabic conventions are scarce and not
advanced enough to be used for example to model phonological reduction
(although see Steels & Kaplan 1998b). The phonological development of
case markers is therefore ignored in this book, but remains a topic of in-
terest for the future;
• The agents also do not care about morphology. There is no meaningful
word-internal structure and the capacity of segmentation is assumed. The
language-specific segmentation process is scaffolded so the agents can per-
fectly cut up utterances into words and markers. The markers themselves
can thus be seen as adpositions rather than as true markers found in case
languages such as German.
Another very important scaffold is the fact that the agents start with a prede-
fined lexicon, but no grammar. There are several reasons for giving the agents
59
3 Baseline experiments
a lexicon in advance. One reason is methodological: as in any other kind of con-
trolled experiment, this book focuses only on the emergence of a case grammar
and not on the formation of a lexicon. Other experiments have already exten-
sively investigated how adaptive lexicons can be formed and shared by large
populations of agents (see §1.4.2). All forces working on the lexicon are there-
fore completely scaffolded. This also means that the meanings of lexical entries
are fixed and known by the agents, so they never have to perform word sense
disambiguation either. One of the future steps of the research program would,
however, involve the integration of lexical and grammatical development in or-
der to verify whether the current results and conclusions remain valid.
A second reason has to do with a very important assumption that the mecha-
nisms underlying the very first emergence of grammatical constructions are the
same ones as those identified in attested cases of present-day grammaticalization
processes. These cases (almost) always display a development from more lexical
to more grammatical functions:
Grammaticalization is the gradual drift in all parts of the grammar toward
tighter structures, towards less freedom in the use of linguistic expressions
at all levels. Specifically, lexical items develop into grammatical items in
particular constructions […]. In addition, constructions become subject to
stronger constraints and come to show greater cohesion.
Haspelmath (1998: 318)
So the agents start from a lexicon and build their grammar on top of that.
This strategy is however not uncontroversial in the field artificial language evo-
lution. For example, Wray (1998; 2002) argues that modern language evolved
through the analysis of a holistic protolanguage. Similarly, many simulations (es-
pecially in Iterated Learning Models) feature the analysis of holistic utterances
into smaller linguistic units. Apart from the many arguments against the real-
ism of the “holistic utterances-first” hypothesis (see De Pauw (2002): 345–348;
and Wellens, Loetzsch & Steels (2008)), the most compelling argument for start-
ing from a lexical language is Ockham’s razor: since there are no data available
from the first language(s), we should first of all investigate what can be explained
and learned from applying present and attested processes of grammaticalization
rather than starting from a hypothetical holistic language (Hoefler & Smith 2008).
One important observation is that even though the agents start with a lexical
language, case markers can be constructed in grammatical languages as well (see
§1.2.7). Rather than thinking of the initial stage as a “lexical language” it is more
fruitful to think of individual constructions that do not mark event structure
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grammatically as the seedbed for grammatical markers. The existence of such
constructions also shows that grammaticalization is not a determined process:
speakers of a language can but do not have to decide to tighten their linguistic
items towards more grammatical uses.
The lexical entries provide the agents with a language which conforms to what
Gil (2008: 124) calls an “Isolated-Monocategorial-Associational Language” (IMA):
1. All the words are morphologically isolating (i.e. they have no internal mor-
phological structure);
2. There are no formal grounds to distinguish syntactic categories such as
nouns or verbs. The words are thus syntactically monocategorial. There is
only a semantic distinction between words that refer to objects and those
that predicate and refer to event types;
3. Utterances are semantically associational: no grammar exists for marking
event structure so the hearer has to find out himself how meanings relate
to each other.
The lexical entries thus look very much as those presented in §2.4.2 but this
time no semantic or syntactic categories are assumed. The entry for words that
refer to event types only contain their event-specific participant roles in their
meaning but no potential semantic roles (yet). For example, the semantic pole of
the entry of give lists a giver, a given and a givee (which have been assigned the
more neutral and arbitrary labels give-1, give-2 and give-3). The form-feature in
the syntactic pole simply looks for the string “give” and does not give any infor-
mation yet about the word’s potential valents. Both poles feature a J-operator
which is used for pulling the form and meaning of give into a separate unit. The

























(form (== (string ?new-unit ”jack”))))
((J ?new-unit ?top-unit)))>
In the baseline experiments 20 different scenes were recorded featuring 15 dis-
tinct event types including ten macro-events (move-inside, move-outside, hide,
give, take, cause-move-on, touch, grasp, fall and walk-to) and five micro-events
(borderscreen, visible, move, distance-decreasing and approach). Every micro-
event type (except for “borderscreen”) can take the value of true or false, which
leads to word-pairs such as visible versus invisible. This makes up for 19 different
words that can be used for referring to events. The total number of event-specific
participant roles is 30 resulting from three one-place predicates (borderscreen,
visible and move), nine two-place predicates (move-inside, move-outside, hide,
touch, grasp, fall, walk-to, distance-decreasing and approach) and three three-
place predicates (give, take and cause-move-on). The event types and the corre-
sponding words are summarized in Table 3.2.
Besides the words for event types, the agents are given 11 unambiguous words
for referring to objects. These words map in a one-to-one relationship to facts
about objects in the memories of the agents. The words are: blue, block, boy,
girl, green, ground, house, jack, jill, table and yellow. These words can be used for
referring to the seven objects that occur in the twenty recorded scenes (a puppet
called “Jill”, a puppet called “Jack”, a blue block, a green block, a table, a yellow
house and the ground).
3.3 Baseline experiment 1: no marking
3.3.1 Overview
The aforementioned debate on holistic versus compositional languages implic-
itly assumes a dichotomy between languages that are either holistic or compo-
sitional in a grammatical way. However, “compositional” does not necessarily
mean “grammatical”. There is at least one additional possibility and that is a
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Table 3.2: This table gives an overview of the different event types that occur
in the baseline experiments. For each event type, it is specified what
participant roles it takes, what truth-values are possible and which
word is used for it.
Event-types Participant roles Truth Words
values























































language that relies heavily on content words rather than on grammatical con-
structions. In the extreme case this is an entirely lexical language which also
forms the first stage in the experiments reported in this book. The goal of this
first baseline experiment is to demonstrate that agents can infer the speaker’s
intended meaning without using grammar but by exploiting the situatedness
of the language game.
3.3.2 An inferential coding system
3.3.2.1 Inferential coding
Languages across the world vary a lot as to which aspects of meaning are ex-
pressed using grammatical constructions and which are left implicit in the mes-
sage. Speakers are nevertheless capable of filling in the blanks and reaching
communicative success. This is possible because language is an inferential cod-
ing system (Sperber & Wilson 1986) in which the interpreter is assumed to be in-
telligent enough to infer the correct meaning by using all the possible resources
at hand such as the shared context and previous experience. This view is nicely
put as follows by Langacker (2000: 9):
It is not the linguistic system per se that constructs and understands novel
expressions, but rather the language user, whomarshals for this purpose the
full panoply of available resources. In addition to linguistic units, these re-
sources include such factors as memory, planning, problem-solving ability,
general knowledge, short- and longer-term goals, as well as full apprehen-
sion of the physical, social, cultural, and linguistic context.
As a consequence the representation or categorization system (in this case
language) can be much more compact and does not encode the entire meaning.
This is different from “Shannon coding” which is typically used in computer pro-
grams where all the information is stored and fixed in the message. The capacity
of inferring the intended meaning of the speaker on the basis of partial linguistic
input is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of grammar in a cognitive-
functional framework: without it, innovation and learning would be impossible.
Applied to the topic of this book, the first key cognitive ability that the agents
need is therefore the capacity to find out how the meanings of the individual
words uttered by the speaker should be linked to each other. This is implemented
using the same formalization of meanings as presented in §2.2 of the previous
Chapter. I will illustrate this with an example. Suppose that the speaker and
hearer both observe a scene in which the puppet “Jack” walks towards the puppet
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“Jill” and that sensory-motor processing yields the following facts in the memory
of the agents:
(8)
(boy object-1) (jack object-1)





Thespeaker first conceptualizes ameaning for communicating to the hearer. First
the event is profiled and then a discriminating description is found for all the
participants that have to be expressed explicitly according to this event profile.
Let’s assume that the speaker profiles the entire event so both participants need
to be expressed. For both puppets, there are two distinctive features in the fact-








Next, the speaker starts a production task which runs entirely as explained
in the previous Chapter. Since the speaker only has a lexical language, only the
lexical information of the entries for walk-to, jack and girl is added. This results




















(syn-subunits (jack-unit walk-to-unit girl-unit)))
(jack-unit
(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”))))
(walk-to-unit
(form ((string walk-to-unit ”walk-to”))))
(girl-unit
(form ((string girl-unit ”girl”)))))>
In the original experiments, each unit also had a ‘goal’-feature in the semantic
pole with the values ‘assert’ for the top-unit, ‘reference’ for the units of the par-
ticipants, and ‘predicate’ for the units of the event types. In the syntactic pole,
there was also a ‘scope’-feature (e.g. with the value ‘utterance’ for the top-unit).
Since they play no role in the simulations, I left them out in the replicating ex-
periments. Since the speaker has unified and merged all the possible linguistic
items, we get the following utterance (word order is completely random because
it was not specified in the coupled feature structure):
(11) “walk-to jack girl”
3.3.2.3 The hearer
The hearer observes the speaker’s utterance and starts parsing it. This involves
segmenting the utterance into words and then unifying and merging all possible
linguistic items with the current node in the reaction network. The hearer, too,
only knows lexical words so only lexical information is added to the coupled




















(syn-subunits (jack-unit walk-to-unit girl-unit))
(form ((meets jack-unit walk-to-unit)
(meets walk-to-unit girl-unit))))
(jack-unit
(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”))))
(walk-to-unit
(form ((string walk-to-unit ”walk-to”))))
(girl-unit
(form ((string girl-unit ”girl”)))))>
The hearer can now extract the following meaning from the semantic pole of
this coupled feature structure:
(13)
((jack ?object-a) (girl ?object-b) (walk-to ?event-x true)
(walk-to-1 ?event-x ?object-x)
(walk-to-2 ?event-x ?object-y))
Note that the hearer does not know from this meaning which participant
played which role in the event. Both Jack and Jill could be the participant which
is moving towards the other, or perhaps even another (implicit) participant plays
a role. The hearer can interpret the parsed meaning by unifying it with the facts
in the memory, which yields the following set of bindings:
(14)
((?event-x . event-1) (?object-x . object-1)
(?object-y . object-2) (?object-a . object-1)
(?object-b . object-2))
Since unification successfully returns a single hypothesis, the hearer can now
infer that the variables ‘?object-x’ and ‘?object-a’ are equal because they both
refer to the same object (‘object-1’). The hearer also infers that the variables
‘?object-y’ and ‘?object-b’ are equal because they both refer to ‘object-2’. The
hearer thus successfully infers that the puppet Jack played the participant role
‘walk-to-1’ and that the puppet Jill played the participant role ‘walk-to-2’.
3.3.2.4 Communicative success
In the above example, the parsed meaning is unambiguously compatible with
the hearer’s world model so the hearer signals agreement to the speaker. This
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means that the language game was successful. The game fails if the parsed mean-
ing would not match the hearer’s world model or if the hearer still has multiple
hypotheses left after interpretation (for example when the context consists of
several similar events). In this case the hearer would signal disagreement.
In this first baseline experiment, success in the game does not influence the
linguistic behaviour of the agents since the lexicon is given and assumed to be
fixed. The point here is rather to demonstrate that the agents can reach success
in communication even though they have no grammar yet.
3.3.3 Results and discussion
The above experimental set-up was tested in a population of two and a popula-
tion of ten agents engaging in peer-to-peer description games without a cross-
generational population turnover. In each game, the agents share a context of
five events from the same scene. Two measures were used: communicative suc-
cess and cognitive effort (see the Appendix for a description of all measures).
3.3.3.1 Results
The results of baseline experiment 1 are illustrated in Figure 3.3. The graph dis-
plays communicative success and cognitive effort for 10 series of 500 language
games. Since the language of the agents is given and static, and since the task
difficulty never changes, the results show a constant behaviour over time. Ex-
periments using a population of ten agents yielded the same results for the same
reasons.
The results indicate that the agents can indeed reach a fair amount of commu-
nicative success without using grammar: in about 70% of the games, the hearer is
capable of unambiguously inferring the intended meaning from the context. For
this, the hearer needs an average cognitive effort of 0,6 during interpretation.
Cognitive effort is fairly high since all failed games are counted as requiring
maximum cognitive effort of 1. If the results of the failed games are ignored, cog-
nitive effort drops to 0,5 on average. The simulations were run using the skewed
frequency of event types.
3.3.3.2 Discussion
The results of baseline experiment 1 demonstrate that the agents can still reach
communicative success if they use their world model for inferring the intended
meaning. The proposed machinery thus works but only under certain conditions.
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Figure 3.3: This graph shows the average cognitive effort and communicative suc-
cess in baseline experiment 1 for 10 series of 500 language games in a
population of two agents and a context size of five events. Success is
reached in about 70% of the games. Cognitive effort during interpre-
tation amounts to 0,6 on average.
For one thing, the hearer needs to have witnessed the scene in order to make
the correct inferences. Second, the context cannot be too ambiguous otherwise
interpretation can involve multiple hypotheses. As can be read from the average
communicative success measure, this happens in 30% of the cases. Failed games
typically occur when the scene contains at least two event tokens which have
the same event type but which involve different participants.
Improving communicative success in the failed games could be achieved in
many ways: agents can be given more complex dialogue strategies, the speaker
can use pointing, the hearer can be more bold in making assumptions about the
speaker’s intention or ask for additional feedback, etc. These strategies would
however involve more negotiation and do not reduce the cognitive load during
interpretation for the hearer. Additional marking, however, would be a solution
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which could resolve ambiguity and reduce cognitive effort during interpretation
at the same time. This solution will be tested in the next baseline experiment.
3.4 Baseline experiment 2: specific marking
3.4.1 Overview
Baseline experiment 1 showed how agents can still reach communicative success
without using grammar. In the second baseline experiment, agents can exploit
this ability to autonomously detect whether it might be useful tomake changes to
their linguistic inventories in order to optimize communication. The hypothesis
investigated here can be formulated as follows: ambiguity or toomuchcognitive
effort during parsing and interpretation can be a trigger for the invention of
functional markers for optimizing communicative success.
3.4.2 Speaker-based innovation
3.4.2.1 Innovation and expansion
In baseline experiment 1 the hearer is faced with the cognitive load of figuring
out who’s doing what in events during each interaction. Moreover, if the context
is complex enough it may not be clear which event the speaker was referring to.
In this experiment, the agents are therefore endowedwith a second key cognitive
ability which involves the innovation and expansion of their language through
event-specific markers. This ability comprises three subparts:
1. Expanding the agents architecture with a “re-entrant” mapping for detect-
ing opportunities for optimization and learning innovations;
2. Endowing the agents with the capacity of inventing a marker and the cor-
responding constructions;
3. Endowing the agents with a consolidation mechanism which allows them
to converge on a shared set of markers.
3.4.2.2 Re-entrance
In baseline experiment 1, the agents could confidently use their lexical items to
communicate with each other since the lexicon in this model is fixed, unam-
biguous, and shared by all the agents. However, should this scaffold be taken
away, the agents would have to worry about whether the words they use are
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also known and understood by the other agents. They would thus somehow
have to be capable of predicting the parsing and interpretation behaviour of the
hearer in order to increase the chances of reaching communicative success. This
can be achieved through “re-entrance” (Steels 2003b) – also called the “obverter”
strategy by Smith (2003a).
Re-entrance can be thought of as self-monitoring in which the speaker does
not directly transmit his utterance to the hearer, but first “re-enters” the utterance
into his own linguistic system and parses and interprets the utterance himself
as if he was the hearer. By taking himself as a model to simulate the linguistic
behaviour of the hearer, the speaker can detect whether there might be problems
or difficulties during parsing and interpretation. If so, the speaker will try to
solve this problem. This strategy is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Similarly, the hearer
can also use a re-entrant mapping for simulating the behaviour of the speaker.
Technically speaking, achieving re-entrance is not so difficult since the agents in
these experiments can act both as a speaker and as a hearer.

















Figure 3.4: Before transmitting an utterance to the hearer, the speaker “re-enters”
her own utterance in her language system and uses herself as a model
of the hearer. In this way the speaker estimates whether there might
be problems or too much complexity for the hearer during parsing. If
so, the speaker tries to repair the problem.
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speaker wants to solve a problem through innovation, he needs to have an ed-
ucated guess about the hearer’s knowledge and which aspects of the common
ground can be exploited for getting the message across. The hearer has to per-
form the same kind of reasoning for guessing the speaker’s intentions. Human
language users obviously adapt their linguistic behaviours to their speech part-
ners (e.g. when speaking to children or second language learners). Given the fact
that all agents in the experiments are each other’s peers, the best model they can
have of other agents is themselves.
3.4.2.3 Innovation
It is unavoidable that language users come across situations in which the speaker
does not know an adequate and well-entrenched convention for expressing a cer-
tain meaning, especially in the extreme case where there is no grammar at all. In
this experiment, the speaker will invent a specific marker for explicitly express-
ing a particular participant role if there are possible ambiguities in the context or
if the hearer needs to do more inference than is desirable. This is implemented
through diagnostics and repair strategies which run in this experiment along
the following algorithm:
1. Diagnostic 1: Re-enter the utterance into the linguistic system and start a
parsing and interpretation task.
a. If interpretation returns a failure or multiple hypotheses, report a
problem;
b. If there is one possible hypothesis which contains at least one unex-
pressed variable equality, report a problem;
c. If there is no inference needed and if there is only one hypothesis,
transmit the utterance to the hearer.
2. Repair strategy 1: If a problem of ambiguity or unresolved variable equalities
has been reported, trigger repair strategy 1.
a. If there is only one unexpressed variable equality, invent a newmarker
for it and start a new production task;
b. If there aremore than one unexpressed variable equalities left (i.e. the
repair is too difficult), ignore the problem and transmit the utterance
to the hearer.
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I will now illustrate this algorithm with a concrete example. Suppose that the
speaker and hearer both observe the same scene as the one used in §3.3 in which
Jack was walking to Jill; and that the sensory-motor processing delivers the same
facts as in example 1. This time the speaker only profiles the part of the event






Since the speaker has no grammar yet, only the lexical entries of Jack and
walk-to are unified and merged with the coupled feature structure which results
in the following, randomly ordered utterance:
(16) “jack walk-to”
Instead of directly transmitting the utterance to the hearer, the speaker first







Interpreting this meaning by unifying it with the speaker’s world model yields
the following set of bindings:
(18)
((?event-x . event-1) (?object-x . object-1)
(?object-y . object-2) (?object-a . object-1))
Unification is successful and returns only one hypothesis so the speaker does
not detect ambiguity. However, there is a variable equality left between the vari-
able ‘?object-x’ and ‘?object-a’: both refer to ‘object-1’. Diagnostic 1 will there-
fore report a problem that triggers repair strategy 1.
The repair strategy assesses the difficulty of the problem: if there aremore than
one unexpressed variable equalities left, the problem is classified as “too difficult
to solve” and then the utterance is transmitted anyway. Here, however, there is
only one variable equality so the speaker will invent a new marker for it. This
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marker is specific to the walk-to-1 role and can thus almost be seen as a lexical
item itself. The speaker then invents a verb-specific construction in which the
new marker (let’s say -bo) binds the referent of the walk-to-1-role to the referent
of the argument that fills this role by using the same variable ‘?object-x’. The
syntactic pole states that this argument plays ‘syn-role-1’ which is nothing more












The morphological rule states that the marker immediately follows the ar-
gument which plays the walk-to-1-role. As explained in the previous Chapter,
the morphological rule will create a new marker-unit and make it a sub-unit of
the argument-unit. Both the verb-specific construction and the morph-rule look
slightly different from the original proposals by Steels (2002b) due to changes in









(form (== (string ?marker-unit ”-bo”)
(meets ?unit-1 ?marker-unit))))
((J ?marker-unit ?top-unit))
((J ?unit-1 ?top-unit (?marker-unit))))>
The speaker now starts a new production task for the same meaning. In the
initial node in the reaction network, the whole meaning is still grouped together
in one unit. The speaker then unifies and merges the lexical entries of jack and
walk-to with the initial node which leads to a separate unit for each word. The
new coupled feature structure looks as follows:
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(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”))))
(walk-to-unit
(form ((string walk-to-unit ”walk-to”)))))>
Before the repair, this would be the final node in the reaction network. This
time, however, the speaker has the newly made construction at her disposal.
Since this is a production task, the semantic pole of the construction needs to
unify with the semantic pole of node-2. This is successful: the construction
needs any unit containing the meaning of a walk-to-event and another unit of
which the referent is the same one as the referent of the walk-to-1-role (‘object-
1’). The syntactic pole of the construction then simply merges the feature-value
pair ‘(syn-role syn-role-1)’ to the argument-unit. The construction thus licenses




















(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”))))
(walk-to-unit
(form ((string walk-to-unit ”walk-to”)))))>
Next, the speaker can unify and merge the new morph-rule with node-3. The
left-pole of the morph-rule (which is syntactic, see §2.4.3) looks for any unit
containing the feature-value pair ‘(syn-role syn-role-1)’ which is indeed present
in the syntactic pole of node-3. Next, the right-pole of the morph-rule is merged



















(form ((string jack-unit ”jack”))))
(bo-unit
(form ((string bo-unit ”-bo”) (meets jack-unit bo-unit))))
(walk-to-unit
(form ((string walk-to-unit ”walk-to”)))))>
The speaker has no other items that can be unified and merged so node-4 is the
final node in the reaction network. The speaker then renders the form-features
of the syntactic pole into an utterance. The ordering between the words jack
and walk-to are still random, but the coupled feature structure specifies that the
marker -bo immediately follows jack. This results in the following utterance:
(24) “jack -bo walk-to”
The speaker now re-enters this utterance again into his linguistic system to
check whether the innovation has the intended effect. I will not repeat the entire
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trace of parsing here since this is completely analogous to the example given in






Note that this time, the meaning-predicates ‘jack’ and ‘walk-to-1’ share the
same variable ‘?object-x’. Interpretation then returns the following set of bind-
ings:
(26) ((?event-x . event-1) (?object-x . object-1)
(?object-y . object-2))
As can be seen in the set of bindings, there are no unexpressed variable equalities
left so no additional inferences are needed. The speaker is thus satisfied with the
utterance and transmits it to the hearer.
3.4.2.4 Learning
Learning a new marker is very similar to inventing one and is achieved through
the same cognitive mechanisms. The hearer first observes the utterance and then
parses it. If there are unknown strings, such as the marker -bo which was just
invented by the speaker, the hearer will ignore it and try to parse as much as
possible. Then the hearer tries to interpret the parsed meaning. If there are unex-
pressed variable equalities left, the same diagnostic as was used by the speaker
will report a problem. The repair strategy then tries to find out whether the utter-
ance contains elements which could carry this particular meaning or function.
1. Hearer diagnostic 1: Parse the utterance and interpret its meaning.
a. If interpretation returns a failure or multiple hypotheses, report a
problem;
b. If there is one possible hypothesis which contains at least one unex-
pressed variable equality, report a problem;
c. If there is no inference needed and there is only one hypothesis, sig-
nal agreement to the speaker.
2. Hearer repair strategy 1: If a problem of ambiguity or unresolved variable
equalities has been reported, trigger repair strategy 1.
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a. If there is only one unexpressed variable equality, check whether
there was one unknown string in the utterance. If so, add a new verb-
specific construction to the inventory which records the unknown
string as a marker for the variable equality. If not, ignore the prob-
lem and signal agreement or disagreement to the speaker depending
on success of the game;
b. If there are more than one unexpressed variable equalities left or if
there were multiple unknown strings, ignore the problem. Transmit
success to the hearer if inference is nevertheless possible.
c. If interpretation fails or leads tomultiple hypotheses, ignore the prob-
lem and signal disagreement.
3.4.2.5 Consolidation
In the original two-agent simulations variety never occurs since the agents only
observe each other’s inventions except for the extremely rare cases in which the
learning task was too difficult and the learner later on invents a different solution
for the same problem. So consolidation is fairly trivial and means just storing the
newly created or learned items in the linguistic inventory.
However, as soon as we scale up the experiments to multi-agent populations
involving at least three agents, a pool of synchronic variation naturally arises
since the agents can independently come up with different innovations for the
same problems. The agents therefore need to have an alignment strategy that
enables them to deal with the variety and to converge on a shared set of preferred
markers.
In §1.4.3 I argued that the experiments on grammar first of all try to move all
the previous work on lexicon formation onto the domain of grammar, so this
experiment starts with a similar alignment strategy as was suggested in prior
work. This strategy goes as follows: each construction has its own confidence
score between 0 and 1. The higher the score, the more confident the agent is
that the item is a conventionalized unit in the population. Based on the game’s
success and based on the speaker’s behaviour, the hearer will update the scores
in the inventory as follows:
• In case of success, increase the score of the applied construction(s) by 0.1
and decrease the scores of all its competitors through lateral inhibition
by 0.1. Competitors of a construction are constructions which either have
the same semantic pole but a different form (competing synonyms), or the
same form but different semantics (competing homonyms);
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• If the game was a failure, do nothing.
The fact that only the hearer performs score updating captures the intuition
that agents first of all want to conform to the behaviours of other agents in the
population rather than imposing their own preferences. A mathematical model
by De Vylder (2007) also shows that this strategy results in smoother conver-
gence dynamics. In case of game failure, neither the speaker nor the hearer up-
dates any scores. The reason for this is that the description game does not offer
enough explicit feedback for the agents to find out whether there might be parts
in the processing chain which were harmful for communication.
3.4.3 Results and discussion
The above diagnostics and repair strategies have been implemented and tested
in three different simulations. The first series (set-up 2a) features a population
of two agents and replicates the results obtained by Steels (2002b; 2004a). The
second experiment (set-up 2b) involves a population of ten agents in which the
consolidation strategies become necessary for convergence. Both experiments
feature the skewed frequency of event types mentioned in §3.2.4. A third set-
up (set-up 2c) also features 10 agents, but this time the skewed frequency was
replaced by an equal frequency of event types in order to study the convergence
and competition dynamics more easily. All the results were obtained after ten
series of language games for each simulation.
3.4.3.1 Results of set-up 2a
The results obtained from the replication experiment confirm the results of the
original case experiment. The top graph in Figure 3.5 shows that the average
cognitive effort needed by the speaker rapidly drops to zero if the agents start
inventing and using specific markers to indicate relations between events and
their participants. With the markers the agents are also capable of overcoming
ambiguity in the context since communicative success rises to 100%. However,
there is a price to pay for this optimization, which is shown in the bottom graph:
for each participant role, the agents have to learn and store a specific marker in
the inventory. In this two-agent simulation, no variation occurs so agreeing on
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Figure 3.5: The top graph shows that the agents rapidly reach 100% communica-
tive success in the two-agent set-up. The agents also succeed in re-
ducing the cognitive effort to zero. The bottom graph shows that they
need to learn and store 30 specific markers in their inventory to do
so.
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3.4.3.2 Results of set-up 2b
If the population size is increased, the agents need much more time to learn all
the variations floating in the population and to converge on a shared set of 30
markers. As Figure 3.6 shows, the agents need 80.000 language games in order
to agree on this set. This is still fairly rapid: it means that each agent needs to
play an average of 8.000 games in order to conform to the language of its peers.
The graph first shows a steep rise to an average of 40 markers in the begin-
ning after which an alignment phase seems to start. However, the number of
markers starts to climb up again after 7.000 games and reaches a height of about
45 markers by the time 20.000 games have been played. Then there is a long and
gradual slope towards convergence at 80.000 games. The two peaks in the graph
are the result of the skewed frequency of event type occurrences: markers for
three-participant events are very rare and are therefore constructed, learned and
propagated later than the frequent markers. Even so, the agents still reach agree-
ment and communicative success while reducing the cognitive effort needed if
they are given enough time.
3.4.3.3 Results of set-up 2c
In the third set-up all the event types occur with the same frequency so we
can better study the convergence dynamics without other influences. Figure 3.7
shows that the agents indeed need significantly less time than in the second set-
up: between six and seven thousand language games. On average this means
about 600–700 games per agent, which comes close to the 500 games needed by
the agents in two-agent simulations. The convergence task here is comparable
in difficulty to a multiple word naming game involving 30 objects (see Van Loov-
eren 2005). The graph shows that the agents keep innovating and learning new
markers during the first 1.500 language games after which they rapidly converge
on a shared set of 30 markers. The peak of 70 markers – as opposed to the peak
of 45 with the skewed frequency – is normal since there are more competing
markers floating in the population at the same time.
Figure 3.8 gives a snapshot of one agent’s knowledge of markers for the par-
ticipant role ‘walk-to-1’. The agent learns three markers at about the same time:
-pev, -duin, and -hesae. The marker -duin seems to be the winning marker and
reaches a confidence score of 0.9 by the time the agents have played 2.000 lan-
guage games. However, the agent then learns a new marker -zuix which seems
to be quite successful in the population: its confidence score rapidly increases to
the maximum while -duin goes downhill very fast because of lateral inhibition.
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Figure 3.6: This graph shows the number of specific markers in baseline experi-
ment 2b for 10 series of 80.000 language games in a population of 10
agents and a context size of five events. The agents start innovating
and learning markers rapidly during the first 3.000 games after which
a short period of alignment seems to kick in. The number of markers
then rises again between game 7.000 and game 20.000. This is due
to the skewed frequency of the event-tyes: events that potentially
take three participants are very rare in the data and markers for them
are only now being acquired by all agents. Finally, a long alignment
period starts which also takes much more time for the less-frequent
event types.
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Figure 3.7: This graph shows the number of specific markers in baseline exper-
iment 2c for 10 series of 7.000 language games in a population of 10
agents and a context size of five events. This case, all event types
occur with the same frequency so we can see the convergence dy-
namics in the population more clearly: agents invent and learn new
markers during the first 1.500 language games. The agents then need
another 4.500 language games in order to align their linguistic inven-
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markers for `walk-to-1’ known by agent 1
Figure 3.8: This graph shows a snapshot of the competition between forms for
marking the participant role ‘walk-to-1’ within agent 1. Agent 1 learns
the marker -pev at first, but soon also observes -duin and -hesae. The
marker -duin seems to win the competition and even reaches a con-
fidence score of 0.9 after 2.000 language games. However, the agent
then learns another marker -zuix which is apparently shared by a lot
of other agents in the population: at game 3.000 it has already pushed
-duin down and it reaches 1.0 confidence score.
Finally, Figure 3.9 shows the average communicative success and cognitive
effort again. The results show that the agents in the multi-agent simulations also
rapidly reach 100% communicative success by using markers. Cognitive effort
also goes down until no inferences need to be made anymore.
3.4.3.4 Discussion
The results of baseline experiment 2 clearly illustrate how agents can use locally
available information to assess their own linguistic interactions and couple this
assessment to repair and consolidation strategies in order to improve communi-
cation. In this case, the agents mainly acted to reduce the semantic complexity
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Figure 3.9: In the multi-agent populations too the agents succeed in reach-
ing communicative success as well as reducing the cognitive effort
needed for interpretation.
of interpretation for the hearer: if additional markers are introduced for explic-
itly indicating the relations between events and their participants, parsing leads
the agents immediately to the desired bindings in interpretation. Without the
markers, additional inferences would still be needed.
However, a price has to be paid for reducing the effort of interpretation and
that is an increased inventory size. During the language games, the agents learn
70 markers on average and retain 30 of them, each one specific to a particular
participant role. The inventory size is in fact not the main problem here but a
side-effect of a bigger issue: since the markers are restricted to one function only,
the agents (given their present capabilities) cannot use them to go beyond the
data of known events. Hence there is no generalization. Inventing new markers
for each participant role may be an efficient strategy in a small and fixed world,




Coupling these results back to natural languages, there are thus two clear qual-
itative differences: (a) markers in natural languages do generalize and become
polysemous; and (b) they are not randomly invented but recruited from existing
lexical items (see sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5). Both issues will have to be addressed
in other experiments.
3.5 Baseline experiment 3: semantic roles
3.5.1 Overview
The results of baseline experiment 2 indicate that the agents can reduce the prob-
lem of ambiguity and cognitive effort if they make use of additional marking.
However, the proposed innovation strategy requires newmarkers to be invented
all the time so (a) there is no generalization beyond the known data, and (b) this
may lead to an explosion of the inventory size in the long run. Baseline 3 inves-
tigates how the same principles of diagnosis and repair in order to reach com-
municative success can lead to generalization. The hypothesis is that analogical
reasoning over event structures can account for an increased generalization
and productivity of case markers.
3.5.2 Generalization as a side-effect
3.5.2.1 Analogical reasoning
When repairing a problem of unexpressed variable equalties in the previous base-
line experiment, the speaker assessed the repair to be too difficult to learn if the
context was too ambiguous. In a more complex simulation, however, one can
imagine that ambiguity is rather the rule than the exception so the speaker needs
to innovate in a more clever way to give the hearer additional clues about what
he meant. One such strategy is to reuse existing items as much as possible in se-
mantically related or analogous situations. In baseline experiment 3, the speaker
can reuse the existing markers in new situations by performing analogical rea-
soning over event structures. The analogy algorithm comprises the following
steps:
1. Given a target participant rolei, find a source rolej for which a case marker
already exists;
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2. Elaborate the mapping between the two:
a. Take the target event structure in which participant rolei occurs (pro-
vided by sensory-motor processing);
b. Take the source event structure of the event that was used to create
source rolej ;
c. Select from the source event structure all the facts and micro-events
involving the filler of source rolej and retrieve the corresponding
facts and micro-events of the target event structure.
3. Keep the mapping if it is good. A good mapping means that:
a. the filler of source rolej always maps onto the same object in the
corresponding facts and micro-events;
b. the corresponding object fills the target rolei in in the target struc-
ture.
4. If there are multiple analogies possible, choose the best one (based on en-
trenchment and category size);
5. Build the necessary constructions and make the necessary changes to ex-
isting items.
Step 3b in the algorithm ensures that an analogical role is also discriminating
enough to distinguish the target role from other possible participant roles in the
same or other events. By reusing existing items in novel but similar situations,
the speaker reduces the hypothesis space for the hearer and facilitates the ab-
duction process. The hearer can retrieve the analogy using the same algorithm
if he also knows the other marker. In this strategy, the generalization of exist-
ing linguistic items is not a goal in itself but rather a side-effect of optimizing
communicative success.
3.5.2.2 The target and the source
I will illustrate the analogy algorithm of this experiment through an example.
Suppose that the speaker wants to construct a marker for the participant role
‘walk-to-2’ of the following walk-to-event:
(27)




I will from now on refer to ‘walk-to-2’ as the target role and to ‘jill’ as the
target filler. Instead of inventing a new marker immediately, the speaker will
first check whether he already knows a marker which is analogous and hence
could be reused. Suppose that the speaker already knows the marker -mi for the
participant role ‘move-inside-1’. I will from now on refer to this participant role
as the source role and its filler as the source filler. The speaker has stored the






3.5.2.3 Elaborate the mapping between the two
In order to elaborate the mapping between the two events, the complete event
structure is taken. The target event (walk-to) consists of four micro-events: one
participant is moving and approaching another participant, which stands still
until the two participants touch each other:
•
(move event-165641 true) (move-1 event-165641 jack)
(move event-165419 false) (move-1 event-165419 jill)
•
(approach event-165486 true) (approach-1 event-165486 jack)
(approach-2 event-165486 jill)
(touch event-165633 true) (touch-1 event-165633 jill)
(touch-2 event-165633 jack)
The source event (move-inside) is made up of eight micro-events. The event
starts with two visible participants, of which one is standing still. The distance
between both objects becomes smaller as one participant moves to the other. This
continues until they “touch” each other after which the moving participant dis-
appears out of sight.
•
(visible event-161997 true) (visible-1 event-161997 jill)
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•
(visible event-161791 true) (visible-1 event-161791 house-1)
•






(touch event-161801 false) (touch-1 event-161801 jill)
(touch-2 event-161801 house-1)
•
(touch event-162493 true) (touch-1 event-162493 jill)
(touch-2 event-162493 house-1)
•
(borderscreen event-162377 false) (object-1 event-162377 jill)
•
(visible event-162665 false) (visible-1 event-161997 jill)
Analogy is commonly defined as a mapping from a source domain to a new tar-
get domain. The next step in the algorithm is therefore to check how the existing
role maps onto the target event structure. This can be achieved by selecting all
the micro-events of the source event that involve the source filler and map them
onto the corresponding micro-events of the target. If the micro-events do not ex-
ist in the target event, they are ignored. Other information such as time-stamps
and hierarchical structure is also ignored. This yields the mapping in Figure 3.10.
source event ==> target event
(touch-1 event-162493 jill) ==> (touch-1 event-165633 jill)
(touch-1 event-161801 jill) ==> (touch-1 event-165633 jill)
Figure 3.10: Mapping source event and target event
3.5.2.4 A good mapping
There are two requirements for a mapping to be good. The first is that the source
filler must always map onto the same object in the target structure. This is indeed
the case in the above example: ‘jill’ alwaysmaps onto ‘jill’ in the target event. The
algorithm thus found an analogy between the source role and a role in the target
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event. The second requirement for a good mapping is that this corresponding
role is the same one as the target role. Again, this is the case in the example: ‘jill’
was indeed the target filler of the target role ‘walk-to-2’. The speaker can thus
decide that the existing marker -ma can be reused.
In this example, the speaker does not have any other markers yet to check for
analogy. If there would be competing analogies, type frequency decides which
analogy will be chosen (i.e. the semantic role which covers the most participant
roles, ranging from one to many). I follow the same definition of type frequency
as Bybee & Thompson (2000: 77):
[T]ype frequency determines productivity: type frequency refers to the
number of distinct lexical items that can be substituted in a given slot in
a construction, whether it is a word-level construction for inflection or syn-
tactic construction specifying the relation among words. The more lexical
items that are heard in a certain position in a construction, the less likely
it is that the construction will be associated with a particular lexical item
and the more likely it is that a general category will be formed over the
items that occur in that position. The more items the category must cover,
the more general will be its critical features and the more likely it will be
to extend to new items. Furthermore, high type frequency ensures that a
construction will be used frequently, which will strengthen its representa-
tional schema, making it more accessible for further use, possibly with new
items.
As type frequency can range from one to a very large number, so there are
varying degrees of productivity associated with ranges of type frequency.
3.5.2.5 Adapting the inventory
If no analogy can be found, the agent will invent a new marker as in baseline ex-
periment 2. In this example, however, the agent already knows a suitable marker
and it will have to incorporate this new use in its inventory. There are basically
two options: either a new verb-specific construction is created for ‘walk-to-2’ fea-
turing the same case marker as the construction for ‘move-inside-1’; or the use
of the existing construction is extended. In this experiment, the latter solution is
tested.
The changes to the inventory are schematized in Figure 3.11 and can be sum-
marized as follows: the specific meaning in the semantic pole of the construction
is removed and replaced by a semantic frame which contains the generalized se-
mantic role. This semantic role shares the same variable as the referent of the
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Figure 3.11: This diagram shows how the semantics of lexical entries and con-
structions integrate with each other. At first, constructions are verb-
specific and unify with the meaning of a lexical entry. If the agent
however decides to reuse this construction in a new situation, a gen-
eralized semantic role is constructed. The relevant lexical entries are
extended with a potential semantic frame which unifies with the se-
mantic frame of the construction. The links between the meaning
and the semantic frames are taken care of by variable equalities.
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other argument unit which was already present in the construction. The two
lexical entries which have to be compatible with the new construction (move-
inside and walk-to) are extended with a semantic frame as well. As explained
in Chapter 2, this is not a frame in the traditional sense but rather a list of the
potential valents of the verb. Since that Chapter also gives a full trace of parsing
and production, I will not repeat the same operation here.
3.5.2.6 Learning
Thehearer learns themarker by following the same strategy as before. If he didn’t
know the marker yet, he will create a new verb-specific construction if the con-
text is clear enough. If he already knew the marker, he will get into trouble dur-
ing parsing because its present use does not correspond to its previous function.
The hearer will ignore the problem for the time being and parse the utterance
as good as possible. Using the parsed meaning, inferred variable equalities and
re-entrance, the agent can then (possibly) retrieve the analogy introduced by the
speaker. If the hearer cannot retrieve any analogy, he will nevertheless accept it
as imposed by the speaker.
The agents in this experiment can thus be characterized as (incremental) instan-
ce-based learners (and innovators) (Mitchell 1997: Chapter 8): the agents are
“lazy” learners in the sense that they postpone generalization until new instances
have to be classified as opposed to “eager” learners that try to make abstractions
over the data immediately. Each innovation or novel classification is not based on
abstract rules but by examining its relation to previously stored instances. This
kind of learning (and innovation) fits usage-based models of language which
presuppose “a bottom-up, maximalist, redundant approach in which patterns
(schemas, generalizations) and instantiations are supposed to coexist, and the
former are acquired from the latter” (Daelemans & Van den Bosch 2005: 20).
3.5.2.7 Consolidation
Theoriginal two-agent simulations did not need to care about alignment strategies
or consolidation too much since the two agents always share the same commu-
nicative history. So the replicating experiment should pose no problems in both
the alignment of case markers and the alignment of the internal structure of se-
mantic roles. The same prediction cannot be made for multi-agent simulations
in which alignment strategies are needed for convergence. Three additional set-
ups have therefore been implemented: one which uses the same mechanism for
updating the confidence scores of linguistic items as in baseline experiment 2
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(set-up 3b), one in which a more fine-grained scoring mechanism has been im-
plemented (set-up 3c), and finally one in which (token) frequency decides on the
speaker’s behaviour (set-up 3d). In this section I will not go into the reasons for
experimenting with these different set-ups: they have been inspired by the exper-
imental results and are therefore discussed later on. Instead, I will restrict myself
to explaining the two new consolidation strategies. The four different set-ups
(and their effects on the results) are summarized in Table 3.3.
Set-up 3c.Themore fine-grained scoringmechanism implemented in set-up 3c
is based on the idea that linguistic items are not “good or bad”, but that they may
be more suitable in some particular contexts and less suitable in others. A single
confidence score for every linguistic item cannot go beyond its black-or-white
updating scheme and thus cannot handle a more nuanced way of processing.
Instead, agents need more clever self-assessment criteria: next to communicative
success, they can use co-occurrences of linguistic items as a source for aligning
their inventories.
Co-occurring items are locally observable to the agents since they form one
chain in the reaction network during processing. The general idea is remini-
scient of Hebbian learning (“what fires together, wires together”): a link is kept
between co-occurring items and a confidence score is kept for this link based
on the successful co-occurrence of both items. Suppose that the agent has the
case marker -ma (see the example earlier in this section) which may cover either
the participant role walk-to-2 or the role move-inside-1. The idea is now that
the agents keep a link between co-occurring linguistic items, so the agent would
now have a link between construction-x one the one hand and the two lexical
entries walk-to and move-inside on the other. Instead of positing a score on the
complete construction, each co-occurrence link has its own confidence score:
(29)
<Construction-x>← 0.5→ <move-inside> (for move-inside-1)
0.5→ <walk-to> (for walk-to-2)
Suppose that the speaker also has the marker -bo which can be used for mark-
ing ‘move-1’ and ‘move-inside-2’:
(30)
<Construction-y>← 0.5→ <move-inside> (for move-inside-1)
0.5→ <move> (for move-1)
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If the agent then observes the co-occurrence of construction-x andmove-inside
(i.e. the agent analyzes an utterance in which -ma was used for marking move-
inside-1), the score of the link is increased with 0.1 and the score of competing
links (here the link between move-inside and construction-y) is decreased by 0.1.
The other confidence scores based on co-occurrence remain untouched:
(31)
<Construction-x>← 0.6→ <move-inside> (for move-inside-1)
0.5→ <walk-to> (for walk-to-2)
<Construction-y>← 0.4→ <move-inside> (for move-inside-1)
0.5→ <move> (for move-1)
Note that this score is not the actual co-occurrence frequency, but a confidence
score between 0 and 1 which only indirectly reflects co-occurrence and which is
updated based on communicative success.
Set-up 3d. The fourth set-up in baseline experiment 3 removes the explicit
lateral inhibition consolidation of the previous set-ups and replaces it with a
combination of token frequency and memory decay. Frequency is implemented
as a simple counter which can be updated after each interaction. This set-up has
the following features:
• During production, the speaker will use the linguistic items which have
the highest frequency score;
• After each successful interaction, the hearer will increase the counter of all
the constructions that were applied during parsing by one;
• When an agent has engaged in 50 interactions, all the frequency scores are
decreased by one (= memory decay).
This kind of (token) frequency favours more general constructions: the larger
the type frequency of a certain class or category, the more chances it has to in-
crease its token frequency. The memory decay implemented here is unaffected
by population size since it is based on each agent’s individual history. It is, how-
ever, sensitive to inventory size and frequency: linguistic items can only survive
if they occur at least once before the next decay is performed. In the present set-
up, each participant role occurs one time out of thirty interactions on average.
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3.5.3 Results and discussion of set-up 3a
3.5.3.1 Results
The replicating experiment featuring a population of two agents confirms the
results obtained by Steels (2002b; 2004a). The agents succeed in reusing existing
markers and generalizing them to semantic roles as is shown in Figure 3.12 . Dur-
ing ten series of 500 language games, the agents constructed on average 6 to 8
markers which could be used for covering at least two participant roles. In total,
up to 24 participant roles out of 30 were grouped together in more general roles.
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Figure 3.12: In the two-agent simulations, the agents have no problems aligning
their inventories since there is no variation in the population. In ten
series of 500 language games, the agents came up with an average
of 6–8 markers for semantic roles and an average of 6-9 markers for
specific participant roles. The semantic roles gather together up to
24 participant roles out of 30.
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A closer examination of the semantic roles learns us that they tend to be small
generalizations mostly covering two participant roles. Some roles exceptionally
gather four or even six participant roles. Here are some example sentences from

































‘The boy moves inside house-1.’
In the same simulation, the following markers and their corresponding partic-









• -zo: fall-1, approach-1
• -tui: fall-2, approach-2
• -shae: touch-2, give-2
• -fe: distance-decreasing-1, grasp-1
• -lu: move-inside-2, distance-decreasing-2
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• -we: move-1, give-1, take-1
• -cui: walk-to-1, object-1, grasp-2, hide-2
• -ge: touch-1, move-inside-1, move-outside-1, hide-1, walk-to-2, take-2
3.5.3.2 Discussion
The results show that the construction of generalized semantic roles allows the
agents to reduce the number of markers by 65–70%. However, the most impor-
tant observation is that by endowing the agents with the capacity of analogical
reasoning, they are capable of generalization beyond previous linguistic experi-
ence as is shown in the increasing productivity of some markers.
In the results there is still a fairly large residue of verb-specific markers which
is partly due to the analogy algorithm and partly due to the fact that only two
agents were involved in the simulation. First, the analogy algorithm is very strict
in the sense that two roles are either analogous or not: there is no in-between
value that allows for some flexibility. Second, since there are no variations in
the population, the construction of semantic roles is entirely dependent on the
linguistic history of both agents: once an analogy is constructed and successfully
applied in communication, the agents will not try to come up with better or more
general analogies later on. In other words, the solutions that the two agents come
up with may not be optimal given their search space so they end up in a local
maximum. A larger population may give this search an additional boost.
3.5.4 Results and discussion of set-up 3b
3.5.4.1 Results
In set-up 3b the population size is increased to 10 agents so there will be more
variation among the agents. This is indeed confirmed in Figure 3.13 which shows
that there are a total of 140 variations floating in the population for marking
30 participant roles. This is an average of 4,7 possible ways for marking each
participant role. This number of possibilities does not drop to 30, which is a
first indication that the agents do not converge on a shared set of grammatical
markers. As for the nature of the markers, the results indicate that there are
about 20 markers that can be used for covering at least two participant roles
whereas there are about 50 specific participant role markers as well. The average
inventory size of the agents is thus far from optimal.
Figure 3.14 confirms that the agents do not reach convergence: the meaning-
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Figure 3.13: When scaling the experiments up to multi-agent simulations, the tra-
ditional alignment strategies used in prior experiments on lexicon
formation are not sufficient for the population to reach convergence.
For thirty participant roles, the agents have to remember 140 varia-
tions to communicate successfully, which is an average of 4,7 possi-
ble ways for marking each participant role.
marker for a particular participant role. As the graph shows, coherence only
reaches 40% which means that the agents use a different marker for the same
participant role in more than half of the language games. Yet, as the graph also
shows, the agents are capable of reaching 100% communicative success and re-
ducing the cognitive effort to zero.
3.5.4.2 Discussion
The results of baseline experiment 3b seem to be contradictory at first sight: even
though the agents do not agree an a shared preferred set of markers, they nev-
ertheless reach communicative success. This is possible because success in com-
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Figure 3.14: This graph shows that the agents reach 100% communicative success
and reduce the cognitive effort needed for interpretation. However,
themeaning-form coherence only reaches about 40%which indicates
that the agents did not converge on a shared set of markers but keep
using divergent preferences in more than half of the language games.
munication does not require meaning-form coherence: if the agents learn all the
variations floating around in the population, they can still parse all utterances
correctly. This happens indeed in this experiment.
The lack of convergence on a preferred set of markers clearly indicates that
the proposed alignment strategy is insufficient. The reason is that the alignment
strategy in which each item has its own single confidence score is best suited for
simulations in which there is always a one-to-one mapping between form and
meaning (as was the case in baseline experiment 2). However, when markers get
generalized to cover more than one participant role, they become polysemous
one-to-more mappings.
I will go through an example to explainwhy the single confidence score cannot
be sufficient for polysemous form-meaning mappings. Suppose that an agent
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knows three markers: -ma, -bo and -li and that the first two are generalized to
cover two roles each whereas -li is still a verb-specific marker. For convenience’s
sake, I will not include all the linguistic items involved but treat the markers as
if they were lexical items:
(35)
<move-inside-1> ←
<walk-to-2> ← (0.5)→ -ma
(36)
<move-inside-1> ←
<move-1> ← (0.5)→ -bo
(37)
<move-1> ← (0.5)→ -li
Suppose now that the agent observes the utterance boy -ma move-inside in
which the marker -ma was successfully used for marking ‘move-inside-1’. The
score for -ma is thus increased and the score for its competitor -bo is decreased.
The consequences for -bo are far-reaching, because it is now not only less success-
ful than -ma for covering ‘move-inside-1’, but also than -li for marking ‘move-1’:
(38)
<move-inside-1> ←
<walk-to-2> ← (0.6)→ -ma
(39)
<move-inside-1> ←
<move-1> ← (0.4)→ -bo
(40)
<move-1> ← (0.5)→ -li
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In another game, the same damage can be done for the marker -ma so -bo can
recover from its score decrease. Generalization thus tends to be harmful for the
markers if only one score is used: the more general a role marker gets, the more
competitors it has and thus the more chances that its score will be decreased.
Specific markers can escape punishment through lateral inhibition much more
easily. On the other hand, if it has competingmarkerswhich are generalized, they
can get punished too even if a different participant role was involved. Suppose
that -bo was observed for marking ‘move-inside-1’ this time, then not only -ma
is seen as a competitor, but also -li because it overlaps with -bo for marking
‘move-1’.
There is thus a constant push-and-pull effect in which markers may get cor-
nered by others but then all of a sudden get more successful again. This is the
reason why the agents can never converge on a preferred set: the single confi-
dence score does not allowmarkers to be successful in one particular context but
unsuccessful in another.
3.5.5 Results and discussion of set-up 3c
3.5.5.1 Results
The results of baseline experiment 3c indicate that the alignment strategy of re-
inforcement and lateral inhibition can lead to convergence if it is applied in a
more fine-grained way. This time, the agents not only use communicative suc-
cess as a guidance but also co-occurrence links: instead of positing one score on
the linguistic item as a whole, they now keep a link between co-occurring items
and assign a confidence score to that link. In case of success, the score of the
link is increased and only scores of competing links are decreased. In this model,
a marker disappears from the linguistic inventory once it has no links to other
linguistic items anymore with a confidencescore higher than zero.
Figure 3.15 shows that the number of variations peaks at 70 possible markings
for 30 participant roles. Thismeans that the agents only have to deal with an aver-
age of 2,3 competing markers for each participant role. Innovation and adoption
of markers stops at about 1.500 language games after which the agents rapidly
converge on a shared set of markers. The graph also shows that the agents con-
verge on a set of 5 generalized semantic role markers and about 20 verb-specific
markers. This means that the verb-specific markers managed to win the com-
petition more often than generalized markers and that semantic roles on average
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Figure 3.15: The more fine-grained alignment strategy allows the agents to con-
verge on one possible marking for each of the thirty participant roles.
There are 5 semantic roles on average which each cover about two
participant roles. The remaining 20 roles are covered by specific
markers.
Figure 3.16 shows that fine-grained alignment allows the agents to converge
on a shared set of preferences: meaning-form coherence reaches 100% after 5.000
language gameswhich corresponds to themomentwhere the agents have pruned
all the variations down to 30 in Figure 3.15. The agents also reach communicative
success and manage to reduce the cognitive effort needed during parsing.
3.5.5.2 Discussion
The results show that the fine-grained scoring mechanism suffices to solve the
problem of convergence among the agents. However, the gain in inventory op-
timization is minimal: the agents end up with an average of 25 markers for 30
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Figure 3.16: Using the more fine-grained alignment strategy, the agents not only
succeed in reaching communicative success and reducing cognitive
effort, they also converge on a shared set of meaning-form conven-
tions.
participant roles. Also the benefits of generalization are on the low side with an
average of two participant roles covered by a semantic role.
By solving the problem of the single confidence scores, the fine-grained scor-
ing mechanism created a new one: since only competing links are taken into
account during consolidation, the influence of the frequency of the entire cate-
gory is neglected. This means that a verb-specificmarker has the same chances of
surviving the competition as generalized semantic role markers do, even though
the latter ones are as a whole more frequent and productive. If a semantic role
loses the competition from a specific marker, its type frequency is reduced and
hence its productivity.
To overcome this problem, the agents need another alignment strategy which
both recognizes the impact of generalized roles and is capable of dealing with
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the context-sensitive nature of polysemous markers. Experiment 3d implements
such a strategy.
3.5.6 Results and discussion of set-up 3d
3.5.6.1 Results
Thefinal set-up in baseline experiment 3 does not use confidence scores or lateral
inhibition. Instead, agents rely on token frequency of successful interactions for
producing utterances. Figure 3.17 shows that the agents spend roughly the same
time as in set-up 3c innovating and learning newmarkers. The average amount of
variation reaches a total of 35–40 possibilities for 30markers, which is an average
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Figure 3.17: When adapting their linguistic behaviours to frequency, the agents
tend to use more generalized semantic role markers rather than spe-
cific ones. Here, about seven semantic roles cover 25 of the 30 par-
ticipant roles. The top line indicates that some amount of variation
persists over time.
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as high as in the previous set-up, but many innovations are excluded very early
on by memory decay. Innovations that do survive the memory decay during the
first 2.000 interactions are quite frequent so they persist in memory for a very
long time afterwards. Getting rid of them is therefore very slow and may take
thousands of additional language games before they are “forgotten” or in some
cases they persist over time. A closer look at the markers themselves learns
us that there are on average eight semantic roles and six markers for specific
participant roles. This means that the semantic role markers can cover up to 24
participant roles.
Figure 3.18 indicates that even though the agents do not reduce their gram-
mars to a single variation for all 30 participants, they nevertheless converge on
a shared set of preferred markings: coherence rises to 100% in 6.000 language
games. Communicative success reaches 100% and the agents rapidly succeed in






































Figure 3.18: This graph shows that the agents reach communicative success, re-
duce the cognitive effort needed for interpretation and converge on




In order to interpret the results of set-up 3d correctly, a closer examination of the
artificial languages of the agents is needed. In one of the simulations, a popula-









• -qui: cause-move-on-3, visible-1
• -fechui: touch-2, take-1
• -kuwae: touch-1, take-2
• -yuis: fall-2, approach-2
• -pae: give-3, walk-to-2, move-outside-1
• -ru: walk-to-1, distance-decreasing-2, move-1, move-inside-2, hide-2, move-
outside-2
• -gahu: object-1, move-inside-1, fall-1, distance-decreasing-1, hide-1, grasp-1
The above markers suggest that there were seven specific markers left and
seven semantic role markers. However, the marker - jaexi can in fact be counted
as a semantic role because it can also cover the participant roles ‘hide-2’ and
‘distance-decreasing-2’. In both cases, however, themarker is in competitionwith
-ru which has both a higher type and token frequency. Similarly, -pae can also
cover ‘hide-1’ but this participant role is dominated by the frequent role marker
-gahu. This explains why in this simulation there remain 33 possibilities for 30
participant roles instead of only 30: the markers -jaexi and -pae have found their
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own ‘semantic niche’ in which they occur frequently enough to avoid memory
decay. Synchronic variation like this is in fact more realistic than the competition
dynamics in the previous set-ups since it causes a pool of variation which may
trigger future changes in the language: both markers may disappear after a while
or they may extend their usage and become stronger rivals for the now more
successful markers -ru and -gahu.
When comparing the results to the two-agent simulations, set-up 3d improves
in terms of generalization: more participant roles are covered by the samemarker.
The improvement is however not that big so the simulations do not demonstrate
that the collective solution found by larger populations can avoid the local max-
ima that two agents encountered in their communicative interactions. In order
to fully test this hypothesis, experiments are needed involving a larger and more
controlled search space.
The alignment strategy however does succeed in favouring the more general
roles through function and frequency: markers which have a higher type fre-
quency and therefore a wider usage tend to have a higher token frequency as
well. This creates the same rich-get-richer dynamics of the strategy involving
one score and lateral inhibition in baseline experiment 2: the more frequent a
marker is, the more likely it will win the competition in the future and the more
likely it will increase its type frequency as well. At the same time, the alignment
strategy allows for the same context-sensitivity as the fine-grained scoringmech-
anism because it does not feature explicit lateral inhibition so no categories are
unrightfully harmed by it. This allows more lexical markers to still survive in
their (sometimes verb-specific) semantic ‘niche’ if they are frequent enough to
survive memory decay.
3.5.7 Conclusions and future work
In this section I discussed the various set-ups of baseline experiment 3 and re-
ported on its results. Common to all simulations was the additional cognitive
ability of analogical reasoning over event structures. This cognitive mechanism
allowed the agents to reuse (and generalize) existing markers in new situations
and contexts. By exploiting analogy, the agents are thus capable of generaliz-
ing their grammars beyond the input of previous experiences. generalization is
thereby not a goal in itself, but rather a side-effect of the need for optimizing
communication in an inferential coding system.
Four set-ups were implemented and compared to each other. The first set-up
successfully replicated the original case experiment and set the baseline for the
other three multi-agent simulations. Set-up 3b indicated that a single confidence
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score is not a sufficient alignment strategy for converging on a shared set of pre-
ferred markings: this strategy is optimized for one-to-one mappings but cannot
deal with the context-sensitiveness of polysemous one-to-many mappings. An
alternative was therefore implemented in set-up 3c in which the agents also ex-
ploited the co-occurrences of linguistic items: this time, a specific link was kept
between all co-occurring itemswith a confidence score for each link. The strategy
proved itself sufficient for reaching coherence in the population but at the cost
of generalization. Finally, an alignment strategy was proposed based on token
frequency and memory decay. This strategy led the agents to convergence on a
set of preferred markings and improved slightly over the results of the two-agent
simulations. The various set-ups are summarized in Table 3.3.
In the simulations, analogy is the source of generalization and increased pro-
ductivity of existingmarkers. This suggests that (at least for innovation and learn-
ing), analogy can be used as a unified account for both the more “regular” forms
in the language and themore “irregular” forms as opposed to rule-based accounts
which posit abstract rules and a list of exceptions. In order to exploit the power
of analogy, however, the agents need the right kind of alignment strategy that
favours the more general categories.
Evidence from natural languages suggests that analogy is also responsible for
the first innovation by recruiting an existing lexical entry for a more grammat-
ical use instead of inventing a new marker (see §1.2.4). Additional experiments
are thus needed in which the innovation strategies of baseline experiments 2 and
3 are combined into one. The recruitment of existing and well-entrenched lexical
entries would naturally follow from the same assumptions that language is an
inferential coding system and that speakers and hearers will exploit whatever
resources that are available for solving communicative problems: using a con-
ventionalized linguistic unit has the major advantage that it offers the hearer a
strong grounding point for inferring the meaning or function of the innovation.
In the present experiments, the newmarkers do not contain any clues about what
their source events were, so this may differ strongly from agent to agent which
explains why the hearer can’t retrieve the analogy in all cases. In the abstractions
and scaffolds of the present set-up, however, this poses no problems.
Implementing a more realistic model of stage 2 in the development of case
markers, however, is not a trivial matter and requires more study on how this
happens in natural languages. From the evidence gathered so far (see §1.2.4), it
seems that the present algorithm for analogy cannot handle this. The first reason
is that the recruited lexical item in serial verb language constructions, which are
typical sources of case markers, seems to “fit” naturally in the utterance by for
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Table 3.3: This table compares the four alignment strategies implemented in base-
line experiment 3. In set-up 3a, no additional alignment strategies were
needed since there were only two agents and hence no variation was
observed in the population. Set-up 3b showed that direct competition
did not yield successful alignment because a confidence score on each
linguistic item cannot deal with polysemous usage of the items. Set-up
3c solved the problem of alignment through a confidence score on each
co-occurrence link. This strategy however led to equal opportunities
for each marker in the population so unproductive markers survived
as easily as general ones. The final strategy involved the frequency
of construction tokens which favoured more general markers because
they have wider application and are thus more frequent.
Exp. Pop. Consolidation Effect
3a 2 store innovations –
3b 10 store innovations alignment fails
+ confidence score on all items
+ lateral inhibition
3c 10 store innovations alignment succeeds
+ confidence score on links (arbitrary winners)
+ lateral inhibition
3d 10 store innovations alignment succeeds
+ frequency of constructions (general roles favoured)
+ memory decay












‘He will fly to Bangkok.’
(Blake 1994: 163)
The present analogy algorithm already expects a marker and would not know
how to deal with the other participant roles of the recruited verb. The task can
involve even three participants in cases where for example give evolves into a da-
tive or recipient marker. The data thus show that next to a more general-purpose
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algorithm for analogy, we also need to find solutions for coordination and ellipsis
so that the recruited lexical entry can naturally blend in the utterance. Before we
can do this, however, we first need to investigate how the syntactic categories
can be formed that have to be coordinated.
A second problem has to do with morphology and phonological reduction. In
the attested examples, the second verb in a serial verb language construction is
implicitly marked for its more grammatical function because it typically occurs
in a non-finite or a non-conjugated form. In the experiments, there is no mor-
phology or syntax that could distinguish two verbs from each other so the hearer
would have a very hard time at figuring out which verb was meant as the “main
verb” and which one was meant as the “marker”. Moreover, the hearer would
have no reasons to assume that one of the verbs has been recruited for a new
use in the first place. The problem with phonological reduction is that there is
no phonological component in the experiments so recruited lexical items cannot
evolve towards a new form which distinguishes them more clearly from their
original uses.
Next to work on syntax, coordination and morphology, a dynamic represen-
tation of categories and word meanings is needed. First steps have already been
taken byWellens (2008) who investigates how word meanings can become more
flexible and therefore change over time. This work however only deals with
words for objects so more effort is needed to integrate it with the architecture
of the experiments in this book. Another particular issue with the model of
Wellens is that it does not allow true polysemy: the agents continuously shape
the meaning of a lexical entry but they cannot use the same word in multiple
ways. The meanings are therefore still one-to-one mappings between form and
meaning, but what the exact content of the “one” meaning is may change over
time. Grammaticalization of case markers, however, requires one-to-many map-
pings or even many-to-many mappings, so the agents have to be capable of dis-
tinguishing between different uses of the same form. I believe that coordination
and pattern formation could be a key in solving this issue, as I will explain in
more detail in the following Chapter.
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4.1 Introduction
Thebaseline experiments of the previous chapter looked at how analogy could be
exploited for the generalization of case markers for covering semantic roles. The
experiments focused on the development of these semantic roles in isolation of
each other in order to identify the diagnostics, repairs and alignment strategies
that make the emergence of such roles possible. However, the behaviour and
functionality of case markers can only be fully understood when they are stud-
ied in relation to the other elements in their linguistic context. In other words:
case markers have to be investigated in relation to the patterns in which they
occur. This chapter therefore presents experiments in which case markers can
be combined in larger patterns.
The next section first gives a brief overview of pattern formation in language
and operationalizes one strategy of pattern formation in the form of diagnostics,
repairs and alignment strategies. §4.3 implements this operationalization and
shows that the “systematicity” of the artificial languages gets lost once smaller
linguistic units are starting to combine into larger patterns. In this section I will
also briefly discuss other experiments in the field in which the problem of system-
aticity occurs but is either overlooked ormisinterpreted by the experimenter. The
next section then presents the results of another experiment that uses the more
complex alignment strategy of multi-level selection to overcome this problem.
Three variations of multi-level selection are implemented and compared to each
other in terms of systematicity and coherence. The insights of these experiments
are ported to experiments involving analogy and the formation of semantic roles
in §4.5. §4.6 finally offers a first step towards simulations involving the forma-
tion of syntactic cases (corresponding to stage 3 in §1.2.5). Even though stage 3 is
not fully accomplished yet, this section offers a clear idea of the work that needs
to be undertaken in order to form syntactic cases.
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4.2 Pattern formation
4.2.1 Overview
One crucial aspect of grammaticalization (see Martin Haspelmath’s definition in
§3.2.5) is the evolution towards tighter structures and a lesser degree of freedom.
For example, lexical items develop into more grammatical items and become part
of (larger) constructions. Within these constructions or patterns, the freedom of
the individual parts is restricted and depends on the pattern as a whole. This
would explain why for example an allative case marker only makes sense in a
motion-pattern. However, linguistic items that become part of a larger construc-
tion may still have a life on their own in their original sense, a phenomenon
traditionally known as “layering” (Hopper & Traugott 1993: 124–126). For exam-
ple the preposition like can still be used for indicating similarity while at the
same time it can be used as a marker for introducing reported speech:
(1) She looks nothing like her father.
(2) And he was like “Oh that is so not true!”
In the following subsection I will briefly touch upon some phenomena of gram-
maticalization involving pattern formation and offer an analysis which is some-
what different from the traditional linguistic approach. I will support my analysis
through other examples of patterns and idioms in language. In the next subsec-
tion, I will then offer an operationalization of my analysis in terms of diagnostics
and repair strategies for the artificial agents that will be used in the experiments
in this chapter.
4.2.2 Pattern formation in language
4.2.2.1 Negation in French
A very good example of the development of a lexical item into a part of a gram-
matical structure can be found in French negation. Traditionally, the develop-
ment of negation particles (also known as “Jespersen’s cycle”) is defined in terms
of a cycle of reanalysis – analogy (generalization) – reanalysis Hopper & Trau-
gott (1993: 65–66):




















‘He doesn’t go (a step).’
3. The word pas is reanalyzed as a negator particle in the construction [ne
Vmotion pas];










5. The particle pas is then reanalyzed as an obligatory part of the construction
[ne V pas];









4.2.2.2 Reanalysis versus pattern formation
Reanalysis is essentially a hearer-based analysis of this developmental cycle in
which the hearer interprets the underlying structure of an utterance in another
way than was intended by the speaker. Reanalysis is traditionally understood
as “change in the structure of an expression or class of expressions that does
not involve any immediate or intrinsic modification of its surface manifestation”
(Langacker 1977: 58). Even though reanalysis is a plausible mechanism for step
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3, its main problem is that it is invisible from the outside. Hopper & Traugott
(1993) write that for “the French negator pas, we would not know that reanalysis
had taken place at stage [3] without the evidence of the working generalization
at stage [4]” (p. 66). As Haspelmath (1998) points out, however, this means that
reanalysis cannot explain how the new use of pas got propagated and accepted in
the speech community unless all speakers are assumed to make the same reanal-
ysis at roughly the same time, which is very implausible. As I will explain more
thoroughly in §5.5.4, reanalysis needs to be accompanied by other mechanisms
in order to account for the empirical data.
I propose a different and simpler mechanism for step 3 that is in line with
the general approach of usage-based models of language: pattern formation. If
a certain group of words occur frequently enough together, they are stored as
a new unit in the linguistic inventory. This means that the language user now
knows two competing constructions in the case of motion verbs: [ne V] and [ne
Vmotion pas]. This approach of pattern formation may seem redundant from the
point of view of inventory size, but it may optimize linguistic processing because
a pattern is a “pre-compiled” chunk that is readily available for use, whereas oth-
erwise the language user needs to compose the structure over and over again.
Since pattern formation is a relatively “simple” operation for optimizing process-
ing, we can assume within a usage-based model that most language users will do
this spontaneously for all recurrent patterns in the language as opposed to a col-
lective operation of reanalysis. Once a pattern is stored in memory, it can start
a life on its own and diverge from its original usage. Steps 1–5 in the negation
cycle can thus be reinterpreted as follows in a more speaker-based analysis:








2. The speakers of French start to reinforce the negation particle ne in some
situations to putmore emphasis on the negation or to solve communicative
problems. In the context of motion verbs, the reinforcement is achieved
through the noun pas ‘step’, whereas in other contexts such as verbs of




















‘He doesn’t see (a point).’
3. The frequent use of these reinforcement nouns leads to the creation of
readily available patterns which co-exist (and compete with) the standard
negation construction;
4. The new patterns are extended analogically to non-motion verbs as well
and start to compete with each other and with the old negation construc-
tion for becoming the new default negation;
5. The construction [ne V pas] wins the competition and becomes the new de-
fault construction for negation. Other competitors using different particles
either disappear or take up their own semantic niche (ne … point ‘nothing’
(old-fashioned), ne … plus ‘no more’, ne … rien ‘nothing’, ne … jamais
‘never’, ne … guère ‘almost nothing’, etc.). The old negation construction
gets lost except for some archaic uses in writing.
4.2.2.3 Idioms
Evidence for pattern formation as opposed to reanalysis can be found in idioms.
Idiomatic expressions have always been problematic for traditional linguistic
theories that take a modular approach to language and assume a sharp distinc-
tion between conventional-lexical items and systematic-syntactic rules. Faced
with such problematic issues, usage-based models and particularly construction
grammars “grew out of a concern to find a place for idiomatic expressions in the
speaker’s knowledge of a grammar of their language” (Croft & Cruse 2004: 225).
Idioms range from highly idiomatic expressions to more schematic constructions
(Croft & Cruse 2004: chapter 9):
(10) by and large; no can do; be that as it may; make believe; so far so good
(11) kick the bucket; pull a fast one; spill the beans
(12) to answer the door; wide awake; bright red; to blow one’s nose
(13) the bigger the better; the louder you shout, the sooner they will serve you
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No theory of grammaticalization that I am aware of explains idioms such as so
far so good or by and large in terms of reanalysis of the words that make up the
idiom. Similarly, compound nouns are given their own lexical entry rather than
introducing a notion of ‘synchronic layering’ (Hopper & Traugott 1993: 124–126)
over the original words caused by reanalysis. Also pattern formation on other
levels of language (e.g. reoccurring syllables, morphemes, etc.) are never treated
as synchronic layers on top of one entry in the linguistic inventory. Reanalysis is
therefore used in an ad-hoc way, or as Haspelmath (1998) writes, “as one pleases”
(p. 341).
By taking pattern formation seriously, meaning that many redundant copies
exist in memory, a simpler alternative exists for the ad-hoc mechanism of re-
analysis. Just as there is no reason for differentiating ‘core case markers’ from
‘peripheral semantic case markers’ (see §1.2.6), the language user makes no dif-
ference between fully idiomatic expressions such as by and large and more gram-
matical constructions such as [ne … pas]. The only difference between them
is that the more schematic constructions were extended and generalized to new
uses whereas the more idiomatic expressions remained unchanged depending on
communicative needs in language use and frequency effects. This usage-based
approach naturally leads to the continuum of linguistic items as observed in nat-
ural languages.
One problem with the alternative hypothesis is that it is invisible from the out-
side just like reanalysis is. This is where computational models can prove their
worth: they can demonstrate the consequences of each alternative hypothesis
and show what kind of cognitive apparatus is needed for both. Additional evi-
dence can then be gathered from other disciplines such as psycholinguistics to
determinewhich cognitive architecture is most plausible. So even though compu-
tational modeling cannot predict actual language change, they can demonstrate
the effects of proposed mechanisms and help to fill in the blanks when there is
a lack of empirical data.
4.2.3 Operationalizing pattern formation
The above idea of pattern formation needs to be implemented in terms of diag-
nostics and repair strategies that make use of information that is locally avail-
able to the agents. Consider the reaction network of Figure 4.1 in which an agent
used two constructions which subsequently licensed node-2 and node-3 in the
network and which licenses the utterance jack -bo push block -ka:
Suppose that the agent is in production mode. In this case node-1 is the cou-








Figure 4.1: An agent’s reaction network is the source for pattern formation. If
the agents have to apply two constructions to license an utterance
(production) or a meaning (parsing), they will create a pattern based
on the applied constructions. This pattern has the same functionality
as the constructions but only requires one step.
entries for jack, push and block. Next, the speaker has to unify and merge two
constructions for marking the two participants of the push-event which licenses
node-3. In a next step, which is not shown in the figure, the agent will unify and
merge the morphological rules. As indicated in the figure, this reaction network
forms the basis for a new pattern (which will be construction-3). In principle this
pattern should combine the entire reaction network including the lexical entries,
but for convenience’s sake the agents will only make a pattern which combines
the functionality of constructions 1 and 2, as shown in Figure 4.2.
construction-3
sem-role-1 <==> "-bo"





Figure 4.2: The two constructions that were used during processing are combined
into a new construction. The agents keep a link between the new
construction and the constructions that were used for creating it.
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The new construction is stored in the linguistic inventory with information
about its origins: the agents keep a link between the new pattern and the con-
structions that were used for creating it. If the speaker has to produce the same
meaning again, the new construction now forms an alternative path in the re-
action network. The speaker will prefer this new path because it is faster in
processing (one step can be skipped) and the links between the constructions
can be used for giving priority to larger constructions if they unify and merge.








Figure 4.3: The new construction now offers the agent an alternative path in the
reaction network. Since the new pattern yields the same coupled fea-
ture structure as node-3 in only one step, it is faster and therefore
preferred. The links between the three constructions are used to give
larger patterns priority if they unify and merge.
Apart from creating the new pattern, not much needs to be changed in the
linguistic inventory apart from the fact that the agents have to link the new con-
struction to the lexical entries that are compatible with it. The agents will not
do this in one sweep but postpone this task until processing: lexical entries are
only linked to the new construction instance by instance if this is required dur-
ing a language game. The mechanism works entirely the same: the agent wants
to unify and merge two constructions and wants to optimize processing by cre-
ating a pattern. This time, however, no new pattern needs to be created because
there is already one. The pattern thus extends its use to a new verb as well. The
newly-made construction looks as follows:
<Construction: construction-3
((?top-unit
















(syn-subunits (== ?unit-a ?unit-b ?unit-c)))
(?unit-a






To summarize, the agents are equipped with the following diagnostic and repair
strategy in all the experiments in this chapter:
1. Diagnostic: If two constructions are used together for licensing a node
in the network, report an opportunity for optimizing processing (both for
production and parsing);
2. Repair strategy: If there is a problem of processing effort:
a) If a larger construction already exists for the same mapping, create a
link between the lexical entry and the construction;
b) Else combine the two constructions into a new construction and keep
a link between them.
During processing, the link between constructions is used for giving priority
to larger constructions. They can also be used for consolidation as I will show
in sections 4.4 and 4.5. There are, however, no inheritance links: all relevant
information is stored in the constructions themselves and no additional aspects
are inherited from other constructions.
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4.3 Experiment 1: individual selection without analogy
4.3.1 Overview
Before immediately picking up the experiments where the previous chapter left
off, the influence of the diagnostic and repair strategy for pattern formation is
first tested for stage 2 in the development of case markers: the invention and
adoption of specific markers.
4.3.2 Experimental set-up
The experimental set-up for experiment 1 is entirely the same as the one in base-
line experiment 2c but this time the new diagnostic and repair strategy for pat-
tern formation are added to the agents. The set-up can be briefly summarized as
follows:
• The population consists of 10 agents that engage in description games;
• The meaning space is the same one as detailed in Table 3.2 and all event
types occur with the same frequency;
• The agents have two diagnostics: detecting unexpressed variable equalities
and the new diagnostic detecting whether two constructions were applied
during processing;
• The agents have two repair strategies: one for inventing and learning verb-
specific markers and one for combining them into a larger construction;
• The agents use an alignment strategy of direct competition which I will
further call ‘individual selection’. This means that the hearer increases
the confidence scores of successfully applied constructions by 0.1 and de-
creases the scores of their direct competitors by 0.1. The speaker does not
perform score updating.
From the above follows that the agents will have to create and converge on
one construction for each possible combination of meanings. There are thirty
individual participant roles that need a single-participant construction, eighteen
combinations of two participant roles and three combinations of three partici-
pant roles. Since the agents have no analogy, the target number of constructions
should be 51 (the sum of all these possibilities). All the combinations can be ver-
ified in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.4: This graph shows the average number of constructions in a popula-
tion of ten agents in experiment 1. In this set-up the agents succeed
in converging on an optimal inventory size – given their cognitive
abilities – of 30 single-argument constructions, 18 two-argument con-
structions and 3 three-argument constructions. The graph here indi-
cates that there is still an average of 19 two-argument constructions
but this competition also gets resolved if more language games are
played.
4.3.3 Results and discussion
4.3.3.1 Results
The experimental set-up was tested in ten series of 16.000 language games. By
looking at the same measures as in the baseline experiments, the simulations
seem to yield successful results at first sight. Figure 4.4 plots the average num-
ber of constructions in the population. Here, the agents have almost reached the
optimal state in terms of linguistic inventory. Only in the case of two-argument
constructions there are additional language games needed for deciding on the
competition between one or two surviving constructions. Acquiring the con-
structions happens quite fast (in less than 3.000 games), but alignment takes
much more time than was needed in the baseline experiments. This is due to
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Figure 4.5: This graph shows average communicative success, cognitive effort
and meaning-form coherence in a population of ten agents in exper-
iment 1. The results show that the agents succeed in reaching 100%
communicative success and reducing the cognitive effort needed for
communication. Meaning-form coherence reaches almost 100% with
only competition between one or two forms that is still undecided.
the individual selection alignment strategy: if a pattern was used, only compet-
ing patterns are punished through lateral inhibition. The individual markers or
rather the single-argument constructions they occur in are not considered during
consolidation.
The long alignment period is also illustrated in Figure 4.5, which displays
average communicative success, cognitive effort and meaning-form coherence.
The fact that communicative success rapidly rises to 100% within 4.000 language
games and that cognitive effort drops to zero between 6.000 and 8.000 language
games suggests that the agents have learned all the variations floating around in
their population. However, meaning-form coherence takes much longer to rise
to its maximumwhich is again due to the alignment strategy. Coherence reaches
almost 100% after 16.000 games with only competition going on for one or two
cases of two-argument constructions. This competition will in the end also be
resolved after additional language games.
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Experiment 1: snapshot after 1.000 language games - individual selection
Figure 4.6: This diagram gives a snapshot of the average coherence in a popula-
tion of 10 agents after 1.000 language games using the direct selection
alignment strategy. Each circle stands for a particular meaning (see
the Appendix), for example circles 4 and 5 stand for ‘appear-1’ and
‘appear-2’. The lines between circles means that the meanings com-
bine into compositional meanings, for example circle 31 means the
combination ‘appear-1 appear-2’. The darker the circle is coloured, the
more agents prefer the same case marker(s) for covering this mean-
ing. A full line between circles means that both meanings are cov-
ered using the same markers (= systematic), a dotted line means that
a different form is preferred for the same meaning (= unrelated). The
diagram shows that for most meanings only half of the population
prefer the same form and that in many cases there is no systematic
choice for a certain case marker.
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The longer alignment period is however not the most fundamental problem
with the artificial languages that are formed by the agents. A closer examination
of them shows that all meaning-form mappings that they agree on are totally
arbitrary. The problem is illustrated in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 which give a snap-
shot of convergence and coherence in one simulation after 1.000 and 7.000 lan-
guage games respectively. Each meaning or combination of meanings (see the
Appendix) is represented as a circle. For example, the meaning ‘approach-1’ is
represented as circle 4 and meaning ‘approach-2’ is represented as circle 5. Lines
between circles indicate that the meaning of one circle is a combination of the
meanings of the other circles. For example, circle 31 combines ‘approach-1’ and
‘approach-2’. The colour of the circles represents the number of agents that pre-
fer the most frequent form in the population for that particular word. A white
circle means that there is either no form yet for this meaning or that there is
no form which is preferred by more than one agent. A black circle means that
all ten agents prefer the same form for this meaning. If all the circles are black,
the agents have reached 100% convergence. If the lines between the circles are
full lines, the same participant role is expressed by the same marker across con-
structions. If however the line is dotted, there is a different form for the same
meaning.
This can best be illustrated through an example. The circle for meaning 4
(approach-1) indicates that there are 4 or 5 agents in the population which prefer
the same form for marking this participant role at this stage of the simulation.
For circles 5 (approach-2) and 31 (approach-1 approach-2), there are two or three
agents that prefer the same form. The dotted lines between the circles, however,
indicate that the most frequent pattern for circle 31 uses different markers than



























4.3 Experiment 1: individual selection without analogy
Figure 4.7 shows that after 7.000 language games, the agents have almost con-
verged on a form for every meaning, but the problem of systematicity remains:
in half of the cases, a different case marker is winning the competition on the
level of single-argument constructions than the one(s) winning on the other lev-
els. The figure also shows that in most of the cases where there is no systematic
use of a form for the samemeaning, convergence is also still not complete. This is
in contrast to the meanings which (accidentally) arrived at the same form across
constructions. Here we see mostly black circles meaning that all agents prefer
the same convention.
4.3.3.2 Discussion
The results clearly indicate that the agents are not capable of constructing a sys-
tematic language. The reason for this is that all constructions are basically treated
as independent linguistic items. This means that once a larger pattern is cre-
ated, it starts living its own life without influencing or being influenced by the
constructions that were used to create it. This results in some case markers los-
ing the competition for marking a certain participant role on the level of single-
argument constructions but still becoming the most successful one as part of a
larger pattern. In all the simulations, this happened in 40 to 60% of the cases (see
Figure 4.10).
The fact that in more than half of the cases the same marker wins the com-
petition on all levels is due to the small meaning space of the experiment and the
fact that patterns are always created by combining the most successful construc-
tions at a given point in the simulation. In fact, the agents can continue to create
new patterns for a certain combination of participant roles even if they already
know other patterns for it. For example, it may happen that on a lower level the
average confidence scores of a new combination becomes more successful than
the confidence score of the patterns. In this case the agents will still innovate
which gives a slight advantage to those patterns that are in line with the most
successful constructions of a lower level. As the results show, however, this is
not enough.
Since natural languages are also not fully regular, it is important to seewhether
the lack of systematicity in the experiments is relevant for the many exceptions
and sub-regularities found in natural languages. The answer is no: for most if not
all irregular forms and sub-regularities in natural language, either a systematic
origin can be found through diachronic changes or through external pressures
such as language contact. For example, the -ed-participle in English did not man-
age to extend its use to all past tenses as can be observed in irregular verbs such
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Experiment 1: snapshot after 7.000 language games - individual selection
Figure 4.7: This diagram gives a snapshot of the average coherence in a popula-
tion of 10 agents after 7.000 language games using the direct selection
alignment strategy. The agents have reached convergence for most
meanings by now, but these form-meaning mappings are not always
systematically related to each other. For example, the meanings re-
lated to 49 were pretty consistent in their meaning-form mappings af-
ter 1.000 games, but have now become totally unrelated to each other:
for each possible combination a new form is introduced to cover the
same meaning. In all the cases where there is no systematicity, the
convergence is not complete yet.
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as to sing and to give. These strong verbs are however remnants of completely reg-
ular classes of verbs in Proto-Indo-European that were able to survive thanks to
their high token frequency. Despite all sociological factors, historical incidents,
language contact, and other kinds of exceptions, natural languages succeed re-
markably well in developing systematicity spanning over many constructions,
as for example word order in English. Given the abstractions and scaffolds of
the present experiments, the agents should thus be capable of developing a fully
systematic language without any problems.
This leaves us the question of how systematicity can be achieved. As said be-
fore, all systematic form-meaning mappings have been formed by accident due
to the small world and the nature of the innovation mechanism. For true sys-
tematicity, however, the agents need to be able to recognize relations between
constructions rather than treating them as a list of independent units. This would
mean that if a particular construction is successful, its systematically related con-
structions should also (perhaps indirectly) benefit from its success. In §4.4 I will
introduce a biologically inspired mechanism that can be exploited to achieve this
effect: multi-level selection.
4.3.4 The problem of systematicity in other work
As tomy knowledge, the problem of systematicity has never been reported before
in the field of the origins and evolution of language. This does not mean, however,
that the problem never existed. In this section, I will give a brief overview of some
prior work in the field in which the problem was either overlooked or in which
it could not occur due to experimental assumptions.
4.3.4.1 Exemplar-based simulations
One computational simulation which is closely related to the work in this book is
presented by Batali (2002). Batali investigates how a multi-agent population can
form a recursive communication system by using exemplars stored in memory.
This work can be categorized as a ‘problem-solving model’ because these exem-
plars have to be agreed upon in locally situated interactions. Each exemplar has
a confidence score which is increased and decreased according to similar lateral
inhibition dynamics as in the simulations of the previous section. The type of
learner is thus the same one as the agents in this book: they build their language
instance by instance in a bottom-up and redundant fashion. Batali’s agents only
keep exemplars and all generalization in the model is captured by directly ma-
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nipulating these exemplars during processing. Figure 4.8 gives an example of an
exemplar composed of two smaller ones (Batali 2002: exemplar 5.1.2.a).
(snake 1) (sang 1) (chased 1 2)




Figure 4.8: A complex exemplar from Batali (2002). The exemplar features a com-
positional meaning with ‘argument maps’ to the smaller exemplars
that take care of variable equalities in the meaning.
Batali does not use event-specific variables as I do in this book but assumes a
simple three-way contrast between arguments 1, 2 and 3. For example the mean-
ing ((snake 1) (sang 1)) translates to something like ‘the snake sang’, whereas
((snake 1) (sang 2)) would mean something like ‘there was a snake and some-
thing sang.’ Event structure is stored immediately in the exemplar but can be
overridden by argument maps between complex exemplars and their subcompo-
nents. For example, the argument map ‘1:2’ translates a meaning like (rat 1) to (rat
2). These argument maps are also stored as part of the complex exemplar. Apart
from these argument maps between complex exemplars and their components,
all exemplars are unrelated and listed in the memory.
The agents then engage in a series of description games. They are able to in-
vent new words for new meanings and they are capable of combining existing
words into larger patterns or breaking up a pattern again into smaller parts. The
ultimate goal of the agents is two-fold: (a) agree on a shared lexicon for all the
single meanings (e.g. cat, fox, chase, etc.) and (b) agree on a way to mark event
structure through the argument maps (i.e. marking the difference between argu-
ments 1, 2 and 3). The simulations make use of a single generation of agents.
The results indicate that the agents gradually reach communicative success
and that they agree on the same exemplars. Goal (a) is therefore definitely reached.
However, the results show that event structure is not always marked in the same
way: all the simulations end up using specific ordering for each exemplar (even
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though they may involve the same meanings) and using ‘empty’ words that ac-
cidentally evolved into markers for argument mappings. The agents thus do not
succeed in agreeing on a systematic way of distinguishing participant ‘1’ from
participants ‘2’ and ‘3’. The agents thus cannot generalize argument mapping
to new predicates such as (give 1 2 3) and have to negotiate event structure for
each word separately. This lack of systematicity is not noted by Batali as a prob-
lem and the use of the empty words is wrongly interpreted as corresponding to
argument markers in natural languages.
4.3.4.2 Probabilistic grammars
Another experiment inwhich the systematicity problem is overlooked is reported
by De Pauw (2002: chapter 10). De Pauw investigates how rudimentary princi-
ples of syntax can emerge from distributional aspects of communication rather
than from the interface between syntax and semantics. This exclusive focus on
syntax is different from the work in this book (even though some semantics is
smuggled into De Pauw’s simulations in the disctinction between animate and
non-animate objects which results in different distributional patterns). Similar
assumptions to this book are the heavy use of memory (even more so by De
Pauw), a bottom-up and redundant formation of the language and a predefined
lexicon in order to focus exclusively on the topic of interest. The population in De
Pauw’s simulations is dynamic in the sense that there is a generational turn-over,
but no linguistic information is transmitted genetically from one generation to
the next.
The agents engage in a series of language games in which they communicate
about objects or events. If there are several objects, the agents can choose be-
tween six word orders: SVO, SOV, VSO, VOS, OSV or OVS. De Pauw therefore
does not distinguish between verb-specific participant roles, but only assumes
a two-way contrast between the subject (S) and the object (O). The agents start
without any preference for a particular word order so variation naturally occurs
in the population. The alignment strategy of the agents is simply storing bigrams
or frequencies of co-occurrences and performing statistical induction on top of
those bigrams (De Pauw 2002: 362):
During the simulations, the agents rapidly converge on fixed word order on
simple relations. However, as De Pauw notes, there are no general tendencies in
terms of a general word order. Each ‘verb’ rather has its own preferred ordering.
For more complex relations, the agents do not always reach coherence. De Pauw
concludes that the agents therefore reside in a local maximum and that they
evolve from one local maximum of convergence to the next. De Pauw argues
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and agent6 agent7 tiger eat pig chased
1 1 0 1 1 0
Figure 4.9: The agents in De Pauw (2002) store co-occurrence frequencies and
use these bigram-probabilities to decide on a preferred ordering.
that this is not a shortcoming of the model but rather its greatest asset: whereas
other models in the field are looking for the state of convergence, “language itself
never converges and constantly adapts to a changing environment and seems
to be driven by chaotic elements, introducing a large degree of randomness in
language both from a synchronic, as well as a diachronic point of view” (p. 378).
There are however no such chaotic elements present in De Pauw’s model
which should prevent the agents from reaching complete coherence. The degree
of randomness in his simulations seems to stem from the systematicity problem:
by only looking at bigram probabilities, it is to be expected that there is an arbi-
trary word order which is verb-specific. In the case of more complex predicates,
the preferred order depends on a combination of various bigramswhich increases
the randomness because the probabilities of these bigrams are constantly chang-
ing so it becomes much harder to agree on a fixed order for these complex mean-
ings. De Pauw dismisses the possibility that the degree of convergence is the
maximum that can be expected from the population, but this is in fact the only
correct conclusion. Given the cognitive capabilities of the agents, convergence
could only increase if the input would be more structured. In certain machine
learning tasks, there is already a lot of structure present in the learning data so
bigrams can be successfully used for making some predictions. In the case of
language formation, however, agents have to start from scratch so there is no
structure spanning multiple levels yet that can be induced.
De Pauw’s concluding remark is that it is empirically impossible to know
whether the agents succeed in “expressing the proper (agent, patient) relation-
ship, or if it is just a side-effect of beneficial bigram probability distributions” (p.
376). I would argue, however, that since the agents are not endowed with the
capacity of relating bigrams to each other but solely rely on these probabilities,
all tendencies in word order are in fact a side-effect of the bigrams. The conclu-
sion is that De Pauw (2002), just like Batali (2002), misinterpreted experimental
results because the problem of systematicity was not noticed.
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4.3.4.3 Iterated Learning Models
So far I only discussed models that featured lazy learners: agents which post-
pone generalization until processing time and which shape their language in a
step-by-step fashion. As opposed to lazy learners there are ‘eager learners’. Ea-
ger learners try to look for generalizations (and abstractions) before it is actu-
ally needed in processing and work on the complete inventory. Eager learners
typically discard the examples that can be derived from a rule and thus try to
optimize the inventory size. If the problem of systematicity also occurs with ea-
ger learners, then we know that the problem is not exclusive to the usage-based
approach proposed in this book.
In the field of artificial language evolution, especially Iterated LearningModels
feature agents that loop through their inventory after each interaction in order
to make abstractions. In §5.2 I will draw a thorough comparison between my
experimental results and those of Moy (2006), who investigated the same topic
using the Iterated Learning Model so I will not go into details here. As a quick
preview, I can already give away one of the conclusions which is that the problem
of systematicity also occurs in Iterated Learning Models. This does not only hap-
pen in Moy’s experiments, but also in the simulations reported by Kirby (2000)
and Smith, Kirby & Brighton (2003) even though these models feature complete
meaning transfer and a population of only two agents.
The conclusion is the same as for the other simulations reported in this sec-
tion: the problem of systematicity goes by unnoticed in most Iterated Learning
Models, but becomes very apparent in Moy (2006). The problem occurs for the
same reasons as in all the other experiments: the agents only behave ‘systematic’
during innovation and learning, but then treat all linguistic items as an unstruc-
tured list of unrelated elements. So either there is no adequate model yet that
avoids the problem of systematicity or the problem is not restricted to the type
of learner. In the latter case, the problem seems to be caused by the fact that the
linguistic inventory is unstructured.
4.3.4.4 Other models
Finally, there are many models that investigate certain aspects of grammar in
which the problem of systematicity does not occur such as De Beule (2007); De
Beule & Bergen (2006); Nowak & Krakauer (1999); Steels & Wellens (2006); etc.
I will take the simulations by De Beule & Bergen (2006) as an example of why
these models don’t have the problem. The conclusions of this brief discussion
extend to all the other models on grammar as well.
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De Beule & Bergen investigate the competition between holistic and compo-
sitional utterances. In case of compositional utterances, one could expect the
problem of systematicity to pop up, but it doesn’t. The reason is that De Beule &
Bergen designed their experiment in such a way that the agents had prior knowl-
edge about what kind of categories and constructions to expect: individual words
are immediately tagged with a certain syntactic category and grammatical con-
structions are fully schematic from the start. One construction can hence be used
for all possible combinations of competing individual words that are tagged with
the same category and remains agnostic as to which words should win the com-
petition. The experiment thus made a clear separation between the lexicon on
the one hand and grammatical constructions on the other; and it did not offer
the agents the possibility of in-between patterns or idioms.
This is not a criticism of themodel per se: given the fact that De Beule & Bergen
only intended to focus on competition between holistic and compositional utter-
ances, the design choice is justified in which the competition dynamics can be
clearly investigated on each level. As such the experiment can be interpreted
as investigating a prerequisite of grammar rather than the emergence of actual
grammar. For the scope of this book, this experimental design is thus not war-
ranted: the barrier between fully idiomatic items and fully schematic items needs
to be broken down.
4.4 Experiment 2: multi-level selection without analogy
4.4.1 Overview
In the previous section I demonstrated the problem of systematicity that occurs
during the emergence of a language if the agents treat all entries in their linguis-
tic inventory as unrelated individuals and if their language comprises multiple
layers of organization. An alignment strategy involving the individual selection
of constructions leads to completely arbitrary form-meaning pairs whereas nat-
ural languages show greater cohesion and a higher degree of systematically re-
lated constructions. Even in idioms such as he kicked the bucket, some degree of
schematicity is present such as the conjugation of the verb. The agents therefore
need a new alignment strategy in which the success of one construction may
have an impact on the success of other related constructions.
In this section I will present an experiment which features new alignment
strategies that are inspired by the notion of ‘multi-level selection’ in evolutionary
biology (Wilson & Sober 1994). Multi-level selection (formerly known as ‘group
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selection’) acknowledges the fact that groups or other higher-level entities can
act as ‘vehicles’ for selection. In this view, not all aspects of groups are reduced
to by-products of individual (and usually selfish) interactions. In other words,
being part of a group can increase the selectionist advantage of individuals.
Natural languages are clear instances of organisms with a hierarchical func-
tional organization which can be conceived as ‘groups within groups’. Compe-
tition is going on at multiple levels of this organization: between synonyms for
becoming dominant in expressing a particular meaning, between idiomatic pat-
terns that group a number of words, between different syntactic and semantic
categories competing for a role in the grammar, between ways in which a syntac-
tic category is marked, etc. Multi-level selections therefore seems to be readily
applicable to language as well.
4.4.2 Experimental set-up
The most important requirement for implementing multi-level selection is that
the agents have to be capable themselves of recognizing relations between lin-
guistic items. This is in fact not so difficult to achieve: in §4.2.3 I explained that
the agents keep a link between larger constructions and the constructions that
were used for creating them. These links can nowbe used for implementingmulti-
level selection. Three different alignment strategies have been implemented for
comparison:
• Top-down selection: if the game was a success, the hearer will not only
reward the constructions that were applied during processing, but also
all the related constructions on a lower level. The confidence scores of
all the competitors of these constructions are decreased through lateral
inhibition.
• Bottom-up selection: If the game was a success, the hearer will not only
increase the score of the applied constructions, but also the scores of all the
related constructions on a higher level. All the competing constructions
are punished.
• Multi-level selection: If the game was a success, the hearer will not only
increase the score of the applied constructions, but also the scores of all re-
lated constructions. All the competing constructions are punished through
lateral inhibition.
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Retrieving related constructions is performed recursively. For example, if a
three-argument construction was applied using the top-down selection align-
ment strategy, its two sub-components are retrieved (a two-argument and a single-
argument construction) as well as the two sub-components of the two-argument
construction. The hearer thus increases the scores of five constructions. The
competitors are all the direct competitors of these five constructions.
During processing, only the scores of the applied constructions are taken into
account and not of the whole group of related constructions. The group selection
dynamics therefore onlymatter during consolidation. The rest of the set-up is the
same as for experiment 1.
4.4.3 Results and discussion
The three alignment strategies were compared to each other and to experiment
1 in ten series of 10.000 language games.
4.4.3.1 Results
Figure 4.10 illustrates the amount of systematicity in all four alignment strategies.
The graph shows that the three alignment strategies involving multiple levels all
improve on the baseline of individual selection of experiment 1. With the align-
ment strategy of individual selection, systematicity fluctuates between 40 and
60% depending on how ‘lucky’ the agents were. The behaviour of the other three
strategies is much more consistent over the ten series. The graph shows that
bottom-up selection allows the agents to improve systematicity to 80% but there
they are faced with ‘frozen accidents’ as well. The top-down selection improves
systematicity even further and allows the agents to reach full systematicity in
some of the runs. However, in most cases, there were still two or three unsystem-
atic patterns left. Only the multi-level selection strategy led to full systematicity
in all the simulations.
Since the measure of systematicity only looks at the most frequent forms float-
ing in a population, it needs to be complemented with meaning-form coherence
to verify whether all the agents converge on the same preferences. Figure 4.11
therefore compares the performance of the four alignment strategies in terms of
coherence. From the results of experiment 1 we already knew that in the case
of individual selection, alignment takes longer than 10.000 language games. The
coherence line for bottom-up selection runs almost parallel with it and does not
improve on it in terms of convergence speed. The only two strategies that reach
convergence within 10.000 games are top-down and multi-level selection. Full
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Experiment 2: population size = 10, context size = 5, equal frequency
Figure 4.10: This graph compares the performance in terms of systematicity of
four experimental set-ups. systematicity fluctuates around 50% in the
baseline case where there is only individual selection (experiment 1).
With the bottom-up selection strategy the agents improve the sys-
tematicity rate to 80% but then get stuck. Top-down selection leads
to full systematicity in some of the runs, but most of the simulations
feature some ‘frozen accidents’ as well. Only the multi-level selec-
tion strategy leads to full systematicity in all the series after about
7.000 language games.
coherence in the case of top-down selection however does not mean full system-
aticity, as was shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.12 shows the average number of constructions in the ten series in-
volving the alignment strategy of multi-level selection. The graph confirms the
fact that the agents converge significantly faster on an optimal number of con-
structions than in experiment 1. At the peak of competing constructions, there
are about 60 single-argument constructions, 30 two-argument constructions and
6 three-argument constructions or an average of two competing constructions
for each possible meaning. This is much less than in experiment 1 (see Fig-
ure 4.4) which featured peaks of 80 single-argument, 50 two-argument and 10
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Experiment 2: population size = 10, context size = 5, equal frequency
Figure 4.11: Since the systematicity graph only takes the most frequent forms
into account, meaning-form coherence has to be checked in order
to verify whether all the agents have converged on the same form-
meaning pairs. We see that after 10.000 language games, only the
top-down and the multi-level selection alignment strategies have al-
ready reached complete coherence. Multi-level selection slightly out-
performs top-down selection but not significantly so. In the case of
bottom-up and individual selection, the agents need additional lan-
guage games for reaching coherence.
three-argument constructions. Also alignment happens much faster: with multi-
level selection, the agents align after 6.000 games as opposed to 14.000 language
games or more if the agents use individual selection.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 offer a snapshot of the most frequent forms in a popu-
lation using the multi-level selection alignment strategy. Both snapshots con-
firm the results indicated by the coherence and systematicity graphs. Figure 4.13
shows already much more dark grey circles than Figure 4.6 featuring individual
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Figure 4.12: This graph shows the average number of constructions known by
an agent using the multi-level selection alignment strategy. Com-
pared to individual selection, multi-level selection allows the agents
to discard competitors much more rapidly: there are significantly
less variations floating around in the population. For example, the
peak of single-argument constructions is about 60 instead of 80 in
experiment 1. Also the alignment phase happens much faster.
selection, indicating that for most meanings there is already a majority of agents
preferring the same form. The preferred forms are also to a higher degree system-
atically related to each other than in experiment 1, even for the more complex
patterns. All black circles in the Figure feature meanings which are related to
other meanings, which suggests that multi-level selection indeed favours groups
of related items. The snapshot in Figure 4.14 only shows black circles, which
means that all agents in the population prefer the same form for that particu-
lar meaning. There are also only full lines between the circles indicating that the
same case markers are consistently used across patterns. This result significantly
improves over the earlier results with individual selection.
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Experiment 2d: snapshot after 1.000 language games - multi-level selection
Figure 4.13: This diagram gives a snapshot of the average coherence in a popu-
lation of 10 agents after 1.000 language games using the multi-level
selection alignment strategy. Compared to the simulations using di-
rect selection, the agents seem to be converging more rapidly on
meaning-form mappings and have already settled on 11 of them.
Whereas there was no convergence at all yet for the more complex
meanings 49–51 in the simulations using the direct selection align-
ment strategy, here they are already shared by a majority of the
population. This suggests that multi-level selection speeds up the
convergence dynamics significantly especially for related meanings.
For the meanings in the bottom right, there is less systematicity and
hence convergence takes longer time.
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Experiment 2d: snapshot after 7.000 language games - multi-level selection
Figure 4.14: This diagram gives a snapshot of the average coherence in a popu-
lation of 10 agents after 7.000 language games using the multi-level
selection alignment strategy. All the circles are black which means
that the entire population prefers the same meaning-form mappings.
The language is also fully systematic so the agents have converged
on 30 case markers which can be combined into 51 different con-
structions. The results indicate that even for instance-based learner-
s/innovators systematicity can be reached by keeping a link between
newly acquired constructions and the constructions that were used
for learning or creating them.
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4.4.3.2 Discussion
The results show that the agents reach full systematicity if each level in the lin-
guistic inventory can have an influence on the competition in other levels. It is
now important to understand why this is the case and why the other alignment
strategies did not yield full systematicity.
First of all, bottom-up selection doesn’t improve on the results of experiment
1 in terms of convergence speed and it doesn’t lead to a systematic mapping
of meaning to form across patterns. A closer examination of the the alignment
strategy reveals that the relatively high systematicity of 80% is due to the higher
frequency of single-argument constructions. The frequent use of these construc-
tions each time has repercussions for the competition between larger construc-
tions whereas this is not the case in the other direction. If there would be more
patterns than single-argument constructions, the improvement would therefore
be less high. The patterns that resist the bottom-up selection can do so because
the competition is not fully decided yet on a lower level (each time reinforcing
competing patterns) and there is additional competition on the level of the pat-
terns themselves which may have different winners than those on lower levels.
In the end, though, the bottom-up strategy should lead to full systematicity but
only very slowly and because the smaller constructions are more frequent.
The top-down strategy is affected by frequency as well: competition between
the larger constructions has significant impact on lower levels because it can
increase the scores of up to six constructions while at the same time punishing
all competitors. However, since the smaller constructions are actually more fre-
quent than the larger ones, some divergent competition pathways may resist this
influence from the patterns and survive nevertheless. As the results indicate, this
in fact happens in most of the simulations. Top-down selection thus improves
systematicity significantly, but it is affected by the frequency of the various levels
of linguistic items and it is therefore no guarantee of full systematicity.
Finally, the agents can achieve full systematicity through multi-level selection.
This strategy allows the competition of each level to influence the competition
on others and given its n-directionality, it is not (or less) dependent on differ-
ences in frequency. Moreover, the agents do not need to differentiate between
a ‘higher’ and a ‘lower’ level but can treat all links between constructions on
equal footing. The results of experiment 2 confirm earlier results on multi-level
selection and systematicity reported by Steels, van Trijp & Wellens (2007). In
these experiments, which involved a scale-up in convergence space, multi-level
selection outperforms the other strategies even more significantly.
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4.5 Experiment 3: multi-level selection with analogy
4.5.1 Overview
Similarly to the previous experiments, experiment 3 investigates how baseline
experiment 3 can be extended with a diagnostic and repair for pattern formation.
Since the previous experiments identified the problem of systematicity, experi-
ment 3 first of all needs to verify whether the conclusions of the second experi-
ment also hold for the new set-up in which the agents are capable of performing
analogical reasoning over events. I will then report an experiment that adapts
the algorithm for multi-level selection to the token-frequency alignment strategy
of baseline experiment 3d (see §3.5).
4.5.2 Experimental set-up
Experiment 3 features the same experimental set-up as baseline experiment 3
with the addition of a diagnostic and repair strategy for pattern formation. To
summarize:
• The population consists of 10 agents that engage in description games;
• The meaning space is the same one as detailed in Table 3.2 and all event
types occur with the same frequency;
• The agents have two diagnostics: detecting unexpressed variable equalities
and the new diagnostic detecting whether two constructions were applied
during processing;
• The agents have two repair strategies: one for inventing and learning new
verb-specific markers and one for combining these markers into a larger
construction. The invention and learning strategy also includes the pos-
sibility of extending and reusing existing markers through analogical rea-
soning. The algorithm for analogy is the same as in baseline experiment 3
and only looks at individual markers.
The experiment has been tested using five different alignment strategies. The
first four strategies are individual selection, top-down selection, bottom-up se-
lection and multi-level selection using the same fine-grained lateral inhibition
mechanism as used in baseline experiment 3c. This means that competition is
only held at the level of the co-occurrence links between a construction and a
lexical entry rather than at the level of the constructions themselves. The algo-
rithms can be summarized as follows:
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• Individual selection: This is the exact same set-up as baseline experiment
3c. If a game was successful, the hearer will increase the score of the co-
occurrence link between the applied lexical entry and the applied construc-
tion(s) by 0.1. He will also decrease the scores of the competing links by
0.1. The score of a link is always between 0 (high uncertainty) and 1 (high
confidence).
• Top-down selection: In this strategy, the hearer will not only increase
the score of the relevant co-occurrence link, but also the score of all the
co-occurrence links that link the lexical entry to the smaller constructions
which are related to the applied construction. The scores of the competitors
of these links are decreased.
• Bottom-up selection: In this strategy, the hearer increases the score of the
relevant link and of all the co-occurrence links that link the lexical entry
to the larger constructions which are related to the applied constructions.
All competitors of these links are punished.
• Multi-level selection: In this strategy, the hearer increases the scores of
the relevant co-occurrence links and of all the links which link the lexical
entry to constructions that are related to the applied constructions.
The fifth experimental set-up does not involve lateral inhibition but imple-
ments multi-level selection and memory decay. In this set-up, the hearer will
not only increase the frequency score of the applied constructions, but also that
of all the related constructions by 1. The frequency scores have no upper limit,
so the higher the score, the more entrenched the construction is. After an agent
has individually engaged in 200 language games, the frequency scores of all the
items in the inventory are decreased.
In all five set-ups, the speaker will use the co-occurrence links to speed up pro-
cessing. This means that not the entire inventory of constructions is considered,
but only those constructions which are linked to the lexical entry. Links can be
added through co-occurrence. When the speaker is faced with multiple hypothe-
ses, he will choose the construction which either has the strongest co-occurrence
link with the lexical entry (in the first four set-ups) or the one with the highest
token frequency (in the fifth set-up). During processing, only the scores of indi-
vidual competitors are taken into account. All simulations have been run in 10
series of 12.000 language games.
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Figure 4.15: This graph compares systematicity in the first four experimental set-
ups of experiment 3. The results confirm those of experiment 2. Even
though there is potentially less variation because of the reuse of
existing markers, individual selection stagnates at 50% systematic-
ity. Bottom-up selection increases systematicity beyond 80% but also
gets stuck. Top-down selectionmanages to reach full systematicity in
more simulations than in experiment 2 because of the smaller vari-
ation space, but does not guarantee full systematicity. Only multi-
level selection reaches systematicity in all the simulations and does
so significantly faster than the other alignment strategies.
4.5.3 Results and discussion
In this section, the first four set-ups are again compared to each other to demon-
strate the reoccurrence of the problem of systematicity. The fourth set-up (multi-
level selection with lateral inhibition) is then compared more thoroughly to the
fifth set-up using multi-level selection and memory decay. Finally, this section
offers a closer look at one language evolved using the fifth set-up.
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4.5.3.1 Results
Figure 4.15 compares the first four experimental set-ups to each other in terms
of systematicity. The lines indicating systematicity for each set-up show the
same behaviour as those in experiment 2 (Figure 4.10). The first set-up using the
alignment strategy of individual selection fluctuates between 45 and 60% system-
aticity and stops evolving after 6.000 language games. The bottom-up strategy
reaches more than 80% systematicity after 8.000 language games. In some simu-
lations, this strategy leads up to 90% but never to maximum systematicity. Top-
down selection performs a bit better than in experiment 2 due to the fact that the
agent’s capacity of reusing existing markers leads to a smaller variation space so
‘frozen accidents’ are less likely. Yet, as the results show, some simulations still
involve an unsystematic convention and reaching systematicity takes a longer
time than the multi-level selection strategy. The latter strategy is again the only
one which leads to full systematicity in all the simulations.
The four set-ups also confirm the results of experiment 2 in terms of coherence.
Figure 4.16 shows that bottom-up selection and individual selection again run
almost parallel in terms of convergence. This time the agents reach coherence
faster because of the smaller variation space. Multi-level and top-down selection
also perform equally well and reach coherence between 6.000 and 8.000 language
games.
Figure 4.17 gives an indication of the kinds of languages that are formed in the
population if the agents use the fourth set-up (multi-level selection with lateral
inhibition). The graph shows that the generalization rate of the agents is not
really impressive: only three to five generalized roles survive the competition.
Moreover, these roles only cover two or maximally three participant roles. This
is clear from the fact that there are still 18 to 25 specific markers floating around
in the population.
These results can be compared to the performance of the fifth set-up (multi-
level selection with decay) which is illustrated in Figure 4.18. The top graph
shows the results for communicative success, cognitive effort, meaning-form co-
herence and systematicity. As the graph indicates, the agents succeed in reaching
full systematicity somewhere between 8.000 and 12.000 language games, which
is a bit slower than the alignment strategy using lateral inhibition. The bottom
graph shows the average number of markers floating around in the population.
Here, we see that the average number of specific markers has made a significant
drop from 18–25 markers to only 9. The number of semantic roles shifts from
simulation to simulation between 4 and 6. The semantic roles also tend to be
more general categories than in the simulations using lateral inhibition.
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Figure 4.16: This graph compares the first four set-ups of experiment 3 in terms of
meaning-form coherence. The graph shows that multi-level and top-
down selection perform equally well and reach 100% between 6.000
and 8.000 language games. Bottom-up and individual selection again
run almost parallel and reach coherence faster than in experiment 2
because of the smaller variation space.
Here is a list of markers and the participant roles they cover in one of the
simulations (from more general to more specific):
• -kad: object-1, approach-1, fall-1, touch-1, move-outside-1
• -fuir: grasp-2, hide-2, move-inside-2, touch-2, walk-to-1
• -kazo: approach-2, fall-2, grasp-1, hide-1, walk-to-2
• -hesa: move-1, take-3
• -ti: visible-1, take-1
• -qiwo: move-inside-1, give-3
• -fen: distance-decreasing-1
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Figure 4.17: This graph shows the average number of markers known by each
agent using the strategy of multi-level selection with lateral inhibi-
tion (the fourth set-up of experiment 3). The results show that the
generalization rate of the agents is not impressive: only 3–5 semantic
roles survive the competition as opposed to 18–25 specific markers.
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Figure 4.18: The top graph shows communicative success, cognitive effort, sys-
tematicity and meaning-form coherence in the set-up using multi-
level selection and decay. The bottom graph shows the average num-
ber of markers in the same set-up.
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The above markers occur systematically across patterns for marking the same
participant roles. In this specific example, the agents succeeded in reaching co-
herence and systematicity after only 8.000 language games. When we compare
the results to those of baseline experiment 3d, roughly the same level of general-
ization is reached.
Finally, Figure 4.19 looks inside the linguistic inventory of a single agent and
offers a partial network of the agent’s knowledge of its language. The figure con-
centrates on three constructions (in the middle) which are related to each other
(indicated by the dotted line). The relation between the constructions indicate
that construction-27 was created as a pattern of construction-2 and construction-
10. The figure also shows all the lexical entries that are conventionally associated
with these constructions. The links between the lexical entries and the construc-
tions are used for optimizing processing: instead of trying out all the construc-
tions in memory, only the linked constructions are considered. Links can be
added as part of a problem-solving process during communication or pruned if
the co-occurrence is not a successful one. Some redundant co-occurrence links
may survive in the inventory. The links can also be seen as fusion links: they are
annotated with information on how the participant roles can be fused with the
semantic roles of the construction. This annotation is however not used by the
agents themselves but for the clarity of interpretation for the experimenter. The
actual fusion is taken care of by the unification of the potential valents of the
lexical entry with the actual valency of the construction.
4.5.3.2 Discussion
The results of experiment 3 confirm the problem of systematicity that was uncov-
ered in the other experiments. Here too, the strategy using multi-level selection
was the only one to yield fully systematic languages. The systematicity rate was
in each of the first four set-ups comparable to the rates in experiment 2. This
may come as a surprise since the variation space is potentially smaller because
the agents can extend the use of existing markers rather than inventing new ones
all the time.
A closer look at the number of markers in the fourth set-up (multi-level selec-
tion with lateral inhibition), however, pointed to the reason for the small differ-
ences in systematicity rates: only a very small number of semantic roles survived
the competition compared to a large number of specific markers. This means that
the generalization rate is not really impressive so the number of variations is not
much smaller in these simulations than was the case in experiment 2. The result-
ing number of specific markers versus semantic roles corresponds to the results
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Figure 4.19: This figure gives a partial network for one agent in one of the simula-
tions using multi-level selection with decay. In the middle there are
three constructions which are systematically related to each other.
The constructions are also linked with lexical entries. The links
act both as co-occurrence links for optimizing processing and as fu-
sion links for integrating the participant roles of the lexical entries
with the semantic roles of the constructions. The networks are con-
structed in a stepwise fashion as a response to communicative needs.
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obtained in baseline experiment 3c and also the reason for the result is the same:
since the competition is held at the level of co-occurrence links and not at the
level of constructions, the type frequency of a marker does not translate into a
larger category gravity. Competition is held only in a local context so specific
markers have an equally high chance of winning as more generalized semantic
roles.
The results of the fifth set-up (multi-level selection with memory decay) also
confirm the results of the baseline experiments and improve significantly in
terms of generalization over the simulations using the fine-grained lateral in-
hibition dynamics. The number of specific categories has dropped by half and
larger, more general semantic roles have a selectionist advantage because they
occur more often. The generalization rate roughly matches the performance of
baseline experiment 3d.
The consistency in number of generalized semantic roles and specific markers
across the baseline experiments and the pattern experiments indicate that this
is the maximum generalization rate that the agents can reach. Possible improve-
ments would have to come from two sources:
1. The structure of the world: The capacity of analogical reasoning is heavily
dependent on the structure of the world environment in which communi-
cation takes place. If the agents have to communicate about lots of events
which show recurrent patterns in terms of visual primitives, they will be
able to detect more analogies. If, however, the world is totally unstruc-
tured, the agents will come up with more specific markers than general
semantic roles.
2. The capacity of analogical reasoning can be made more flexible. At the mo-
ment, the agents make a sharp distinction between what is analogous and
what is not. A possible relaxation could be to only care about whether the
mapping between a source role and a target role is discriminating enough
for identifying the target role as well. Another possibility would be to use a
similarity or a distance metric instead of the more rigid structural mapping
that the agents currently use.
Experiment 3 also shows the potential power of the combination of analogical
reasoning, pattern formation and multi-level selection respectively. First of all,
analogical reasoning over the linguistic inventory can lead to an increasing gen-
eralization rate in the population, as is also shown in several instance-based ap-
proaches to language (Daelemans & Van den Bosch 2005; Skousen 1989). These
150
4.5 Experiment 3: multi-level selection with analogy
models also argue that a language can look rule-based from outside whereas in
fact the generalization is distributed over the linguistic items in the inventory.
This experiment shows that this observation also holds true for the case of the
emergence of grammar if multi-level selection is applied. Finally, the formation
of patterns to improve processing can have dramatic effects on the grammar: the
patterns increase the survival chances of its related items; and they may poten-
tially extend their use as well in later interactions.
So far, I did not spend much attention to the efficiency of the formalization of
argument realization proposed in Chapter 2. In all the experiments presented in
this Chapter and the previous one, the representation has proven to be flexible
enough to deal with the enormous amount of uncertainty that is inherent to the
emergence of new grammar conventions. In this case, the agents needed a flexi-
ble way of integrating lexical entries with constructions of various degrees of en-
trenchment. Instead of copying all the possible case frames into a new entry, the
formalization allowed the agents to constantly ‘mould’ their lexical entries until
a stable set of conventions had been negotiated. In this way, the competition of
case markers could be held exclusively at the level of constructions instead of cre-
ating an additional competition on the lexical level for how these lexical entries
should be integrated with the constructions. The lexical entries also integrated as
easily with verb-specific constructions as with verb-class specific constructions.
The formalization was also flexible enough to deal with multiple argument
realization: the agents were capable of integrating a single lexical entry into
multiple patterns or constructions without the need for derivational rules or ad-
ditional copies in the lexicon. Moreover, the lexical entries do not need to ‘pro-
file’ their participant roles: the actual valency of a verb is determined by the
construction it integrates with. Preferences for certain patterns of argument re-
alization could be captured in this formalization by assigning a frequency score
to the co-occurrence links of the lexical entries and the constructions that they
are conventionally associated with.
One aspect that is still absent in the experiment is how the functions of the case
markers start to influence each other once they start combining into patterns. At
this moment, the meanings of the markers stay the same and patterning only
influences their survival chances. Future work would thus have to include a
way for the patterns themselves to evolve, which would also require the analogy
to use the patterns as the source domain for innovation rather than focusing
exclusively on single markers.
Including the patterns into the search domain could however lead to a huge
hypothesis space and a complexity measure is needed to verify whether the algo-
151
4 Multi-level selection and language systematicity
rithm for analogy can scale up to larger worlds while maintaining a reasonable
processing time. If not, a possible alternative could be a nearest-neighbour al-
gorithm which has already been successfully applied to various tasks in natural
language processing. In a comparison between Royal Skousen’s Analogical Mod-
eling (Skousen 1989) and Memory-Based Language Processing (Daelemans & Van
den Bosch 2005), Daelemans (2002) shows that a relatively simple and efficient
nearest-neighbour learner yields comparable and sometimes even better results
than the costly algorithm of Analogical Modeling. This observation seriously
challenges the more traditional approach to analogy and is highly relevant for
the discussion of this work as well.
4.6 Towards syntactic cases
4.6.1 Overview
The experiments so far have dealt with stages 1 to 3 in the development of case
markers (see Chapter 1). The next step is the introduction of syntactic roles that
group together two or more semantic roles. In this section, I will introduce a first
experiment that investigates how the transition to stage 4 can be achieved and
what can be learned from the results. I will then use the grammatical square as
a roadmap for future experiments.
4.6.2 A first experiment
As I argued in sections 1.2.5 and 1.2.6, syntactic roles impose even more abstrac-
tion on the conceptualization of specific events than semantic roles do. In natu-
ral languages, syntactic roles typically emerge when a category gradually starts
extending its use until two cases merge into one class. In this first tentative ex-
periment, I will scaffold the merger of cases and assume that a case marker can
extend its use by subcategorization rather than by merging two roles. I will make
this assumption more clear in the following paragraphs.
4.6.2.1 Experimental set-up
The experiment features the exact same set-up as the fourth set-up in experiment
3: the agents are capable of reusing a marker through analogy and combining the
markers into larger patterns. They employ the alignment strategy of multi-level
selection using lateral inhibition. Themain question of the experiment is whether
the agents are capable of aligning their grammars, which form an abstract inter-
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mediary layer of semantic and syntactic roles which are not directly observable
by the other agents.
The novelty of this particular set-up involves the idea of ‘reusing as much as
possible’. Roughly speaking, a speaker will reuse an existing marker even if it is
not analogous to the target role, on the condition that the marker does not cover
a conflicting participant role yet. The algorithm is operationalized as follows:
1. If the speaker diagnosed a problem of unexpressed variable equalities, he
tries to repair the problem.
2. The speaker checks whether he already has a marker which can be reused:
a) Take all known markers. Markers are ordered according to type fre-
quency, that is, from more general (i.e. covering the most participant
roles) to less general (i.e. covering the least participant roles). Loop
through the markers until a solution is found:
i. Take all the semantic roles that are covered by the marker, also
ordered according to type frequency.
ii. Loop through the semantic roles until a role is found which is
analogous to the target role. If so, return the analogy.
b) If a solution is found, return the analogy. If not…
i. Take the most general marker which does not cover another par-
ticipant role of the same event yet;
ii. Create a new role for the target role and make it a subcategory
of the chosen marker.
c) If there are no markers yet or if no marker can be found that does not
already cover a conflicting participant role, create a new marker.
3. The speaker creates the necessary rules and/or links in the inventory.
The hearer learns a marker in a similar way. If he observes a marker in a new
situation, he will first try to retrieve an analogous role covered by that marker.
If he cannot retrieve the analogy, he creates a new specific role and makes it a
subcategory of the marker. It will often happen that the speaker used a marker
which according to the hearer already covered a conflicting participant role. For
example, the speaker uses -bo for marking ‘approach-1’, whereas the hearer has
already observed this marker for covering ‘approach-2’. In this case, the hearer
will nevertheless create a new specific role for the new use as a possible subcat-
egory of the marker. The fine-grained alignment strategy of the experimental
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set-up is flexible enough to rule out which participant role should win the com-
petition (unless another marker takes over).
The main idea behind this innovation and learning strategy is that the speaker
will be reluctant to invent a newmarker. Rather, he will reuse a marker as long as
it is discriminating a participant role in an event from the other roles. This means
that, in principle, the agents should suffice in using three different markers. This
experimental set-up has been implemented in a two-agent simulation and a five-
agent simulation.
4.6.2.2 Results
The two-agent simulation features no variation in the population so the agents
have no problems in aligning their grammars since they are endowed with the
same algorithm of analogical reasoning. The resulting grammar is illustrated in
Figure 4.20 which shows the mapping between participant, semantic and syntac-
tic roles.
The diagram shows that the two agents indeed agree upon three case markers
for covering all thirty participant roles. The results even seem to improve on the
markers that were formed in baseline experiment 3a: ten semantic roles have
been formed as opposed to six specific roles (which are also called ‘sem-roles’ in
the experiment for convenience’s sake). On the other hand, the baseline exper-
iment featured two semantic roles which covered six and four participant roles
respectively, whereas the semantic roles in this case reach a maximum of four.
In terms of inventory size, the agents require 16 single-argument, 16 two-
argument and 3 three-argument constructions. The fact that the number of two-
and three-argument constructions is almost the same as in the experiments us-
ing no analogy is due to the fact that only in two cases, a larger construction can
also be fused with two different lexical entries. For example, approach and fall
integrate with the same three constructions. So even though single-argument
constructions can group several participant roles together, the patterns do not
succeed in going beyond a verb-specific use.
The results of the two-agent simulation can now be taken as the baseline for
the multi-agent simulations. A similar snapshot of the multi-agent simulation
is presented in Figure 4.21 and Figure 4.22. These diagrams present the internal
mappings between participant, semantic and syntactic roles from two different
agents in the same population. Both agents (as well as the other agents in the
population) converge on a coherent set of meaning-form mappings.
A closer look at the two diagrams shows that the agents have converged on
five different case markers. Two of these markers are participant role-specific,
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Figure 4.20: This diagram shows the mapping between participant roles and se-
mantic roles; and between semantic roles and syntactic roles in the
two-agent simulation on the emergence of syntactic roles. Since
there are no variations in the simulation, both agents align their
grammars perfectly. The results are taken as the baseline for the
multi-agent simulations.
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while the others group together multiple roles. Compared to the two-agent sim-
ulation, there is a significant loss in number of semantic roles: the first agent has
constructed five semantic roles and the second agent has constructed six seman-
tic roles. This leaves 18 and 17 specific roles respectively. Most of the semantic
roles also only cover two participant roles.
A comparison of the semantic roles of both agents also shows that they do not
align their internal categorization. For example, the agent in Figure 4.21 groups
‘move-outside-2’, ‘walk-to-1’, ‘fall-2’ and ‘grasp-2’ together. The other agent has
a similar category but has constructed a separate role for ‘fall-2’. The other agent
has also created a semantic role for covering ‘move-inside-2’ and ‘move’, whereas
these are two distinct categories for the first agent.
4.6.2.3 Discussion of the two-agent simulation
The agents in the two-agent simulation were capable of improving over baseline
experiment 3a in terms of semantic roles, single-argument constructions and the
number of markers. The improvement is due to the fact that the limited use of
markers guides the search space more strongly during innovation. In the pre-
vious experiments, each semantic role had its own case marker so the chances
that they had the same type frequency were quite high. In this case, the speaker
would always randomly choose which semantic role to extend. In this new simu-
lation, the type frequency of the syntactic role was more important which led to
a faster divergence between the productivity rate of the cases. This means that
semantic roles which would otherwise miss extension due to random choice now
have more weight to categorize new participant roles.
An interesting side-effect of the innovation algorithm is that there are two
syntactic roles which cover almost exclusively semantic roles while a third role
acts as a waste basket category for three participant roles which are all three
part of events featuring three participants. This maps onto the distinction be-
tween agents and patients (and subjects and objects) that is made by most of
the languages in the world. Most theories of language assume a (near-)universal
distinction between agents and patients to be given (either based on a universal
conceptual space or on Universal Grammar). This first tentative experiment sug-
gests an alternative hypothesis: the distinction could emerge as a side-effect of
communicative goals because language users want to make grammatically and
communicatively relevant distinctions. In most of the cases, two or three syntac-
tic roles suffice. The extension of case markers and the merger of semantic role
could thus spontaneously lead to ‘core’ cases.
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Figure 4.21: The mapping between participant, semantic and syntactic roles in a
single agent in the multi-agent simulation.
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Figure 4.22: This diagram shows the internal mapping as known by another
agent in the population.
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A final remark considering the two-agent simulation is that there is no gain
in terms of inventory size with respect to larger constructions. This is due to
the fact that only a couple of constructions share the same semantic roles which
combine into the same larger construction. As I suggested during the discussion
of experiment 3, the newly formed patterns themselves should be considered by
the analogy as well. This could further increase the generalization and produc-
tivity rate of the agents and could be an additional drive towards a prototypical
agent-patient distinction.
4.6.2.4 Discussion of the multi-agent simulation
The results of the multi-agent simulation shows that the alignment of an indirect
and multilayered grammatical mapping is no trivial issue: the number of seman-
tic roles constructed by each agent drops significantly and there are differences
in how the internal mapping of each agent is organized. This is basically a prob-
lem of feedback: there is too much variation floating around in the population for
the agents to successfully retrieve the analogy meant by the speaker. Additional
feedback could consist of alternative agnating structures that could be exploited
for constructing semantic roles. This, however, would require the capacity of
dynamically updating the function or meaning of the semantic roles, which the
agents do not have (also see the concluding remarks in §3.5).
4.6.3 The grammar square: a roadmap for further work
The first experiments towards syntax showed that once the mapping between se-
mantic roles and syntactic roles becomes indirect and polysemous, the agents are
faced with a complex coordination problem: the abstract layer of semantic and
syntactic roles is not directly observable from the outside and the agents have
no means of finding a shared categorization. Yet the alignment of this internal
categorization is crucial in order to preserve a good productivity and generaliza-
tion rate for reaching communicative success in future interactions. In order to
take this step, the experimental set-up needs to be expanded. We can use the
grammar square (repeated in Figure 4.23), as a guidance for identifying which
efforts need to be made in order to solve this coordination problem.
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Figure 4.23: The grammar square can be read as a roadmap for future research.
Each mapping in the square is dependent on the context, so experi-
ments should investigatewhichmechanisms and conditions can lead
to such an indirect mapping.
4.6.3.1 Mapping participant roles onto semantic roles
Participant roles of a particular event can map onto several semantic roles in
natural languages. This is clear in the following sentences, in which the window
first plays the role of patient, then some entity which undergoes a change of state,
and finally some stative entity:
(17) He broke the window.
(18) The window broke.
(19) The window was broken.
In the experiments presented in this book, such functional variation was im-
possible: during conceptualization, the agents always profile the complete partic-
ipant role in the event structure. This could lead to sentences similar as example
17. However, in the other two sentences, only a subpart of the participant role is
profiled: example 18 profiles the change of state whereas example 19 profiles the
resulting state of the participant.
In order to achieve the same functional variation, the agents would thus have
to be able to include aspect (and tense) distinctions in their conceptualization.
For this, the conceptualization algorithm and the algorithm for analogy would
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have to be changed in order to include the hierarchical structure of the event
descriptions and the time stamps provided by the event recognition system. On
the level of the interaction pattern, the agents would somehow have to be able
to get sufficient feedback in order to recognize and learn the relevant aspectual
distinctions. The emergence of grammatical markers for aspect (and tense) is no
trivial matter and goes well beyond the scope of this book.
4.6.3.2 Mapping semantic roles onto syntactic roles
The mapping between semantic roles and syntactic roles can already be multi-
layered in nature without taking information structure into account: in exam-
ples 18 and 19, the distinction is not one of active versus passive, but rather one
of aspect. In order to see such alternations emerging, the idea of reuse can be
exploited again. As the agents develop their grammars, they increase their ex-
pressive power. From the moment they want to express aspectual distinctions as
well, they could try to reuse the existing grammatical system instead of invent-
ing some new strategy. This puts pressure on the existing conventions and may
lead to additional abstractions in the form of syntactic roles.
Another way to investigate the emergence of syntactic roles would be to en-
dow the agents with the capacity of dynamically updating the representation of
their categories. If categories are not fixed but dynamic, there is a risk of ‘category
leakage’ as observed in natural languages: some categories start expanding their
use which could lead to the merger of two semantic roles into one case. Typically,
the more frequent cases would start extending their usage which could gradually
lead to prototypical agent and patient categories.
4.6.3.3 Mapping syntactic roles onto case markers
In the experiments, there is a one-to-one relation between syntactic roles and
case markers. In natural case grammars, however, there are often paradigms of
related markers that together cover a particular case. These marker alternations
typically indicate grammatical distinctions in terms of gender and number. Evolv-
ing this kind of variation would thus require a need for marking grammatically
relevant distinctions between arguments.
Even more intriguing are case systems where the same markers can be used
to indicate different cases. For example, Latin uses the inflection -um to mark
nominative case in neuter singular words (bellum ‘war’) and accusative case in
masculine singular words (dominum ‘master’) (Blake 1994: 4–5). This means that
case markers somehow manage to grow a paradigmatic case system which goes
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beyond the borders of individual cases. Applied to the experiments, this would
mean lifting the present assumption that competing case markers are always
competing with each other for marking a particular participant role. Instead,
agents should be allowed to accept competition and variation at each possible
mapping in the grammatical square. This may lead to a credit assignment prob-
lem in which the agents can never have complete certainty about whichmapping
in the grammatical square was relevant during a particular innovation.
From the above discussion it should be clear that scaling up the experiments to-
wards richer syntax and grammar is not a trivial matter. It would include research
into the emergence of aspect and tense distinctions, a dynamic representation of
linguistic categories, and allowing competition on all aspects of the grammatical
square. A scale-up to include information structure as well would involve expan-
sion of the language game model to larger dialogues, which creates the need for
additional capacities such as episodic memory, scoping and coordination issues
and possibly anaphora resolution.
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evolution and linguistic theory
5.1 Introduction
The time has now come to weave through the theoretical foundations and exper-
imental results to reflect on the contributions of this book to artificial language
evolution and linguistics. §5.2 deals with the first part of this reflection by com-
paring the results of this book to those obtained in a recent study on casemarking
in the Iterated LearningModel, one of themost widely adopted approaches in the
field of artificial language evolution. The comparison shows that the cognitive-
functional approach outperforms the Iterated Learning Model and that the work
in this book is a significant step forwards in the field.
The other three sections of this chapter deal with the contributions of this book
to linguistics. More specifically, I believe this book can have an impact in three
domains. First of all, the formalism proposed in Chapter 2 is the first compu-
tational implementation of argument structure ever in a construction grammar
framework. In §5.3, I will compare it to an upcoming alternative in Sign-Based
Construction Grammar. A second contribution has to do with the structure of
the linguistic inventory. The problem of systematicity and multi-level selection
is new to linguistics and may have an impact on how we should conceive the
constructicon. I will discuss this matter from the viewpoint of construction gram-
mars and usage-based models of language in §5.4. Finally, the experiments in this
book and prior work in the field provide alternative evidence in recent debates in
linguistic typology and grammaticalization. These debates concern the status of
semantic maps and thematic hierarchies as universals of human cognition, and
the appropriateness of reanalysis as a mechanism for explaining grammatical-
ization. §5.5 introduces the debates and illustrates how experiments on artificial
language evolution can propose a novel way of thinking about the issues at hand.
5 Impact on artificial language evolution and linguistic theory
5.2 Pushing the state-of-the-art
5.2.1 Overview
The significance of scientific research can only be fully appreciated by compar-
ing it to other studies in its domain. In this section, I will illustrate how the
work in this book advances the state-of-the-art in artificial language evolution
by comparing it to a recent study byMoy (2006) who investigated the emergence
of a case grammar in the Iterated Learning Model (ILM), at present one of the
most widely adopted models in the field. The comparison reveals some funda-
mental problems with the ILM and shows that a cognitive-functional approach
is the most fruitful way for moving the experiments on artificial language evo-
lution towards greater complexity, expressiveness and realism. In the following
subsections, I will summarize four series of experiments reported by Moy and
discuss how and why the work in this book yields better results. Finally, I will
give a general overview of both approaches.
5.2.2 Experiment 1: A primitive case system?
The main objective of Moy’s work is to expand the Iterated Learning Model as
presented by Kirby (2002) in order to study the emergence of a case grammar.
Kirby’s original experiments investigated how a recursiveword-order syntax can
emerge as a side-effect of the cultural transmission of language from one gener-
ation to the next without the need for communicative pressures (the so-called
“function independence principle”, Brighton, Kirby & Smith 2005). Moy’s first
series of experiments are a replication of these simulations.
5.2.2.1 The experiment
The experiment features a population of two agents: one “adult” speaker and one
“child” learner. The adult speaker has to produce a number of utterances that
are observed by the learner. The adult speaker has an innovation strategy which
allows him to invent a random holistic word for each newmeaning if he does not
know a word yet. The child learner is equipped with a Universal Grammar in the
form of an induction algorithm and will try to induce as much grammatical rules
as possible. The child will thus overgeneralize the input provided by the speaker
which causes language change as illustrated in the child-based model in Chapter
1. After some time, the adult agent “dies” and the learner becomes the new adult
speaker so its grammar becomes the new convention. A new child learner is then
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introduced into the population. This population turnover is iterated thousands
of times.
The ILM hypothesizes that the development of grammar is triggered by the
Poverty of the Stimulus or the learning bottleneck: since children cannot observe
all possible utterances in a language, there is a pressure on language to become
more learnable. The linguistic inventory should therefore evolve to an optimal
size for a givenmeaning space. Themeaning space consists here of five predicates
and five objects, which can combine into simple two-argument events such as
loves(john, mary). In total there are 100 possible events. The optimal inventory
size consists of 11 rewrite-rules: one abstract rule for word order, and ten rules
for each word.
One challenge for a Universal Grammar mechanism is to provide the agents
with a strategy for filtering the “correct” input from the “wrong” input. In these
experiments, child learners will especially be confronted with conflicting input
at the beginning because the language of the adult speaker is still holistic and un-
structured. The ILM solves this problem by ignoring all variation. For the learner,
this means that once a rule has been induced, all conflicting input is neglected.
On top of that, the agents are endowed with a deterministic parser which always
picks the first matching rule in the list. Competing rules are therefore never
considered because they are lower in the list. This assures a one-to-one mapping
betweenmeaning and form, which is crucial for the ILM to work properly (Smith
2003b). The deterministic parser also allows the agents to rely on word order for
distinguishing the semantic roles of events.
5.2.2.2 Results
The results of the simulations show that the agents start inventing holistic utter-
ances, which leads to an unstructured language in the first generations. After
several hundreds of generations, the language becomes more and more regular
and thus learnable due to the overgeneralization of linguistic input by the child
learners. These overgeneralizations become the new grammar of the language
once the child replaces the adult speaker. Moy notes, however, that not all lan-
guages evolve to the optimal size of 11 rules, but that “a significant number of
the runs converged on a larger grammar with 16 rules” (p. 113). These grammars
contain two distinct noun categories: one for the agent and one for the patient.
Here is an example of such a grammar which uses an SOV word order:
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(1)
s/ [P, X, Y] → 3/X, i, 1/Y, 2/P
1/anna → i, p, l
1/kath → c, s
1/mary → t, a
1/john → j, e
1/pete → h
3/kath → a, k, f
3/pete → a, u, f




2/hates → z, s
2/loves → m, q, j
2/adores → u, i
2/sees → m, y
(Moy 2006: 113)
In the above grammar, the agents have to use a different word for the same



















This kind of “suboptimal” grammar is not exclusive to Moy’s replication exper-
iment: it also occurs in Kirby’s original simulations. For example, Kirby (1999)
suggests that the two distinct noun categories can be considered as case-marked
nominals. In the discussion of the replicating experiment, Moy seems to follow
this hypothesis:
Could we view such a grammar as exhibiting some form of primitive case
system, in that it is possible to distinguish subject forms of nouns from ob-
jects, rather than using the same form for both? This is analogous perhaps
to highly irregular forms of case found in some languages, such as the En-
glish pronouns I, me, we and us, where the nominative forms, (I and we)
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used to the [sic] represent the subject of a sentence, have no morphological
relationship to the accusative forms used for objects (me and us). (Moy 2006:
114)
5.2.2.3 Discussion
As I argued in §4.3.4, considering the above grammar as some kind of primitive
case system is an over-interpretation of experimental results. While there are
many attested examples in natural languages in which a word form depends on
the linguistic context (e.g. many Slavic languages such as Russian use different
lexical entries for verbs depending on aspect), they do not come about as frozen
accidents of the learning mechanism. As for the English pronouns, they are rem-
nants of a stage in the development of English where the grammar had a fully
productive case system. Both Moy and Kirby thus fail to identify the problem of
systematicity that occurs in the experiments.
This observation illustrates the importance of a strong dialogue with linguis-
tics. Most research in the field so far has contented itself with shallow compar-
isons to natural languages. It is however crucial to go into more empirical details
in order to appreciate the enormous complexity involved in grammatical phe-
nomena in natural languages. In this book, I tried to offer such an appreciation
of case markers in the first Chapter. A better understanding of the developmental
pathways of case markers helped to uncover the problem of systematicity in this
book and prevented me from simply concluding that the lack of systematicity
could be mapped onto some of the more exotic case alignment systems found in
the world’s languages (see Figure 5.5). Other first steps towards domain-specific
dialogues exist for colour terms (Steels & Belpaeme 2005), spatial language (Loet-
zsch et al. 2008b) and vowel systems (de Boer 1999).
In this book, I solved the problem of frozen accidents through multi-level se-
lection. I implemented multi-level selection as an alignment strategy which is
therefore tightly coupled to communicative success. In the ILM, however, com-
municative success has no impact on the behaviour of the agents somulti-level se-
lection cannot be readily applied here. Second, multi-level selection only makes
sense if there is variation in the model, but the ILM avoids variation as much as
possible so once a frozen accident occurs, it is hard to get rid of it.
Even though it is unwarranted to equate the frozen accidents in the ILM exper-
iments with case systems in natural languages, Moy’s work takes an interesting
turn by asking how the ILM can be expanded so that it favours these “subopti-
167
5 Impact on artificial language evolution and linguistic theory
mal” languages. If Moy succeeds in demonstrating the factors that systematically
lead to the emergence of such languages, the experiments could still come up
with relevant pressures for evolving a case language.
5.2.3 Experiment 2: dealing with variation
In order to encourage the emergence of a primitive case system, Moy (2006: chap-
ter 5) experiments with various modifications of Kirby’s parser that make it less
deterministic and which allows for variation in word order. The hypothesis is
that if the agents can no longer rely on word order for distinguishing agents from
patients in the events, they will start learning grammatical rules with case-like
properties.
5.2.3.1 Experimental results
Moy first tries to introduce variation in the word order by allowing the agents to
randomly choose among conflicting rules or by reshuffling the inventory. In all
the simulations, however, the agents fail to converge on a compositional gram-
mar: the linguistic inventories of the agents are very large and too much conflicts
are known for reaching a regular language. Moy argues that this is due to the fact
that compositionality can only emerge in the ILM if variation in meaning-form
mappings is ignored: learners will not consider any new variation anymore once
they have associated a certain meaning with a certain form, and the determin-
istic parser excludes the use of variations. The same conclusion has also been
suggested by Smith (2003b), but as opposed to Moy who rejects this unrealis-
tic assumption, Smith argues that natural languages have such a bias towards
one-to-one mappings as well.
Moy thus points to a fundamental problem with the ILM: in order to allow
variation in word order, the agents need to be capable of parsing and producing
competing rules. Yet, in order for the grammar to emerge at all, the ILM expects
that a single variation is maintained. Moy notes that in order to dampen the
search space, the agents need a way to prefer some variations over other ones.
She therefore endows the agents with an alignment strategy which takes the
frequency of rules into account. The more frequent the rule, the higher the prob-
ability that the agent will select it for production. The alignment strategy allows
the agents to reach a compositional language again. It does not, however, lead to
an increase in the number of primitive case grammars. In additional experimen-
tal set-ups, Moy allows even more word order freedom by reshuffling sentences
before they are actually produced, but this again does not lead to a preference for
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the primitive case grammar. Finally, manipulating the size of the transmission
bottleneck (i.e. the number of utterances that the child learner observes during
a lifetime) does not yield significant results either.
Moy concludes that the small effect of free word order and the bottleneck size
is due to the fact that the agents do not have to reach mutual understanding: if
the free word order cannot be parsed by the hearer, it will simply be ignored so
it will not lead to a change in the linguistic inventory. In other words, the child
agent does not really care about converging on the same language as that of the
adult speaker but learns whatever hypotheses its induction algorithm comes up
with. Moy argues that the agents thus have no need for disambiguating semantic
roles, which prevents them from reaching a case-like grammar.
5.2.3.2 Discussion
Moy’s experiments reveal a number of fundamental shortcomings of the ILM:
first of all, the agents have no way of dealing with variation. This problem did
not surface in Kirby’s prior work because he implemented a bias towards one-
to-one mappings that excludes the possibility of competitors. Moreover, the ILM
is typically implemented using only two agents, so no competing rules can ever
be introduced in the population. Moy’s results clearly show that there is no con-
nection whatsoever between the grammar that is acquired by the learner and
the grammar of the speaker: in fact, the learner will apply a “first come, first
serve” approach to learning grammar in which the first successful parse leads to
a fixed entry in the inventory. This means that the agents in Kirby’s models did
not learn to mark the distinction between semantic roles, but that they have this
distinction already built in.
Moy rightfully notices that the agents need some kind of (alignment) strategy
in order to reach a regular language. She introduces an utterance-based strategy
which counts the number of occurrences of rules. Equipped with this alignment
strategy, the agents are capable of producing and parsing multiple word orders,
but this has hardly any effect on the language of the agents. Moy then rightfully
concludes that the agents need communicative pressures: since the child learner
does not care about communicative success, any grammar induction will do. The
experiments thus show that the ILM’s “function independence principle” cannot
lead to grammar (at least not a case grammar) unless by accident or through
a Universal Grammar. The transmission bottleneck is therefore not a sufficient
trigger for marking event structure through grammar.
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5.2.3.3 Problems with multi-agent simulations
Another way in which the problems of the ILM can be demonstrated is to scale
up the experiments to multi-agent populations. This has indeed been attempted
by Smith & Hurford (2003). Smith & Hurford reached the following conclusions:
1. The agents fail to align their grammars because they have no alignment
strategy and different agents will come up with different innovations and
generalizations;
2. As a result, learners are presented with inconsistent training data;
3. The eager abstraction algorithm has disastrous consequences for the per-
formance of the agents.
Smith & Hurford consider the option of allowing the learners to keep mul-
tiple hypotheses. Since the agents are however “eager learners”, their abstrac-
tions harm their performance: abstractions made by one agent are not always
the same as the abstractions made by another one so the agents never reach a
shared language. This means that the agents would have to maintain all possi-
ble grammars, which rapidly becomes intractable. Another problem is that the
agents need to find out which grammar is “best”. Smith & Hurford refute the
possibility of a cost system (similar to the lateral inhibition strategies proposed
in many problem-solving models) on the grounds that it is “rather ad hoc”. The
solution offered by Smith & Hurford is however at least ad hoc as most cost sys-
tems are: they implement strong production biases coupled to “smart pruning”
in order to reduce the number of hypotheses.
However, variation is a fundamental property of language. Introducing addi-
tional production biases is a way to put less weight on the cultural evolution of
language and more on the genetic endowment of the agents, which is exactly the
contrary of what the ILMs try to show. Moreover, there now exist mathemati-
cal models of lateral inhibition dynamics which solve the “rather ad hoc” status
of cost systems (Baronchelli et al. 2006; De Vylder 2007). Also the alignment
strategy based on token frequency proposed in this book is rooted in proposals
made in cognitive-functional models of language.
The real problem for the ILM is however that such a cost system only works
in a bottom-up, instance per instance learning of the grammar. Otherwise it
would indeed lead to an intractable search space containing all possible gram-
mars. In order to avoid innate biases towards one-to-one mappings, it is there-
fore necessary to introduce an utterance-based selectionist system rather than
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a grammar-based selectionist system. The work in this book demonstrates how
such a bottom-up approach can lead to systematic languages if analogy is used
in combination with multi-level selection.
5.2.4 Experiment 3: implementing communicative pressures
Following the conclusion that the agents need additional communicative pres-
sures in order to form a primitive case grammar, Moy (2006: chapter 6) presents
a series of experiments in which ambiguous word orderings occur. The hypoth-
esis is that this ambiguity will lead the agents to prefer rules that use different
noun categories to mark the distinction between semantic roles.
5.2.4.1 Experimental results
In a first set-up, Moy implements an “inversion procedure” that swaps the or-
dering of words for which the agent already has a rule. This procedure thus
guarantees ambiguity during learning. The results are however disastrous: most
of the runs fail to reach any kind of regularity at all. Moy assigns the reason for
this failure to the fact that the child learner indeed faces ambiguity, but that he
still does not need to reach mutual understanding with the speaker. The hearer
thus keeps ignoring the ambiguous utterances if they do not fit the grammar
rules that have already been acquired.
In an attempt to fix this problem, Moy implements a learner that does not
tolerate ambiguity and an interaction script that forces the speaker to introduce
unambiguous utterances: the meaning that was parsed by the hearer is compared
to the intended meaning of the speaker. If there is a mismatch, the speaker has to
come up with an alternative verbalization. However, this implementation does
not lead to success either: in most cases, the speaker does not have an alterna-
tive way to verbalize an utterance so he will invent a new holistic string. Since
the ILM features meaning transfer, the hearer will each time learn this new ut-
terance. The result is that there is constant innovation in the simulations so the
agents never reach an “optimal” language. Additional attempts, such as punish-
ing ambiguous utterances, do not yield improvement either.
5.2.4.2 Discussion
Even thoughMoy’s experiments started from a correct observation, the “commu-
nicative pressures” that are needed for a case grammar were not operationalized
and implemented in a satisfying way. The main problem is that the agents in
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her experiments are not truly communicating. First of all, the speaker’s output
was randomly changed by an artificial procedure in order to create ambiguities
for the hearer. This is already highly problematic because it would require some
malicious mind-reading from the speaker’s part, but there are other more serious
issues: the speaker does not have any communicative goal at all. He just produces
an utterance but does not care about whether this utterance had the intended ef-
fect in the hearer’s mind. Other simulations that emphasize the importance of
communication have all come to the conclusion that the speaker must try to pro-
duce an utterance in such a way as to improve the chance of being understood
by the hearer (Smith 2003a; Steels 2003b). In this book, this was operationalized
in the form of re-entrance (see Chapter 3).
From the part of the hearer, there is the same problem. “Ambiguity” in Moy’s
model does not mean that the hearer did not understand what the speaker said
because there is meaning transfer and the hearer can even compare his parsed
meaning to the speaker’s intended meaning. The problem is that the hearer does
not attempt to align his grammar to that of the speaker at all: a mismatch in
meanings means the rejection of the speaker’s utterance. This means that the
hearer stubbornly sticks to his induced grammar rules which may well be com-
pletely different than the grammar of the adult speaker because of the greedy
induction algorithm. This problem does not occur in the experiments in this
book because the agents try to find out what the speaker’s intentions were and
want to conform to the conventions of the population.
In short, none of the agents ever actually try to reach communicative success.
As I argued in Chapter 3, language is an inferential coding system in which the
language users are assumed to be intelligent enough to make innovations that
can be understood by the hearers, and in which hearers can make abductions
about the speaker’s intended meaning. In Moy’s experiments, the agents only
want to get rid of internal inconsistencies rather than trying to converge on the
same grammar.
5.2.5 Experiment 4: more innate knowledge
In a final series of experiments, Moy (2006: chapter 7) tries to address the problem
of the “suboptimal” primitive case system in a different way. She starts from
the observation that the grammar inducer “is not capable of effectively learning
inflectional grammars” (p. 206). For example, the default inducer would fail to
notice the inflectional markers in an utterance such as johnalovesmaryb: instead
of recognizing -a as an indicator of the subject and -b as an indicator of the
object, the learner will induce them as an integral part of the word form. Moy
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therefore proposes several implementations that attempt to solve this problem.
I will discuss one of these attempts in which he implements a richer meaning
representation.
5.2.5.1 Experimental results
In all of the previous experiments, the semantic roles of agent and patient were
implicit in the meaning so the inducer wasn’t able to extract them. Moy therefore
decides to make the meaning representation richer by explicitly adding the roles
of “actor” and “actedon”. The meaning [loves, john, mary] would thus become
[[act, loves], [actor, john], [actedon mary]] (p. 217). The “optimal” case mark-
ing language should have 15 rules: one top-level rule, ten lexical entries, two
markers and two rules to combine the markers with the noun categories. De-
spite the explicit representation of semantic roles, however, not all simulations
led to satisfying results. There were two kinds of problematic cases:
• One type of grammar again features two completely distinct noun cate-
gories with different words for the same meaning. The inducer failed to
recognize inflectional markers for the agent and the patient.
• A second type of languages did have inflectional markers, but they also
featured two different lexical entries for the nouns. An example of such a
grammar is:
(4)
s/ [P, X, Y] → 1/Y, 13/X, 6/P
13/ [A, B] → 16/B, 15/A
1/ [C, D] → 3/C, 8/D
15/ actor → i
3/ actedon → h
16/ john → v, s
16/ jane → k, h
8/ john → e, v, s, n
8/jane → s
6/ [E, F] → 14/F, 7/E
7/ act → i, b
14/ adores → y, n, k
14/loves → j, v
14/sees → h, m, l
(Moy 2006: 230)
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Moy’s experiments suggest that the Iterated Learning Model cannot overcome
its bias towards one-to-one mappings, which is confirmed in the fact that ex-
perimenters working with the model increasingly turn to innate constraints for
explaining grammar emergence: Moy explicitly includes two semantic roles in
the meaning space, and Smith (2003b) and Smith & Hurford (2003) implement
explicit biases towards one-to-one mappings. This is highly problematic since
grammatical categories are clearly multifunctional. It also means that the ILM
studies have given up on their original objectives: instead of demonstrating that
grammar can evolve through cultural selection, a strong Language Acquisition
Device is built in.
The experiments in this book do not presuppose such a bias towards one-to-
one mappings and in fact offer the first multi-agent simulations ever featur-
ing polysemous categories. By taking communicative pressures seriously and
by providing the agents with a richer cognitive apparatus including analogy
and multi-level selection, this book demonstrated how agents can deal with the
variety and uncertainty that is inherent to multi-agent simulations, how they
can self-organize and coordinate a grammar involving multifunctional semantic
roles, and how they can reuse the same linguistic items in multiple patterns of
argument realization.
What is also striking about Moy’s results is the fact that even though there are
only two agents at each given time and even though the learner is equipped with
a highly specialized learning mechanism, the grammars can still get stuck in a
state which is not fully systematic. This suggests that (a) a learning bottleneck
is not a sufficient pressure for reaching a systematic language, and that (b) an
innate mechanism that seriously restricts the space of possible grammars is not
sufficient for dealing with variation. The only way to avoid this unsystematic
state, as I argued in Chapter 4, is to assume a cognitive-functional view on gram-
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mar in which agents are given credit for possessing the right skills and alignment
strategies to arrive at a shared and systematic communication system.
5.2.6 Summary: case markers serve communication
The ILM and the problem-solving approach both argue that grammar evolves
through cultural evolution but both models diverge significantly in terms of as-
sumptions and hypotheses (see Table 5.1). The most important difference is that
the ILM tries to explain as much grammatical structure as possible as a side-
effect of the cultural transmission of language from one generation to the next,
whereas the problem-solving approach assumes that grammatical development
is triggered by the need to optimize communicative success. This leads to two
different types of learners: in the ILM the learner needs strong innate constraints
Table 5.1: This table summarizes the main differences between Moy (2006) and
the work in this book.
Iterated Learning This book
Triggers - Poverty of the Stimulus - Communicative success
of grammar - Learning bottleneck - Reducing cognitive effort
- Function independence - Increasing expressiveness
Learner - Eager learner - Lazy learner
- Greedy induction - Careful abstraction
- Top-down - Bottom-up
Language - Hearer-based innovation - Speaker-based innovation
change - Mismatch in learning - Adoption by hearer
- Propagation in population
Grammati- - Analysis only - Analogy and patterns
calization - Holistic strategy - Continuity principle (reuse)
- Start without language - Start from lexicon
Inventory - Rewrite rules - Constructions
- Ordered but unstructured - Structured through usage
Meanings - Two-way contrast - Event-specific meaning
- Semantic roles given - No prior semantic roles
Population - Two-agent simulation - Multi-agent simulation
- Generational turnover - Single generation
- Speakers vs learners - Peer-to-peer interactions
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as opposed the problem-solving approach where the learner is equipped with a
rich cognitive apparatus for detecting and solving communicative problems.
Since the learner in the ILM is endowed with some kind of Universal Gram-
mar, the model has a lot of difficulties with handling inconsistent input data and
variation. The problem-solving model of this book, on the other hand, does not
face those difficulties. It features a redundant and bottom-up approach to lan-
guage and an utterance-based selectionist system in which careful abstraction is
possible despite the enormous uncertainty about the conventions in the speech
community. The agents in this book do not assume one-to-one mappings and
the experiments offer the first multi-agent simulations ever which involve poly-
semous categories.
Another achievement of this book is that it detected and solved the problem of
systematicity. I showed that the problem also occurs in Iterated Learning Models
(and other models, see Chapter 4) but that it remained unnoticed so far. I argued
that this was due to an underestimation of the complexity of natural language
phenomena and a shallow comparison between natural and artificial languages.
The work in this book is more firmly rooted in linguistic theory and offers a
model which is closer to attested cases of grammaticalization.
It should be noted that both approaches are notmutually exclusive. The problem-
solving approach naturally incorporates all the learning constraints that are fo-
cused upon in the ILM but goes much further in terms of learning and innovation
strategies in order to optimize communicative success. Expanding the model to
multi-generational population dynamics is indeed technically quite trivial and
has already been successfully demonstrated in many experiments (e.g. De Beule
2008; Steels & McIntyre 1999). Expanding the ILM to a multi-agent population,
however, is much more problematic.
5.3 Argument structure and construction grammar
5.3.1 Overview
In Chapter 2 and van Trijp (2008b), I proposed a formalization of argument re-
alization in Fluid Construction Grammar. Even though my proposal was explic-
itly implemented for supporting experiments on artificial language evolution, its
ideas are relevant for formalisms of natural languages as well. Within the family
of construction grammars, however, no alternative computational implementa-
tion has been reported yet in a peer-reviewed publication that can handle both
parsing and production. As such, van Trijp (2008b) offers the first computational
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implementation of argument structure constructions within a construction gram-
mar framework.
This doesn’t mean that no other work has been done yet: at the moment this
book was written, a different proposal was still in the process of being worked
out (but not implemented) in Sign-Based ConstructionGrammar (SBCG, Fillmore
et al. unpubl.), a formalism that combines HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1994) with Berke-
ley Construction Grammar (BCG, Kay & Fillmore 1999). Since the draft proposals
are closely related to the more construction-oriented approaches in HPSG, I will
assume here that SBCG can be implemented and applied in a computational for-
malism as well. In the remainders of this section, I will briefly illustrate how
SBCG deals with argument structure (based on Fillmore et al. unpubl. Kay 2005;
Michaelis 2012; Sag 2013). I will then illustrate this for the English ditransitive
based on Kay (2005) and then compare it to my own representation of argument
structure.
5.3.2 Argument structure in BCG and SBCG
Early representations of argument structure in a construction grammar frame-
work (such as Goldberg 1995) and the representation used in this book propose
argument structure constructions in which the meaning can be seen as a skeletal
or schematic event type such as X-CAUSES-Y-TO-MOVE. These constructions
then have to unify or fuse with the lexical entry of the verb. In later versions of
BCG and in SBCG, however, argument structure constructions are implemented
as two-level derivational rules that have a “mother”-component (MTR) and a
“daughter”-component (DTR). The DTR unifies with the lexical entry of the verb
and is complemented by the MTR. The SBCG proposal looks very much like lex-
ical rules in lexicalist accounts.
The SBCG approach is in the same spirit as Goldberg (1995) in the sense that
minimal lexical entries are assumed for verbs which have to be complemented
by argument structure constructions. SBCG however goes a step further and
allows argument structure constructions to override the default behaviour of a
verb (Michaelis 2012; Sag 2013). Sag (2013) writes that SBCG has a feature called
“argument structure” (ARG-ST) which encodes the valence of a verb. This feature
is a structured list which is coupled to the “Accessibility Hierarchy” of Keenan &
Comrie (1977): the first argument maps onto subject, the second onto the direct
object, etc. The rank-based listing of arguments is chosen to eliminate the need
for explicit features such as “subject” and “object”.
Different argument realization patterns, such as the active-passive alternation,
are represented through different values for the ARG-ST list. SBCG has two
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different ways to implement these differences: either a derivational construction
overrides the default ARG-ST of the verb (as is the case in passivization) or there
is lexical under-specification (for example in locative alternations). In addition
to the feature ARG-ST, SBCG also has a feature VAL(ence) which is a list of the
syntactic elements that a linguistic expression yet has to combine with. Sag gives
the example of the verb phrase persuaded me to go, which takes the VAL list <
NP > because it still needs to combine with a subject NP. The clause my dad
persuaded me to go takes an empty VAL list because it doesn’t need to combine
with any other argument anymore. Only lexical constructions have both ARG-
ST and VAL features. Phrases, clauses, NPs, and other items only have empty
VAL lists.
5.3.3 An example: the ditransitive construction
I will now illustrate argument structure constructions in SBCG based on Kay
(2005)’s analysis of the English ditransitive. Kay’s proposal is somewhat differ-
ent than the most recent developments of the SBCG architecture, but the under-
lying ideas are the same (Kay, pers. comm.). It shares many aspects with the
approach offered by Goldberg (1995), such as the assumption that there is a de-
fault and minimal lexical entry for each verb. For example, the lexical entry of
the verb to bake contains two minimally required arguments (a baker and a thing
that is baked). Argument structure constructions can add arguments such as the
beneficiary in He baked him a cake.
Goldberg sees argument structure constructions as larger patterns carrying
grammatical meanings which have to be “fused” with the meaning of the lexi-
cal entries. Kay, however, proposes argument structure constructions which are
more like lexical constructions with a “mother constituent” and a single daugh-
ter. The daughter unifies with a lexical entry and is elaborated by the mother
constituent. Applied to the English ditransitive construction, Kay proposes three
“maximal recipient constructions” which all three inherit from a more schematic
“Abstract Recipient Construction”:






(refuse, promise, allow, …)
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These constructions are represented in a unification-based grammar as de-
tailed in Kay & Fillmore (1999), and which is similar to analyses of argument
structure in HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1994). The Abstract Recipient Construction is
shown in Figure 5.1. The construction shows all information which is common
to all English ditransitive constructions. The lower box represents the DTR con-
stituent, which needs to unify with the lexical entry of the verb. As can be seen,
its valence list contains an NP (which plays the role of “actor”) and an under-
specified argument (…). The top box represents the MTR constituent which com-
plements the lexical entry of the verb with the “recipient” role. The ‘list’-feature
displays the construction’s primary semantic frame (an intentional actwhich has
an actor and an undergoer) and additionally an intended result which still needs
to be specified by another frame. Kay proposes that the intended result in the Di-
rect RC is the ‘receive frame’ (see below) whereas in the other sub-constructions
it is not.
The Direct RC corresponds to Goldberg (1995)’s “central sense” of the ditran-
sitive as in He gave him a book. The main frame of the MTR component is a
CAUSE-MOVE act which is defined as a subtype of an intentional act. The re-
ceive frame is unified with the intended result of the main frame indicating that
there was an actual transfer of possession. The daughter’s valence list indicates
that it takes verbs which have at least two arguments (an actor and an undergoer).
The Direct RC is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
In the Intended RC, for handling utterances such as He baked him a cake, there
is no actual transfer of possession entailed but only the intention of transfer. A
second reason for positing a different construction for the Intended RC is that
it cannot occur in the passive. Kay therefore includes an explicit stipulation in
the construction which states that it cannot combine with a derivational passive
construction. All the remaining senses of the ditransitive are grouped together in
the Modal RC. This construction is similar to the Intended RC in that it does not
entail actual transfer either, but it is different in the sense that it doesn’t require
beneficiary semantics. Kay argues that specific meanings are contributed by the
verbs themselves so no additional constructions need to be posited.
5.3.4 Discussion and comparison
5.3.4.1 Derivational versus non-derivational constructions.
The most remarkable distinction between argument realization in Sign-Based
Construction Grammar and Fluid Construction Grammar is that FCG adopts the
cognitive-functional tradition of construction-based approaches in which argu-
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Figure 5.1: The Abstract Recipient Construction proposed by Kay (2005).
ment structure constructions have skeletal meanings that need to unify or fuse
with the semantics of the lexical entries of the verbs. FCG could thus be said
to implement a “fusion” process similar to proposals made by Goldberg (1995).
SBCG, on the other hand, has given up on this kind of analysis and moved closer
towards HPSG by using (almost lexical) derivational rules which feature two
components: a mother and a daughter.
These different approaches are the result of different solutions to the same
problem: multiple argument realization. Both SBCG and FCG try to solve the
problem through the notion of “potential syntactico-semantic arguments” (Sag
2013) or what I called “potential valents” in Chapter 2. This word “potential”
refers to the fact that a lexical entry can combine with multiple argument realiza-
tion patterns. However, the implementation of this “potential” is fundamentally
different in both formalisms.
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Figure 5.2: The Direct Recipient Construction proposed by Kay (2005).
SBCG starts from the traditional assumption that lexical entries have a fixed
predicate-frame which is implemented in the verb’s VAL(ence) list. In order to
still cope with multiple argument realization patterns, this VAL list either needs
to be under-specified or overridden by derivational rules. This capacity of over-
writing the predicate-frame of a verb is in fact the only difference with traditional
lexicalist accounts. FCG, on the other hand, does not assume a minimal lexical
entry: a linguistic item merely lists its potential from which more grammatical
constructions can select the actual valency. In other words, the meaning of the
verb strongly influences its morpho-syntactic realization but its actual valency
is still dependent on the other constructions that combine with it.
The difference can be easily explained through an analogy to mathematics
which I borrowed and adapted from Michaelis (2012). Michaelis writes that con-
181
5 Impact on artificial language evolution and linguistic theory
structions have the possibility to change the associations within an arithmetic
sequence like 2 x (3 + 4) to the sequence (2 x 3) + 4, which would yield different
results (14 and 10). The individual numbers, however, denote the same value in
each sequence. Michaelis’ analogy does not quite fit, however, since in SBCG
a number would be listed with a minimal ARG-ST (for example saying that “2”
has to be used in a sum). SBCG therefore does more than storing the entry “2”
with its denotation and would need a derivational rule which overrides the spec-
ification of “2”. FCG, on the other hand, would list the number “2” and state that
it can be potentially used in sums, divisions and other functions without actu-
ally committing to a single operation. The construction would then pick what it
needs from the number.
5.3.4.2 Evidence from corpus-linguistics
Technically speaking, the implementation differences between SBCG and FCGdo
not really matter. The main problem with derivational constructions, however,
is the assumption that some senses of lexical items are more central or more
basic than others. Traditionally, these “minimal entries” are however based on
intuition rather than empirical data. For example, what is the minimal entry for
a verb such as to give if the following examples are taken into account:
(8) He gave him the book.
(9) He was given the book.
(10) He gave blood.
(11) Give it!
(12) Give it to me!
(13) Give me the book!
More examples can easily be found. The point is however that FCGwould have
no real preference for either pattern (except perhaps as the result of frequency
and priming effects) since the lexical entry does not contain a fixed predicate-
frame. SBCG would list give as a three-place predicate even though numerous
sentences can be observed in which not all three arguments are present. Both
formalisms thus make different predictions as to the frequency of argument real-
ization patterns: FCG allows for different frequency patterns for each verb indi-
vidually (which is captured through co-occurrence links between lexical entries
and constructions), whereas SBCG predicts a most basic use of a verb with de-
rived and therefore less frequent uses.
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These predictions can be verified through careful corpus studies. A good exam-
ple is the active-passive alternation. In FCG, the passive is an argument structure
construction in its own right which stands on equal footing with active argument
structure constructions. In SBCG, on the other hand, the passive construction is
a derivational construction, which needs to overwrite the default active VAL.
The relationship between active and passive has been investigated by Stefanow-
itsch & Gries (2003) in a “collostructional analysis”. Collostructional analysis
combines statistical data of co-occurrences between words with a close atten-
tion to the constructions in which these words occur. This method allows for
a detailed analysis of the relations between words and constructions. Stefanow-
itsch & Gries use a slightly extended collostructional analysis for investigating
various alternations among which the active-passive one. The results of their
study shows that there are clear semantically motivated classes of distinctive
collexemes for both the active and the passive. The most distinctive collexemes
with respect to the active voice were to have along with emotional-mental stative
verbs such as think, say, want and mean. With respect to the passive voice, there
is a clear class of verbs that “overwhelmingly encode processes that cause the
patient to come to be in a relatively permanent end state” (p. 110), such as base,
concern and use.
Stefanowitsch &Gries thus confirm prior claims by Pinker (1989) and conclude
that the passive construction is primarily a semantic construction rather than a
construction that is mainly used for marking differences in information struc-
ture. In other words, there are no empirical grounds for assuming that the active
construction is basic and that the passive construction has to be derived from it.
This observation is highly problematic for the lexical derivations in SBCG but
can be captured nicely by FCG.
5.3.4.3 Thematic hierarchy
The above observations also make the ranked ordering of the ARG-ST of SBCG
highly problematic: many verbs apparently prefer the passive construction and
therefore violate the ranking more frequently than they follow it. Moreover, the
universality of the thematic hierarchy has become a matter of big debate due to
the serious empirical problems with such hierarchies (Levin & Rappaport Hovav
2005). In fact, many researchers in HPSG have turned to macro-roles or other
constructs to get rid of the unsatisfactory thematic hierarchies (Davis & Koenig
2000).
FCG does not assume any notion of thematic hierarchies, macro-roles or uni-
versal linking rules. Instead, preference patterns for argument linking and real-
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ization emerge as a side-effect of analogy in innovation and multi-level selection:
analogical reasoning explains why existing linguistic items get reused in new sit-
uations and multi-level selection assures a growing systematicity in which lin-
guistic items combine into a structured linguistic inventory. Recurrent patterns
are hypothesized to be captured by the distributed constructions which show
systematicity in their classification behaviour. I will come back to this matter in
more detail in the other sections of this chapter.
5.3.4.4 The emergence of argument structure constructions.
A third problem with the architecture of SBCG is that it would be very hard to
implement in the scenario of an emergent language or in which the first emer-
gence of grammar takes place. If there is no grammar yet, there are simply no
conventions to build a grammar upon. Language users would nevertheless have
to agree on the “basic” argument structure of a lexical entry despite the many
conflicting variations floating around in the population (which are often more
frequent than what would be intuitively speaking the “minimal” entry). Then
they would have to agree somehow that all possible alternations are in fact de-
rivational constructions. On top of that, these derivational constructions have to
be nicely ordered: for example, the passive alternation comes after the ditransi-
tive derivation which comes after the lexical entry. Again, FCG seems to be more
flexible in this respect.
5.4 Analogy, multi-level selection and the constructicon
5.4.1 Overview
In generative grammar, the problem of systematicity has never been an issue
since all categories and grammar rules are assumed to be innate. In construction
grammars and usage-basedmodels of language, however, the linguistic inventory
is supposed to be acquired in a bottom-up fashion so more attention has been
given to how this inventory should be structured. In this section, I will give a
brief overview of the most important proposals in construction grammar based
on Croft & Cruse (2004: 262–290). Next, I will argue that construction grammars
need to take multi-level selection into account in how they conceive the relations
between constructions in the linguistic inventory or the “constructicon”.
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5.4.2 The organization of the linguistic inventory
Croft & Cruse (2004) write that the structured, linguistic inventory of a speaker
is usually represented by construction grammars in terms of a taxonomic
network of constructions. Each construction constitutes a node in the tax-
onomic network of constructions. (Croft & Cruse 2004: 262)
In otherwords, constructions are related to each other through taxonomy links
or instance links which describe a relationship of schematicity between two con-
structions. The following example shows a taxonomic relation between the idiom
The X-er, the Y-er and an instance of that more schematic construction:
(14) [The X-er, the Y-er]
[The bigger they come, the harder they fall.]
(Croft & Cruse 2004: 263, example 3)
The rule of thumb for deciding when a construction has its independent node
in the network is when not all aspects of the construction’s semantics or syn-
tax can be derived from its subparts or from more schematic constructions. For
example, the idiom to kick the bucket has its own representation in the network
because its meaning cannot be derived from the individual words in combination
with a schematic transitive construction. Most but not all theories assume that to
kick the bucket is also part of the inheritance network but which locally overrides





(Croft & Cruse 2004: 263, example 4)
Depending on how much redundancy the theory allows, frequent instances
can be kept as well even though a more schematic construction may already
exist. Finally, sentences usually feature multiple inheritance: constructions often
only offer a “partial specification” of the grammatical structures of their daughter
constructions. Croft & Cruse give the example I didn’t sleep, which inherits from
both the [Subject - Intransitive Verb] construction and the [Subject Auxiliary-n’t
Verb] construction (p. 264, example 6).
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Themost influential construction grammars all assume the above organization
of the linguistic inventory. Croft & Cruse discuss four of them: Berkeley Con-
struction Grammar (Kay & Fillmore 1999), the Lakoff/Goldberg model (Goldberg
1995), Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987) and Radical Construction Grammar
(Croft 2001). The latter three are also considered to be usage-based models of
language. Croft & Cruse compare the different models based on a couple of ques-
tions, of which the following two are directly relevant for our discussion (p. 265,
questions (iii) and (iv)):
1. What sorts of relations are found between constructions?
2. How is grammatical information stored in the construction taxonomy?
5.4.3 Construction grammars
5.4.3.1 Berkeley Construction Grammar
In the discussion of Berkeley Construction Grammar (BCG) in §5.3.2 I already
briefly mentioned that BCG features an inheritance network for organizing the
linguistic inventory. Unlike examples 14 and 15, however, BCG does not allow for
any kind of redundancy. It is a complete inheritance model in which information
is only represented once and at the highest, most schematic level possible. This
also means that BCG does not require all constructions to be symbolic units (i.e.
form-meaning mappings): they can be entirely syntactic or semantic as well.
BCG therefore captures all information in terms of taxonomy links. Since no
information is stored more than once, parts of constructions can in fact be chil-
dren of other parent constructions. The network thus not only has instance links
between constructions, but also between parents and parts of other construc-
tions.
5.4.3.2 The Lakoff/Goldberg model.
The model proposed by Lakoff (1987) and Goldberg (1995) focuses more on the
categorization relations that may exist between constructions. Next to the taxon-
omy/instance links, Goldberg also proposes a meronomic or subpart link (p. 78)
and a “polysemy” link (p. 38). The subpart link is different from the BCG subpart
links: in BCG, a subpart is a complete instance of a more schematic construc-
tion, whereas Goldberg sees subpart links as constructions which are subparts
of larger constructions but nevertheless have an independent representation in
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the inventory. The “polysemy” links are links between constructions that have
the same syntactic specification but different semantics.
One important aspect of the Lakoff/Goldberg model is the notion of a pro-
totype and (metaphorical) extension. For example, if constructions are related
through polysemy links, there is always a “central sense” assumed. For the En-
glish ditransitive, this is the sense of actual transfer as in I gave him a book. Gold-
berg and Lakoff propose a somewhat different model when it comes to metaphor-
ical extension: Goldberg assumes that metaphorical extension involves a super-
ordinate schema fromwhich the central sense and the extenstion(s) are instances;
Lakoff does not assume such a schema.
The type of inheritance in the Lakoff/Goldberg model is different from BCG in
the sense that an instance is allowed to locally overwrite some information that
is normally inherited from a higher schema. For example, a schematic category
such as BIRD may contain the feature FLIES, but this is not true for penguins.
In the penguin-category, the inheritance of FLIES is therefore blocked by local
specifications. This solution is also handy when there is conflicting information
in the case ofmultiple inheritance: the instance is then assumed to be represented
as a full entry in the inventory.
5.4.3.3 Cognitive Grammar.
Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (CG) is regarded by most cognitive linguists as
some form of construction grammar because it shares many of its assumptions
and objectives. Langacker assumes that a category typically has a prototypical
member or a set of members and that new instances are categorized by extension
from the prototypes. Next to this model of prototypes and extension, CG also al-
lows for a more schematic unit which subsumes the prototype and its extensions.
This view comes closest to the model of extension through analogy that I opera-
tionalized in Chapter 3.
The organization of the linguistic inventory is dependent on language use. The
entrenchment or independent representation of a linguistic item is hypothesized
to depend on its token frequency: if a unit occurs frequently enough, it is stored
in memory. Productivity of a linguistic unit goes hand in hand with its extension
through language use: if a (prototypical) category gets extended to new situa-
tions, it increases its type frequency and hence its productivity. As said before,
categories can form a network based on prototypical members (instances) and
non-prototypical members, but there are also abstractions which are related to
their members through taxonomy links.
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5.4.3.4 Radical Construction Grammar
The word “radical” in Radical Construction Grammar (RCG) comes from the fact
that RCG does not assume constructions to be built from atomic categories such
as nouns or verbs, but rather that the construction is the atomic unit of language.
All other categories are defined in terms of the constructions they occur in. Cate-
gories are thus assumed to be construction- and language-specific. For example,
the transitive construction and intransitive construction are hypothesized to con-
tain two different verb categories: the transitive verb and the intransitive verb.
The superordinate category Verb is seen as a linguistic abstraction over those
two categories (Croft & Cruse 2004: 287–288):
(16) [MVerb-TA]
[IntrSbj IntrV] [TrSbj TrV TrObj]
In the above example, the label MVerb is used to indicate that this is a mor-
phological construction (TA stands for Tense and Aspect). The superordinate
abstraction can only be made if it is linguistically motivated. For example, both
transitive and intransitive verbs can be marked for tense and aspect so both cat-
egories should be able to occur in those Tense-Aspect constructions. In short,
RCG is a strongly non-reductionist approach as opposed to BCG.
RCG features the same taxonomy links as other construction grammars and
also allows for redundant information according to the principles of usage-based
models of language. One other important aspect of RCG is that it is based on the
“semantic map” model (see §5.5). In this model, all constructions are hypothe-
sized to map onto contiguous regions in “conceptual space” which is assumed to
be universal. Finally, syntactic structures are defined as language-specific units
but in relation to “syntactic space” which aims at typologically comparing the
world’s languages.
5.4.4 The inventory in Fluid Construction Grammar
5.4.4.1 Design stance
Before I start the comparison between Fluid Construction Grammar and the
above theories, I would like to emphasize again that FCG takes a design stance
towards the emergence of grammar and that it therefore only implements mech-
anisms that are experimentally demonstrated to be necessary requirements. The
fact that FCG does not make the same abstractions or does not feature the same
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complex mechanisms for organizing the linguistic network therefore does not
mean that they are refuted, but only that they are not necessary (yet) for the
level of complexity that is reached in current simulations. On the other hand,
FCG can show which proposals stand the computationally rigid test in less com-
plex languages. Secondly, by demonstrating novel but necessary mechanisms in
those less complex languages, FCG can show which ideas are currently being
overlooked by linguistic theories.
5.4.4.2 The emergence of linguistic categories
With respect to the “atomic” building blocks of a grammar in emergence, FCG
is closest related to Radical Construction Grammar. From an evolutionary point-
of-view, it is more natural to think of constructions or form-meaning mappings
as the atomic units in language and that other categories are dependent on the
organization of these constructions. For example, the experiments do not feature
an explicit category for nouns or verbs, yet all words can be used without any
problem in argument structure constructions. Further categorizations should be
functionally motivated. For example, if the agents should also worry about tense
and aspect marking, they might need additional generalizations over their exist-
ing constructions.
This scenario is attractive in many ways. First, the agents do not need to agree
on a set of building blocks such as nouns or verbs before they can start combining
them into sentences. Instead they keep on constructing new categories on the
fly but only when this optimizes communication and thus when it is functionally
motivated. This approach also seems to fit natural languages better since it is im-
possible to come upwith an abstract rule that can be applied to all parts of speech
of a language. Finally, this approach also suits my proposal of potential valents
for linguistic items: the freer and typically lexical items can be potentially used
in many different constructions, whereas the more grammaticalized, tightened
constructions typically decide on the actual valency of a linguistic expression.
FCG therefore rejects the reductionist approach of BCG (and SBCG). Reduc-
tionist approaches are still dominant in linguistics as a result of a desire for max-
imizing “storage parsimony” in the linguistic inventory. Croft & Cruse (2004:
278), however, point to psychological evidence that suggests that storage parsi-
mony is a cognitively implausible criterion for modeling the linguistic inventory.
Language users rather seem to store a lot of redundant information which re-
quires more memory but which optimizes “computing parsimony” because not
all information has to be computed online.
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5.4.4.3 Innovation through analogy and pattern formation.
Fluid Construction Grammar also subscribes the usage-based model and argues
that innovation occurs through analogical reasoning. In the experiments of this
book, I implemented an innovation strategy in which the productivity of a cate-
gory is related to its type frequency and which is therefore similar to proposals
made in Cognitive Grammar. FCG also allows for careful abstraction in which
an instance link is created between the more abstract category and the specific
instances that are compatible with it. A second drive for innovation is pattern
formation: frequently co-occurring utterances are stored as independent units
in memory. This is also completely in line with usage-based models that take
token frequency as an indicator of entrenchment. The newly formed patterns
themselves may be extended through analogy as well.
One salient feature of FCG is that all innovation occurs in a stepwise fashion.
If a careful abstraction is made, it is at that moment only valid for the instances
that were used in creating the abstraction. The newly formed category therefore
does not automatically extend its use to other situations: an explicit link in the
network has to be created during other interactions. For pattern formation as
well, links are kept between the newly created pattern and its subparts. All the
links in the inventory are used for optimizing linguistic processing: instead of
considering the entirememory, only linked constructions are unified andmerged.
Onlywhen this strategy leads to communicative problems, the language user will
try to adapt the inventory through analogy.
5.4.4.4 Multi-level selection in the emergence of language systematicity.
The work in this book has also uncovered the problem of systematicity which
has so far been overlooked by all linguistic theories. The usage-based models pre-
sented in the previous section mainly focus on a top-down inheritance network
and seem to assume that this suffices for reaching and maintaining systematicity
if the network is combined with an innovation strategy based on type frequency
and productivity.
The experiments in Chapter 4, however, demonstrate that this is not the case.
Next to an innovation strategy which systematically reuses productive and suc-
cessful items of the inventory, language users need an alignment strategy based
on multi-level selection to further streamline their inventories and keep the gen-
eralization rate of their language high. The experiments demonstrated that a
top-down strategy does not suffice but that the success and evolution of specific
instances must also have a way to influence the more schematic constructions in
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the network. The networks therefore need systematicity links rather than (only)
taxonomy links.
5.4.4.5 On the status of inheritance networks.
The experiments on multi-level selection show how a linguistic network similar
to the one proposed in Radical Construction Grammar could gradually emerge:
a nonreductionist approach is taken in which each construction has its specific
categories. However, FCG does not make explicit generalizations over these con-
structions as is done in RCG, but rather keeps systematicity links which are used
by the multi-level selection alignment strategy. There is no need for an inher-
itance network and all utterances are licensed by unifying and merging fully
specified constructions.
This architecture suffices for the kinds of experiments performed in this book
and only further work can show whether additional abstractions and perhaps
inheritance networks are really needed. A serious challenge to these kinds of
abstractions and inheritance networks is posed by the successful application of
instance-based models in natural language processing such as Memory-Based
Language Processing (Daelemans & Van den Bosch 2005) and Analogical Mod-
eling (Skousen 1989). Another challenge for inheritance networks, I believe, is
that they might require abstractions that are too greedy and therefore harmful to
the communicative success of language users, especially in experiments on the
emergence of grammar. As becomes very clear in such experiments, agents have
to deal with an enormous amount of uncertainty about the conventions in their
population. It might very well turn out to be that a fully redundant model (with
or without careful abstraction) using multi-level selection is a more adequate
model.
5.5 Linguistic typology and grammaticalization
5.5.1 Overview
The previous two sections mainly dealt with the relations between construction
grammar and the experiments in this book. In this section, I will discuss how the
methodology of artificial language evolution can provide novel insights to the
fields of grammaticalization and linguistic typology.
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5.5.2 The status of semantic maps
5.5.2.1 Introduction
Semanticmaps have offered linguists an appealing and empirically rootedmethod-
ology for visualizing the multifunctional nature of grammatical categories and
for describing recurrent structural patterns in how these functions relate to each
other. Consider the following examples in which various functions of the English
preposition to are illustrated along with some corresponding examples from the
French preposition à and the German dative case (taken from Haspelmath 2003:
example 2, p. 212 and example sentences on p. 213–215):
(17) English preposition to:
a. Goethe went to Leipzig as a student. (direction)
b. Eve gave the apple to Adam. (recipient)
c. This seems outrageous to me. (experiencer)
d. I left the party early to get home in time. (purpose)
e. This dog is (mine/*to me). (predicative possessor)
d. I’ll buy a bike (for/*to) you. (beneficiary)
e. That’s too warm (for/*to) me. (dative judicantis)











‘This dog is mine.’ (predicative possessor)











‘It’s too warm for me.’ (dative judicantis)
5.5.2.2 The universality of semantic maps.
Instead of listing the various functions of a grammatical morpheme or “gram”,
semantic maps offer a
‘geometrical representation of functions in “conceptual/semantic” ’ space
that are linked by connecting lines and thus constitute a network. (Haspel-
math 2003: 213)
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Figure 5.3: This partial semantic map compares the French preposition à to the
English preposition to with respect to which typical dative functions
they cover. Non-dative functions are ignored in this map (adapted
from Haspelmath 2003: figures 8.1 and 8.2, p. 213 and 215).
Figure 5.3 gives an example of a semantic map which shows some typcal func-
tions for the dative case. This map features a network of seven nodes which
each represent a grammatical function. The Figure also illustrates that the En-
glish preposition to covers four of these functions (as was shown in example 17):
purpose, direction, recipient and experiencer. It does not cover the functions
beneficiary, predicative possessor (if prepositional verbs are not counted as in
the dog belongs to me) and dative judicantis.
Semantic maps depend crucially on cross-linguistic research. For example, a
node in the network is only added if at least one language is found which makes
the distinction. Haspelmath gives the example of direction versus recipient (p.
217). Based on English and French, which use one preposition for both functions,
this distinction could not be made. However, German uses zu or nach for direc-
tion, whereas it uses the dative case for recipient. A large sample set of languages
is therefore needed to uncover all the uses of a gram.
Another important aspect of semantic maps is the connection between nodes
in the network. The map must represent these nodes in a contiguous area on the
map. Haspelmath writes that based on the English preposition to, for example,
the following three orders could be possible for purpose, direction and recipient
(p. 217, example 4):
(20) a. purpose – direction – recipient
b. direction – purpose – recipient
c. direction – recipient – purpose
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Again, data from other languages are taken into account for choosing which
option can be eliminated. Since the French preposition à cannot be used for
marking purpose, option (b) cannot represent a contiguous space in the network.
The German preposition zu eliminates option (c) because it can express purpose
and direction, but not recipient. The direct connections between functions on
the semantic map are important because they are hypothesized to be universal:
Semantic maps not only provide an easy way of formulating and visualizing
differences and similarities between individual languages, but they can also
be seen as a powerful tool for discovering universal semantic features that
characterize the human language capacity. Once a semantic map has been
tested on a sufficiently large number of languages […] from different parts
of the world, we can be reasonably confident that it will indeed turn out to
be universal. (Haspelmath 2003: 232)
This view is shared bymany other linguists, amongwhomBill Croft. Croft’s Se-
mantic Map Connectivity Hypothesis (Croft 2001: 96) states that the functions of a
particular construction will always cover functions that are connected regions in
conceptual space. In other words, grammatical categories are language-particular,
but they are based on a universal conceptual/semantic space.
The universality of semantic maps is however an issue of debate. For example,
Cysouw (2007) reports on his attempts at making a satisfying map for person
marking. He concludes that there is no single “universal” semantic map. Instead,
different semantic maps are possible depending on the level and granularity of
the analysis. Cysouw therefore calls for using semantic maps as a tool for model-
ing attested linguistic variety and as a way to predict probable languages rather
than possible languages by weighting the function nodes in the network depend-
ing on the number of attested cases.
Cysouw thus points to a serious problem of the semantic map hypothesis:
what grain-size is acceptable for making semantic maps? For example, Haspel-
math (2003) uses functions such as “recipient” and “beneficiary” as primitive cat-
egories for his analysis. However, these functions are language-specific and no
grammatical category has been demonstrated to cover all possible instantiations
of such a function. Instead, languages tend to have many exceptions, irregular-
ities or a redundant overlap in categories that mark that function. For example,
“recipient” and “beneficiary” not only occur with the prepositions to and for re-
spectively, they can also take the first object position in the English ditransitive.
The universality hypothesis therefore faces a problem of circularity. On the
one hand, semantic maps are hypothesized to represent universal conceptual
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space; on the other hand, that conceptual space is based on an analysis which
ignores language-internal differences and irregularities, and the languages that
do not mark any differences are still assumed to have the same underlying func-
tions.
Artificial language evolution could demonstrate an alternative hypothesis to
explain the universal tendencies in grammatical marking. In problem-solving
models such as this book, grammatical evolution is a consequence of distributed
processes whereby language users shape and reshape their language. The main
challenge is therefore to find out what these processes are and under what cir-
cumstances they could create the kind of semantic maps that are observed for
human languages. The hypothesis is that these processes suffice for the emer-
gence of semantic maps and that conceptual space is dynamically configured in
co-evolution with grammar. Semantic maps of different languages will naturally
show similarities and differences depending on whether they followed the same
evolutionary pathways or not.
5.5.2.3 Prior work on concept emergence.
Asmentioned in §1.4, prior work in the field has already demonstrated how a pop-
ulation of agents could self-organize a shared ontology through communicative
interactions. Steels (1997a) reports the first experiments in which conceptualiza-
tion and lexicon emergence are coupled to each other. In the experiment, a pop-
ulation of artificial agents take turns in playing “guessing games”: the speaker
chooses one of the objects in the context to talk about and wants to draw the
hearer’s attention to it by saying a word. The game is a success if the hearer
points to the correct object. If the game fails, the speaker will point to the in-
tended topic and the hearer tries to guess what the speaker might have meant
with his word. The agents start without any language and even without an ontol-
ogy. Instead, they are equipped with several sensory channels for perceiving the
objects in their environment. At the start of a game, two agents are randomly
chosen from the population to act as a speaker and as a hearer. The speaker
chooses an object from the context to talk about and needs to conceptualize a
meaning which discriminates the topic from the other objects in the context. For
example, if the topic is a green ball and there are also three red balls in the context,
then the topic’s colour would be a good discriminating feature. At the beginning
of the experiment, the agents have no concepts yet so the speaker has to create
a new one. He will do so by taking the minimal set of features that can discrim-
inate the topic from the other objects. The speaker will then invent a new word
for this concept or meaning and transmit it to the hearer.
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The hearer will in turn experience a communicative problem: He does not
know the word that was used by the speaker. The game thus fails, but the speaker
points to the intended object. The hearer then tries to retrieve the intendedmean-
ing through the same discrimination game. Often there are many different sets
of discriminating features possible, but if the agents play a sufficient amount of
language games with each other, they come to an agreement on what the form-
meaning pairs are in their language and thus also reach a shared conceptual
space. Similar experiments have been successfully performed in the domains of
colour terms (Steels & Belpaeme 2005) and spatial language (Steels & Loetzsch
2008), and they have been scaled up to large meaning spaces (Wellens 2008).
5.5.2.4 The contribution of this book
All of the above experiments confirm that communicative success can be a driv-
ing force for constructing an ontology of meaningful distinctions and that lan-
guage can be used as a way to agree on a shared ontology among a population of
autonomous embodied artificial agents. These experiments, however, have only
focused on concept-and-lexicon emergence so far, and the systematic relations
between words have not been investigated yet. The experiments in this book,
however, have polysemous semantic roles so they form an ideal starting point
for testing the alternative hypothesis.
Figure 5.4 illustrates how analogical reasoning can be responsible for con-
structing coherent classes of semantic roles. The diagrams shows two semantic
maps for two languages that were formed in the last set-up of experiment 3 as de-
scribed in §4.5 (multi-level selection with memory decay and pattern formation).
Both diagrams show that it is possible to draw a primitive semantic map which
compares the semantic roles of both languages. For example, in one language
the marker -mepui can be used for covering four participant roles. Three of them
(grasp-1, touch-1 and take-2) overlap with a semantic role of a different language.
A similar observation counts for the two semantic roles in the second semantic
map.
A comparison of the formed artificial languages suggests that grammaticaliza-
tion processes can be visualized as a movement or change in connected regions
of a continuous domain as a side-effect of analogical reasoning: extension of
a category happens when new situations are encountered which are closely re-
lated to the existing categories. This shows that semantic maps could in principle
be the result of dynamic processes involving analogy rather than starting from
universal conceptual space.
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Figure 5.4: This diagram compares two different artificial grammars with respect
to two categories in each of them. The languages were formed using
the final set-up of experiment 3 (§4.5). Even though the agents did
not have a continuous conceptual space in advance, it is nevertheless
possible to draw a primitive semantic map afterwards.
The alternative proposed here needs further investigation and essentially re-
quires a significant scale-up in terms of the meaning space and world environ-
ment as well as the conceptualization capabilities of the agents. The present
results are however encouraging and the proposed alternative has the advantage
that it is more adaptive and open-ended to a changing environment: a univer-
sal conceptual space would still require some mechanism of mapping culture-
specific developments (such as buying and selling, driving cars, and steering
airplanes) onto a prewired structure. If the alternative hypothesis is followed,
semantic maps would thus not point to a universal map of human cognition but
rather to recurrent patterns in human experience and preferred developmental
pathways followed by dynamic categorization mechanisms.
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Figure 5.5: The alignment of case marking of full nounphrases (Comrie 2005: 98).
5.5.3 Thematic hierarchies in case systems
Many linguistic theories assume that argument linking is governed by a univer-
sal thematic hierarchy (e.g. Dik 1997; Fillmore 1968; Givón 2001; Jackendoff 1990;
Keenan & Comrie 1977). However, empirical evidence shows that such hierar-
chies can offer tendencies at best, and that they cannot be considered as innate
knowledge (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005). Even for language-specific argu-
ment linking patterns, no satisfying hierarchy has been found yet.
The question of how language systematicity can ever arise becomes a big is-
sue if no universal hierarchy can be found, especially if no Universal Grammar is
assumed. The map in Figure 5.5, for example, shows the alignment of case mark-
ing of full noun phrases across 190 languages. It clearly demonstrates strong
systematicity in the marking of “core arguments” in these languages. Comrie
(2005) distinguishes five different systems (I count the two variants of nomina-
tive-accusative systems as one):
• Neutral: the subject of intransitive clauses (S) is marked in the same way
as both the subject (A) and object (P) of transitive clauses. Example: Man-
darin.
• Nominative-accusative: A and S are marked in the same way (nominative
marking). P is marked differently (accusative marking). Example: Latvian.
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• Ergative-absolutive: S and P are marked in the same way (ergative mark-
ing), A is marked differently (absolutive marking). Example: Hunzib.
• Tripartite: S, A and P are all marked differently. Example: Hindi.
• Active-inactive: There is a different marker for an agentive S (aligning with
A) and a patientive S (aligning with P). Example: Georgian.
The answer for most linguists is again sought in universals. For example, Croft
(1998) assumes a universal conceptual space and universal linking rules for map-
ping arguments to core syntactic cases. The problem here is again that the pro-
posals only work for analyses that do not go beyond the crude representation
of case marking systems as presented in Figure 5.5. Closer studies show that
the proposed systems are again only tendencies in each language and that there
are lots of exceptions to the “default” alignment of case marking. Also the ty-
pological variation across languages is greater than suggested by the traditional
SAP-system of core arguments (Mithun 2005).
5.5.3.1 Analogy, pattern formation and multi-level selection.
In the case of thematic hierarchies, a similar alternative can be devised based
on the distributed processes whereby language users shape and reshape their
language for communication. As I argued in Chapter 3, generalization of gram-
matical categories arises as a side-effect within inferential coding systems: lan-
guage users want to increase their communicative success and when speakers
have to solve a problem or innovate, they will try to do this in such a way that
the intended communicative effect is still reached. By exploiting analogy, the
speaker can hook the new situation up to previous conventions which are prob-
ably known by the hearer as well. The hearer can then retrieve the intended
meaning through the same mechanisms of analogical reasoning.
As categories get reused more often, they increase their type frequency and
hence their productivity. An additional factor that boosts the success of such a
category is when it starts to form patterns or groups with other elements in the
inventory. A multi-level selection alignment strategy then assures that certain
categories can also survive and reoccur in multiple levels of the linguistic net-
work which again increases their frequency and chances of survival. Multi-level
selection could thus explain how different constructions align their categories
with each other as demonstrated in the map in Figure 5.5.
Preferences in argument linking, as predicted by thematic hierarchies, could
thus gradually emerge as a side-effect of these mechanisms: as certain categories
199
5 Impact on artificial language evolution and linguistic theory
become more and more dominant and productive, they can start to extend their
use across patterns and eventually evolve into prototypical subject and object
categories (as I also suggested in §1.2.6). The many subregularities that are ob-
served in languages are no problem in this model and are in fact predicted be-
cause everything has to emerge in a bottom-up fashion. Further experiments on
the emergence of syntactic cases could thus be the starting point for modeling
this alternative to thematic hierarchies.
5.5.4 A redundant approach to grammaticalization
A third debate in which artificial language evolution can offer novel insights is
grammaticalization theory. As I already mentioned in §1.2.4, one of the problems
of grammaticalization is that linguists can usually only detect language change
once the processes of grammaticalization have already taken place. It is there-
fore difficult to hypothesize what mechanisms should be proposed to explain
such changes especially since the consequences of communicative interactions
in larger populations are often overlooked. Multi-agent simulations can thus
demonstrate which mechanisms are better suited for dealing with innovations,
variations, and propagations of linguistic conventions.
5.5.4.1 Reanalysis and actualization
Diachronic reanalysis has taken a foreground position in traditional grammati-
calization theory. For example, Hopper & Traugott (1993) write: “Unquestionably,
reanalysis is the most important mechanism for grammaticalization” (p. 32). Re-
analysis is understood as a “change in the structure of an expression or class of
expressions that does not involve any immediate or intrinsic modification of its
surface manifestation” (Langacker 1977: 59). In other words, reanalysis is not no-
ticeable from the surface form but only has consequences for the grammar at a
later stage. Many theories therefore posit another mechanism called “actualiza-
tion” that maps out the consequences of reanalysis (Timberlake 1977).
Reanalysis is typically illustrated by the grammaticalization of be going to into
gonna (Hopper & Traugott 1993: 2–4). In an older use of be going to, to was part
of a purposive directional complement as in I am going to marry Bill meaning ‘I
am going/travelling in order to marry Bill’. At a later stage, to is hypothesized
to be reanalysed as belonging to be going instead of to the complement. In other
words, rebracketing of the structure has taken place from [[I] [am going] [to
marry Bill]] to [[I] [am going to] [marry Bill]].
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Reanalysis has recently been challenged. Haspelmath (1998) writes that reanal-
ysis does not entail a loss of autonomy which is typical for grammaticalization
and that grammaticalization is (almost exclusively) unidirectional instead of bidi-
rectional as predicted by reanalysis. Haspelmath also rejects the combination of
reanalysis with actualization which is often used as a way to assign gradualness
to reanalysis (p. 340–341). Actualization makes “reanalysis” as a mechanism im-
possible to verify and it requires speakers to know at least two analyses of the
same construction to account for both the old and the new behaviour. Actual-
ization also does not explain how innovations might propagate. Haspelmath’s
comparison of “grammaticalization” and “reanalysis” is summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: This table shows the major differences between grammaticalization
and reanalysis (Haspelmath 1998: 327, Table 1).
Grammaticalization Reanalysis
loss of autonomy / substance no loss of autonomy / substance
gradual abrupt
unidirectional bidirectional
no ambiguity ambiguity in the input structure
due to language use due to language acquisition
Despite the problems of reanalysis, it seems hard to conceive an alternative
process that could explain certain changes. Haspelmath suggests that formal
theories should implement the gradience of membership of word classes in some
way such as “V1.0 for ordinary verbs, V.7/P.3 for preposition-like verbs (e.g. consid-
ering) and so on” (p. 330). Even though gradience is indeed an important matter,
such a proposal cannot capture the fact that the old use of a linguistic item and
its new function can co-exist for hundreds of years in a language. The alterna-
tive that I would propose is redundancy and pattern formation along the lines of
my example for French predicate negation in Chapter 4. Applied to the example
of gonna, this alternative would simply state that the frequent co-occurrence of
the words be going to led to the creation of a pattern for optimizing linguistic
processing. Once this pattern is created, it may start evolving on its own which
allows it to gradually drift away from the original use of the words.
201
5 Impact on artificial language evolution and linguistic theory
5.5.4.2 Example: the English verbal gerund.
To illustrate this alternative approach, I will briefly take a look at the English
verbal gerund which historically developed from a deverbal nominalization and
which later acquired more and more verbal properties. I will show examples of
this development taken from Fanego (2004) and summarize how he describes this
grammaticalization process in terms of “reanalysis” and “actualization”. Next, I
will argue for a simpler model based on redundancy and pattern formation.
The English gerund is a unique category in European languages in the sense
that it is a third type of verbal complement besides to-infinitives (example 21)
and finite clauses (22). The present-day English gerund has the following verbal
properties: it can take a direct object (23), it can be modified by adverbs (24),
it can mark tense, aspect and voice distinctions (25), it can be negated using
the predicate negator not (26) and it can take a subject in a case other than the
genitive (27).
(21) I just called to say ‘I love you’.
(22) Just tell him we’re not interested anymore.
(23) By writing a book, he managed to face all his inner demons.
(24) My quietly leaving before anyone noticed.
(25) The necessity of being loved is a driving force in our lives.
(26) My not leaving the room caused a stir.
(27) We should prevent the treaty taking effect.
Studies on the emergence and evolution of the gerund suggest that it developed
from a deverbal nominalization construction, similar to phrases such as the writ-
ing of a book (Tajima 1985). This nominalization lacked the aforementioned verbal
properties, which can be illustrated with a similar nominalization construction
in Dutch: example 28 shows that the nominalized bewerking “adaptation” can-
not be complemented by a direct object (as is possible with the English gerund).
Instead, it requires the genitival preposition van ‘of’ (a). Example (c) shows that
speakers of Dutch need to combine a prepositional noun phrase with some kind











‘the adaptation of the play’
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‘by adapting the play’
From this kind of deverbal nominalization, the English gerund probably evolved
according to the following steps (Tajima (1985); summary and examples taken
from Fanego (2004)):
1. Around 1200, the deverbal nominalization -ing began taking adverbialmod-
ifiers of all kinds:
(29) Of þi comyng at domesday
‘Of your coming at doomsday.’
2. The first examples with direct objects have been attested around 1300.
(30) yn feblyng þe body with moche fastyng
‘in weakening the body by too much abstinence’
3. In the Early Modern English period, other verbal features are increasingly
found, such as distinctions of voice and tense. From Late Modern English
on, gerunds also start to take subjects:
(31) he was war of hem comyng and of here malice
‘he was informed of them coming and of their wickedness’
Fanego (2004) argues that these changes are best understood as reanalysis of a
nominal structure to a (more) verbal one (p. 26). This requires the speaker’s abil-
ity to recognize multiple structural analyses since the “old” and the “new” use
co-existed for a long time. The following examples show how the nominal anal-
ysis and the more verbal structure could be used together around 1300, whereas
nowadays the nominal structure is unacceptable unless there is a determiner:
(32) Sain Jon was … bisi In ordaining of priestes, and clerkers, And in
planning kirc werkes.
‘Saint John was … busy ordaining priests and clerics, and in planning
church works.’
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(33) the ordaining of priests / the planning of works
(34) ordaining priests / planning works
(35) *ordaining of priests / *planning of works
In order to account for the gradualness of the change, Fanego suggests a reanalysis-
plus-actualizationmodel. He acknowledges Haspelmath (1998)’s criticism on this
model that it is still not gradual enough and he proposes that the gerund should
be regarded as a hybrid category which is partly noun and partly verb. To sum-
marize, Fanego suggests that the development of the various uses of the English
gerund involved (a) reanalysis and (b) actualization using Haspelmath’s proposal
for gradient categories.
5.5.4.3 Problems with Fanego’s account.
Fanego’s analysis of the development of English requires complex cognitive oper-
ations from the part of the speaker that do not seem entirely justified. First of all,
in order to reconcile reanalysis with the data, he needs to call on the process of
actualization. However, as Haspelmath (1998) already noted, actualization “wa-
ters down the notion of reanalysis, because it allows one to posit non-manifested
reanalysis as one pleases” (p. 341). It also seems contradictory to propose reanal-
ysis, which is essentially an abrupt and discrete process, together with Haspel-
math’s gradient categories. Mechanisms such as semantic bleaching, analogy
and extension could explain a gradual shift from a nominal category to a more
verb-like category just as well without evoking reanalysis.
A second problem has to dowith the idea of a gradient category, that is, analyz-
ing the gerund as some hybrid category which is let’s say 20% nominal and 80%
verbal. This kind of analysis treats the Gerund as a single category in the gram-
mar whereas Fanego himself distinguishes at least three different types existing
today, each with their own particular syntactic behaviours:
• Type 1: gerunds lacking determiners (e.g. by writing it)
• Type 2: gerunds taking determiners (e.g. the writing of the letter)
• Type 3: verbal gerund (e.g. the people living in this town)
5.5.4.4 A model based on redundancy
Reanalysis is a mechanism which is based on mismatches in learning. In the case
of the English gerund, Fanego writes that the first gerunds to take verbal traits
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were the ones occurring in constructions without determiners (p. 19–20). How-
ever, the lack of determiners is in itself not necessarily a reason for reanalyzing
a grammatical structure, especially since determiners were not at all obligatory
in many noun phrases in Old and Middle English (Traugott 1992: 172–174). One
can therefore reverse the question and ask why some uses of the gerund resisted
the spread of determiners. In other words: is there a functional explanation for
the development of the gerund?
A first step in the alternative hypothesis is to accept redundancy: language
users store many instances in memory so rather than looking for a single cate-
gory which leads to multiple structural analyses, speakers are assumed to store
many instances in memory. Actual change in the system only takes place if one
of these redundant instances gets extended. No layering or complex mechanisms
for disambiguity are needed since there are still enough instances left that cover
the older use of a particular form. Redundancy thus requires a far more simple
cognitive model than the reanalysis-and-actualization approach and treats each
use of the gerund as a construction in its own right.
Instead of reanalysis and mismatches in learning, the alternative hypothesis
assumes that some patterns or instances extend their usage for a communicative
reason. Fanego lists several possible sources (p. 11–17): first of all, the -ing-form
of nominalizations was in competition with the Old English present participle
-ende (which still exists in Dutch, for example). -ing became dominant by the
fifteenth century and thus increased its frequency. Along with this competition,
the productivity of -ing also increased from a limited number of verbs to an al-
most fully productive schema. A third possible source could be the fact that the
English to-infinitive has resisted the combinations with other prepositions than
to and for to. This created a gap in the usage of the infinitive which could be
filled by the gerund (or conversely, the expansion of the gerund prevented the
infinitive from filling this gap itself). Other sources are influences from French
and the co-occurrence of the gerund with a genitive phrase.
The point here is not to find the source for the development of the English
gerund but rather to illustrate that many possible sources can be identified and
that they all probably played some role. It is therefore fruitful to see language as a
selectionist system in which all linguistic items compete for a place in the inven-
tory. Due to multi-level selection, categories can become more dominant across
patterns which is what seemed to have happened with the gerund: it increased
its productivity, won the competition against -ende for marking participles and
hence became more frequent and successful.
Haspelmath (1998) also criticized reanalysis for failing to explain the strong
unidirectional tendency of grammaticalization. In a system of multi-level selec-
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tion, this could be explained due to the fact that once linguistic items become part
of larger patterns or occur in multiple constructions, they are no longer fully in-
dependent of those constructions. The benefit of belonging to larger groups is
that each item’s individual survival chances increase, but the possible downside
could be that the original use becomes structurally ambiguous or that it loses
its distinctiveness. This would weaken its position and leaves the possibility for
other items to conquer its space. In other words, there are always two factors
influencing survival of a linguistic item: frequency and function.
5.5.4.5 Back to the computational model
The above analysis is only an illustration of how computational modeling could
inspire linguists to come upwith alternative hypotheses. The grammaticalization
model of redundancy that I presented here mainly comes from the observation
that variation in a population is an extremely challenging problem and that it is
very difficult for a population to reach a shared and coherent language without
losing generalization accuracy. Moreover, the design stance can offer mecha-
nisms and operationalizations that are simpler than the processes that are often
proposed in verbal theories.
That said, the experiments presented in this book have not yet offered any
proof that an analysis such as the one proposed here can actually work. How-
ever, they did show that a redundant and bottom-up approach can deal with high
degrees of uncertainty in the development of a grammar whereas no such model
exists (yet) for reanalysis. The comparison between the Iterated Learning Model
(which essentially relies on reanalysis) and this book has shown that a usage-
based approach performs significantly better than a reanalysis model. This does
not mean that reanalysis does not exist or that it cannot be operationalized, but




This book is a trimmed version ofmy doctoral dissertation inwhich I investigated
how case systemsmay emerge as the consequence of locally situated interactions
in a population of autonomous artificial agents that shape and reshape their lan-
guage in order to optimize their communicative success (van Trijp 2008a). When
I submitted my thesis, I felt that I had just finished the first part of a longer saga,
and the past six years have proven that feeling to be right. This postscriptum
therefore summarizes the directions that my research has taken since 2008.
Fluid Construction Grammar
If there is one important aspect that sets the experiments in this book apart
from previous experiments in artificial language evolution, it is the fact that they
are more strongly connected to empirical evidence of real-life language evolu-
tion. Earlier experiments typically involved abstract models, whereas I reverse-
engineered a processing model of English argument structure constructions in
Fluid Construction Grammar. This methodological innovation1 ensures that the
agents have sufficiently sophisticated representation and processing techniques
for handling linguistic structures of natural language-like complexity, and it of-
fers a “target structure” that helps the experimenter to identify adequate learning
and innovation operators. It also led to the first computational and bidirectional
construction grammar implementation of argument structure (van Trijp 2008b),
which demonstrates that it is perfectly feasible to operationalize constructional
analyses in a formally precise way.
The formalization of argument structure in this book stretched the expressive
power of the “2005–2007-implementation” of FCG. My colleagues and I therefore
1 I do not claim to be the inventor of this innovation: the choice of reverse-engineering an actual
languagewas in the first placemade possible by the vision of Luc Steels, who realized that more
sophisticated language technologies were required for moving the field of artificial language
evolution forward (Steels 2004a), and by my colleagues (particularly Joachim De Beule, Martin
Loetzsch, Michael Spranger and PieterWellens) who further developed Steels’ implementation
into the FCG-system and experimental framework that support the experiments in this book
(Loetzsch et al. 2008a).
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came together in a groundbreaking FCGworkshop in Ellezelles (Belgium, 30 June
– 4 July 2008) in which almost all of FCG’s present-day features were devised
and implemented.2 FCG is now regarded as an innovative and mature grammar
formalism (van Trijp 2013a) that has been applied for reverse-engineering gram-
mars of English, French, Russian, German, Hungarian, Polish, Spanish, and so on
(Steels 2011; 2012; Steels & Hild 2012). Many of those grammars have served as
a basis for understanding the evolution of intricate phenomena such as colours
(Bleys 2011), spatial terms (Spranger 2011) and quantifiers (Pauw 2013).
The increased expressive power of FCG has allowed me to tackle many non-
trivial problems concerning argument structure and language processing. First
of all, this book’s proposal for handling argument structure has turned out to be a
recurrent “design pattern” for argument realization and has been further refined
by van Trijp (2011a). The implementation has been extended with solutions for
feature indeterminacy and ambiguity (van Trijp 2011c), and long-distance depen-
dencies (van Trijp 2014b); and it has been grounded on humanoid robots (Steels
et al. 2012). I have also been particularly concerned with fluid and robust lan-
guage processing (Steels & van Trijp 2011), integrating diagnostics and repairs
in the FCG-system (Beuls, van Trijp & Wellens 2012) and exploring reflective
architectures for open-ended processing (van Trijp 2012a).
Artificial language evolution
Most experiments in artificial language evolution involve direct one-to-one map-
pings between meaning and form. The experiments reported in this book have
significantly pushed the state-of-the-art by showing how polysemous categories
may emerge in a multi-agent population (for more recent results, see van Trijp
2010a; 2011b; 2012d,e). Moreover, the experiments have identified multi-level se-
lection as a crucial step in the transition from lexical to grammatical languages.
The relation between multi-level selection and language systematicity has been
explored in more detail by van Trijp & Steels (2012).
The experiments have also taken an exciting turn in recent years by applying
the model to real-life language phenomena, which is made possible thanks to
the aforementioned advances in Fluid Construction Grammar. The first experi-
ment of this kind is presented by van Trijp (2010b), who investigates an ongoing
evolution in the pronoun system of Spanish. More specifically, the experiment
2 The workshop participants included Luc Steels, Joris Bleys, Thomas Cederborg, Pascal
Costanza, Joachim De Beule, Katja Gerasymova, Martin Loetzsch, Vanessa Micelli, Simon
Pauw, Michael Spranger, Pieter Wellens and myself.
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demonstrates how a population of language users are able to shift a case-based
system of pronouns to a gender-based system without loss in communicative
success (despite competing variants in the population).
Another recent case study focuses onGerman definite articles (van Trijp 2012c,b;
2013b; 2014a), which are notorious for their case syncretism (i.e. the same form
maps ontomultiple, often conflicting functions). These syncretic forms have long
been regarded as non-systematic, historical accidents. The agent-based models
however demonstrate that the system of definite articles has evolved to become
easier to process by comparing a reverse-engineered processing model of the
current German grammar to a model of its oldest attested historical predecessor
(Old High German).
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Appendix: Measures
The simulations reported in this thesis make use of a number of measures for
assessing the progress made during the experiments. This appendix collects and
explains them all both in order to provide the reader with a clear understanding
of what is being measured and in order to provide the research community with
clear definitions of measures for future experiments.
Communicative success
Communicative success as a local measure. Communicative success can bemea-
sured by the agents themselves and it can influence their linguistic behaviour. In
the description games played in the experiments in this thesis, a game is a suc-
cess if the hearer signals agreement with the speaker’s description and a failure
if the hearer signals disagreement. The hearer will agree if interpretation yields
a single set of bindings between the parsed meaning and the facts in the mem-
ory. The hearer will disagree if interpretation is ambiguous (i.e. more than one
hypothesis was returned) or if interpretation failed.
Plotting communicative success. Communicative success can also be plotted
for a series of interactions by recording the success or failure of every language
game. This is a global measure which is not observable by the agents themselves
and thus has no influence on their linguistic behaviour. Each successful game is
counted as 1 and each failed game is counted as 0. The sum of these results is
then divided by the size of a certain interval into a single number between 0 and
1. The interval in all the reported simulations is set to 10.



















Cognitive effort as a local measure. Local cognitive effort is defined in this the-
sis as the number of inferences the hearer has to make during interpretation (i.e.
the number of variables that need to be made equal). Since the event types in the
simulations take a maximum of three participant roles, this measure ranges from
0 to 3. This number is recalculated onto a scale between 0 and 1 by taking the
effort and dividing it by the maximum number of inferences (which is 3). One
inference thus returns 0.33, two inferences 0.66 and three inferences 1. Failed
language games count as 1, which is the maximum effort score. The agents use
cognitive effort as one of the triggers for expanding their language.
Plotting cognitive effort. Cognitive effort can be plotted for a series of inter-
actions by recording the hearer’s effort during each interaction. Again, this is
a global measure which is only accessible for the experimenter but not for the
agents themselves. Aswith communicative success, cognitive effort in each game
returns a value between 0 and 1. Global cognitive effort is measured by dividing
the sum of the results by the size of a certain interval (which here is 10). This
returns a measure between 0 and 1. In the following formulae CGi stands for
















The average preferred lexicon is used by various measures in this thesis. This
lexicon is derived by taking the most frequent form for every possible meaning
in the population. For example, if six agents in a population of ten prefer the
marker -bo for the participant role ‘move-1’ as opposed to four agents that prefer
themarker -ka, then -bo is listed in the average preferred lexiconwith a frequency
of 0.6. This lexicon is calculated for each individual participant role and for each
possible combination of participant roles. For the experiments in this thesis, the
complete meaning space of participant roles consists of the following meanings
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50. give-1 give-2 give-3
51. take-1 take-2 take-3
Meaning-form coherence
Meaning-form coherence is a globalmeasurewhich is not accessible to the agents.
It takes the most frequent form for a particular meaning (i.e. the form which is
preferred by most agents in the population) from the average preferred lexicon.
For example, if the marker -bo is preferred by six agents in a population of ten
agents, it is listed in the preferred average lexicon with a frequency score of 0.6.
Meaning-form coherence calculates the average of all these individual frequency
scores:
MF coherence =
sum of all frequency scores in preferred average lexicon
number of entries in preferred average lexicon
Systematicity
Systematicity is again a global measure which is not accessible to the agents. It
is calculated by taking each meaning in the average preferred lexicon and com-
paring it to the combinations of meanings in which it occurs. If the combination
uses the same marker as the relevant meaning, then a score of 1 is counted. If it is
not, a score of 0 is counted. The sum of all these scores is divided by the number
of meanings that had to be checked in the average lexicon, which yields a score
between 0 (no systematicity) and 1 (maximum systematicity).
For example, suppose that the meaning ‘appear-1’ is most frequently marked
by -bo, ‘appear-2’ by -ka and the combination of the two as -bo -si. First we take
‘appear-1’ and check whether its marker also occurs in the combination with
appear-2: this is indeed the case so the form-meaning mapping is systematic in
both constructions, which is counted as ‘1’. For appear-2, however, the pattern
uses a different marker -si so no systematic relation exists across patterns, which
is counted as 0. The combination itself does not occur in a larger pattern so it is
not considered by the systematicity measure.
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The evolution of case grammar
There are few linguistic phenomena that have seduced linguists so skill-
fully as grammatical case has done. Ever since Pāṇini (4th Century BCE),
case has claimed a central role in linguistic theory and continues to do so
today. However, despite centuries worth of research, case has yet to reveal
its most important secrets.
This book offers breakthrough explanations for the understanding of
case through agent-based experiments in cultural language evolution. The
experiments demonstrate that case systemsmay emerge because they have
a selective advantage for communication: they reduce the cognitive effort
that listeners need for semantic interpretation, while at the same time lim-
iting the cognitive resources required for doing so.
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